The Consent of Parents

873. State of the question. (A) It is certain that the consent of parents is not required for the validity of the sacrament of Matrimony; for Trent declared this, against the Protestants, striking with anathema those who "falsely affirm that marriages contracted by children of a family without the consent of parents are void, and that parents can make them ratified or void."³ For children of a family, even minors, provided they are pubescent and enjoy the use of reason, have power over their own body in order to marriage, and therefore validly can, even against the will of their parents, hand this power over to others through marriage. Hence Trent did not wish to agree to the request of the King of France, who wanted marriages of children entered against the will of parents to be held as invalid.

² Sanchez, lib. IV, c. 23; St. Alphonsus, n. 849-850; Carrière, n. 443-452; Kenrick, 41-42; Gasparri, n. 485-488; Génicot, n. 514-516; Vantroys, Étude historique et juridique sur le consentement des parents au mariage de leurs enfants, Paris, 1899.

³ Sess. XXIV, de Reformat. Matr., cap. I.

(B) Therefore the question is concerning the liceity of contracting marriage without consulting parents or against their will, and also concerning the mutual duties and rights of parents and children in this matter. Now St. Alphonsus (n. 849) sets forth four opinions: the first teaches that children of a family sin lethally if they enter marriage, whether parents have not been consulted or are unwilling;⁴ the second says that they are held under mortal sin to seek the counsel of parents, but not to follow it;⁵ the third holds that they sin only venially if they contract whether parents have not been consulted or are unwilling;⁶ the fourth distinguishes: if parents are trying to turn a son away from every marriage, with danger of incontinence, he is not held to obey; otherwise, if parents justly impede.⁷

⁴ Pontius, l. II, c. I, n. 26; Sylvius, Supplem., p. 47, a. 6, concl. 4, etc.

⁵ Sanchez, l. IV, disp. 23, n. 10; Laymann, p. I, c. I, n. 14; etc.

⁶ Salmant., c. VI, n. 22; Sporer, n. 206; etc.

⁷ Lacroix, n. 570, with the authors there cited.

What seems more probable to us the following rules will declare.

874. Rule 1: Per se, minor children sin gravely who contract espousals or marriage with parents wholly unconsulted.

For such a manner of acting is opposed to the reverence due to parents, since it brings with it a certain contempt in a grave matter; and also to prudence, which demands that the counsel of parents be sought in a matter which, because of the affinity contracted, contributes to the temporal good, peace, happiness, and honor of the whole family.

It is said per se, because per accidens this omission is free either from every fault, or at least from mortal fault, according to various circumstances:

(a) There is no fault if there is a grave and just cause, for example if the son is far away, and cannot easily seek the counsel of the parents, or if it is prudently feared lest they unjustly impede the nuptials; in this case, however, one must beware of illusions.

(b) Likewise there is no fault if espousals are contracted under the condition that the parents consent, or with the intention and hope of obtaining their consent to the nuptials at a more opportune time.

(c) There will be only slight fault if it is prudently judged that the parents care little about this, because they are little solicitous concerning those things which pertain to the children, provided their own tranquillity is not disturbed. - Hence in practice attention must be paid to the customs of places and to the relations existing between parents and children.

875. Rule 2. Per se, children are not held, strictly speaking, to obey parents in order to marriage. For in all things which pertain to the choice of a state, they now do not depend on parents, but are truly of their own right; therefore, provided they have reverently sought the counsel of parents, they are not held, by the command of parents, to embrace the matrimonial state rather than the celibate state or religious life, nor to marry this person rather than that one; parents indeed can use persuasion in this, but not precept.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 104, a. 5; Supplem., q. 47, a. 6.

Yet per accidens parents could command that a son or daughter enter marriage, if this were the only means for relieving their grave poverty; or forbid that a daughter marry a young man ruined in morals or impious; for in these and similar cases, children are already held to perform this, since parents do nothing except urge the fulfillment of a natural precept.

876. Rule 3. Parents per se sin gravely when they absolutely deny consent to children desiring to enter a suitable marriage. For thus they unjustly affect them with grave sorrow, stand in the way of their happiness, scatter seeds of discords, and expose the children to the danger of sinning basely.

