point — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Point III. On the Causes of Dispensing

185.

I. Distinction of causes. The final or motive cause and the impulsive cause are distinguished. The final cause is generally said to be one which suffices by itself alone; the impulsive cause is one which alone does not suffice, but nevertheless helps toward obtaining the dispensation. Several impulsive causes sometimes constitute a sufficient cause. Special points concerning these, however, belong in the treatise on Matrimony.

186.

II. Necessity of a just cause. 1. The legislator, his successor, and his superior dispense validly but illicitly without a just cause (can. 84, § 1). The reason for the former is that, just as law in coming to be depends on the will of the legislator, so also it depends on it in persisting. The reason for the latter is that a legislator dispensing without a just cause would present himself as an acceptor of persons and would give occasion to complaints, by exempting one without cause from a law while others were bound by it (St. Alphonsus, I, 178).

  1. An inferior dispenses illicitly and invalidly without a just cause in the law of a superior (can. 84, § 1). The reason is that the legislator is not considered to have granted the faculty of dispensing unjustly.

Corollary I. A legislator who dispenses without a just cause of himself sins only venially, but an inferior sins gravely, unless smallness of matter excuses. This follows from the fact that disordered use of a power which someone possesses is of itself only lightly evil, but usurpation of a power which someone lacks, setting aside smallness of matter, is gravely illicit (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary II. If a superior errs concerning the cause, the dispensation is valid if the cause in fact exists. If it certainly does not exist, of itself it is invalid, because one dispensing who can dispense without a just cause is not presumed to have wished this; but an inferior cannot even do that (St. Alphonsus, I, 180, 181; III, 25). I said of itself, because the legislator can establish that some dispensations are always valid, as he has established concerning dispensations from lesser impediments of Matrimony (can. 1054); namely, besides the fact that in lesser impediments of this sort some cause is easily had, such a disposition conduces to order and to tranquillity of souls. Therefore in these dispensations too at least the reason of the common good is found. Finally, if it is doubted whether the cause existed, one must stand for the validity of the act (St. Alphonsus, I, 182).

187.

III. Diverse just causes. There are customarily numbered: piety, necessity, and utility. Indeed the dignity of the petitioner, or the kindness of the superior to be shown, can also be a sufficient cause (St. Alphonsus, I, 198). Of itself a graver cause is required according as the law is graver (can. 84, § 1), and according as the damage arising to the common good from the dispensation is graver. Of course, a cause which of itself excuses from the law is not required. Besides, observe:

  1. In doubt about the sufficiency of the cause, a dispensation is granted validly and licitly (can. 84, § 2), and this even by an inferior. Likewise a dispensation is licitly sought in doubt about the sufficiency of the cause (can. 84, § 2; St. Alphonsus, I, 178).

  2. When a just cause is present, the superior is held to dispense as follows:

a) "If the cause is only sufficient so that the dispensation is permitted, but not owed, the superior can licitly grant it and deny it, or grant it to one and deny it to another; because although a dispensation is expedient for the good of the subject, the observance of law is expedient for the common good."

b) "But if the cause is such that it makes the dispensation owed, namely for avoiding common damage or private damage of great moment, or for common utility, or great particular utility... then the superior is held to dispense; otherwise he would sin gravely or lightly according to the matter. Yet if the dispensation is denied, even unjustly, the subject cannot act against the law, unless such a cause urges that it withdraws him from the law, that is, excuses him from it. Wherefore, if a bishop unjustly denies a dispensation from the publications before Matrimony, the Matrimony can, when a grave cause urges, be contracted without them" (St. Alphonsus, I, 179).

What if the faculty of dispensing someone is conferred upon a person, and the motive cause has ceased before the dispensation has been granted or obtained?

Response. In the case, the dispensation granted would be invalid, because the superior of himself is not considered to confer the faculty of dispensing in the case in which the motive cause has ceased. I said of himself, because the Superior can proceed otherwise, and sometimes does proceed otherwise, as will be explained in the treatise on Matrimony (St. Alphonsus, VI, 132; cf. can. 41).