§ 2. On the Causes of Dispensation.

185. Necessity of a cause. If a dispensation is sought, the causes of the dispensation must be alleged. These causes must be proportionate to the gravity of the law; but which causes are sufficient must be left to the prudent judgment of the one dispensing. Nevertheless they must not be so grave that of themselves they excuse from the law: for in this case there would be no need of dispensation.

It can happen that a law, on account of some impeding cause, either certainly or probably no longer obliges; not only in the first case, but also in this second case, there is no need of dispensation, since the obligation of the law ceases without dispensation. But if impeding causes stand in the way of the law which indeed of themselves do not excuse from the obligation of the law, but which nevertheless certainly or at least probably suffice for the superior to be able to dispense, there is need of dispensation.

Whether a superior, when a just cause exists, ought to dispense.

1. Dispensation, when a just cause exists, is sometimes due either from precept or from justice.

The cases in which dispensation is due are usually enumerated as these: a. if common law or a particular precept requires that dispensation be given on account of that cause; b. if it is necessary for the common good, in which case (legal) justice requires that dispensation be given; thus on account of the necessity of the Church, dispensation from interstices can be due; c. if it is necessary for the spiritual good of the petitioner, for which cause dispensation in vows can be due; d. if it is necessary for averting grave damage or public scandal; thus dispensation from the proclamations of marriage can be due.

2. Once dispensation has been denied, even if this was done unjustly, it is not lawful to act against the law. But if it has been denied by an inferior, recourse to the superior is clearly open; and if the superior also has denied it, the law must be observed, unless the difficulty of observation is so great that it excuses of itself from observing the law.

186. Distinction of causes. 1. The causes of dispensation are some internal, which arise from the difficulty of observing the law itself, as if persons are dispensed from fasting on account of weakness;¹ others external, which arise from circumstances of the person to be dispensed or of the person dispensing, or from the common good.

Some laws, as e.g. the law of integrity in confession, are so constituted that by their nature they have great difficulty; this difficulty in a particular case does not excuse from the observance of the law. Other laws, as e.g. the law of fasting, likewise by their nature have some difficulty, but not so great. But if in a particular case this difficulty is great, it is joined accidentally with the observance of the law, even if it is internal, and therefore it excuses from the observance of the law (n. 139).

a. External causes of dispensing are the dignity of the petitioner or of the superior, common or private utility, the payment of money for the utility of the Church. And certainly dispensation is customarily granted to reward the merit of some person, so that a person may be bound to the Church, to provide for the necessity or utility of a person, to show liberality or benignity on the part of the legislator, etc.

b. But if sometimes a dispensation is said to be granted without cause, this must be understood without an internal cause, or without another external cause besides the payment of money. Namely, where another external cause of dispensing seems to be lacking, for the dispensation an alms is imposed to be spent on a pious work, by which the good of the Church is promoted. In this case the utility of the Church is the cause of dispensing.

2. The causes of dispensation are some motive (final), which of themselves suffice for granting a dispensation, others impulsive, which of themselves do not suffice for granting a dispensation, but nevertheless help the motive causes, so that the dispensation may be granted more easily. Therefore if the former did not exist, the superior would not have dispensed; but if the latter did not exist, he nevertheless would have dispensed.

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 195.

187. Principles. 1. He who dispenses by proper power can validly dispense even without a cause, because the obligation of the law depends altogether upon his will; but he who dispenses by vicarious power cannot validly dispense without a cause: for the superior is not judged to concede to an inferior the faculty of dispensing without a just cause (n. 181).

2. For dispensing licitly, a cause certainly or at least probably sufficient is always required. He who dispenses by proper power without cause commits the vice of acceptance of persons, and therefore does not sin gravely unless perhaps by reason of scandal or damage to others; but he who dispenses by vicarious power without cause can sin gravely in grave matter, because he abuses the power conceded to him. In doubt whether the cause suffices, not only the legislator himself but also the legislator's inferior grants the dispensation both validly and licitly; otherwise too great a burden would be imposed on the superior.

If an inferior dispensing in the law of a superior through error thinks that the cause is sufficient, the dispensation is valid: for in doubtful cases concerning the sufficiency of a cause the power of dispensing validly has been conceded, even if the cause in reality is not sufficient, lest scruples concerning the value of dispensations be able to arise. But if through error he thinks that a cause is present when in reality none is present, the dispensation is invalid.

3. In order that a dispensation be valid, it is required that at least one motive cause be true, and indeed at the time at which the dispensation is granted; for the dispensation is granted on this condition: if the prayers rest upon truth, because the superior is not judged to wish to dispense without cause, even if of himself he could do so. Nevertheless, the exaggeration of a cause otherwise true does not render the dispensation invalid.

a. It suffices that the cause be true at the time at which the dispensation is granted, even if it is not true at the time at which it is sought: for the prayers rest upon truth when the dispensation is granted. Whether it must also be true at the time at which the action is placed, for the licit placing of which the dispensation was obtained, depends both upon the law itself and upon the intention of the one dispensing, as will be clear from what is to be said below.

b. A dispensation is invalid if the cause is indeed true at the time at which it is sought, but not at the time at which the dispensation is granted, because the prayers do not rest upon truth. It makes no difference whether falsehood has crept into the petition in good or bad faith.

c. Likewise a dispensation is invalid if the cause is not true at the time at which it is sought and granted, but is true at the time at which the dispensation is communicated: for what does not subsist from the beginning is not strengthened by the passage of time.

4. Not only he who dispenses without cause, but also he who seeks dispensation without cause, acts illicitly, because he induces the one dispensing to an illicit thing; nevertheless he who uses a valid dispensation illicitly sought does not sin: for he who has been validly dispensed is not bound to observe the law. In doubt whether the cause suffices, it is lawful to seek dispensation; otherwise too great a burden would be imposed on subjects, since doubts of this kind, which cannot be solved, frequently occur.