It is said per se; because, if from the marriage to be contracted very grave scandals or hatreds are foreseen, because, for example, there is excessive inequality of the betrothed, or the union tends to the damage of an honorable family, they have a just cause of dissenting. Yet it is not sufficient, for denying consent, that one of the betrothed be of mediocre condition, since this can be compensated by other qualities.

Nor per se are parents excused from fault because of civil law, which in some regions grants them the faculty of denying consent;¹ for human law cannot confer privileges contrary to divine law. Nevertheless some, because of civil law, are in good faith, and can be left in it, if it is prudently feared lest they resist the priest admonishing them.

¹ In Gaul, a son and daughter, until they have completed the twenty-first year, need the consent of parents: if these disagree, the father's consent suffices; if one of the parents is dead, or incapable of giving consent, the consent of the other suffices; when father and mother are dead, grandfathers and grandmothers succeed to their rights in this matter; if both lines disagree, that dissent is equivalent to consent. Cf. Cod. civ., art. 148-160, and law of June 21, 1907 (Dalloz, Mariage, 9 sq.)

All these things agree sufficiently with can. 1034: "Let the pastor gravely exhort minor children of a family not to enter nuptials without the knowledge of parents, or when parents are reasonably unwilling; but if they refuse, let him not assist at their marriage, unless the local Ordinary has first been consulted."

In most States of the United States of America, minors indeed contract validly, provided they are pubescent, but illicitly, unless the consent of parents given in writing or orally accedes; and in some States, not only the delinquents, but also the ministers before whom the nuptials are entered, are fined with various penalties. Cf. Bishop, op. cit., § 551-559. - Here it is worthwhile to note with Kenrick (n. 44) that children of a family, to whose marriage parents unjustly do not wish to consent, can licitly evade the civil laws by betaking themselves to another State; but it is not licit for them by a false oath or false witnesses to declare that they have reached the years of majority.

S. Th., Suppl. q. 45, a. 1 and 3; q. 48, a. 1.

796. General principle. Consent of the parties, externally expressed unto matrimony concerning the present, is the efficient cause of matrimony itself and is so necessary that it could be supplied by no human power (can. 1081, § 1). - It is certain from the Council of Florence, from the epistle of Pius VI, July 11, 1789, and from the encyclical of Pius XI Casti connubii.

It is said: 1° consent of the parties externally expressed by words concerning the present, by which they mutually receive each other here and now as spouses: for consent concerning the future does not make matrimony, but only a promise of matrimony, or betrothals;

2° is the efficient cause of matrimony itself, namely, in fact, or of the conjugal bond, if nevertheless the consent is accompanied by the due conditions; but it is not the cause of matrimony in becoming, which formally is nothing except the consent of the parties externally expressed;

3° is necessary: for the conjugal bond does not arise except from a contract (n. 748), which is nothing except mutual consent;

4° so that it could be supplied by no human power: for no human authority has force to hand over dominion of the body of the man to the woman, or of the woman to the man, because it does not have direct power over the body and life of subjects.

It is proved: 1° From this, that in matrimony there is a mutual handing over of bodies: the things which belong to one person are not handed over to another without his own consent. Therefore matrimony, in which there is a handing over of bodies, does not exist without mutual consent.

And indeed: Matrimony, as contract and as sacrament, consists of matter and form, which consist in the mutual external handing over and acceptance of the right to the body, or in words or signs expressing consent with respect to that handing over and acceptance. Whence St. Thomas, q. 45, a. 1: "One person does not receive power over that which is freely another's except through his consent. But through matrimony each of the spouses receives power over the body of the other, as is clear from I Cor. VII, since before this each had free power over his own body. Therefore consent makes matrimony."

2° From this, that matrimony is constituted by contract: A contract without mutual consent cannot even be understood, for every contract is a certain mutual pact, or the consent of two or more persons in the same agreed thing. Since, therefore, matrimony is constituted by contract, consent is wholly necessary for constituting matrimony. But if other contracts are not made without mutual consent, therefore matrimony is so by parity.

3° From this, that matrimony is a sacrament, in which a spiritual conjunction is signified and obtained through the mediation of the material conjunction of the contract, as St. Thomas explains, q. 45, a. 1:

"In all the sacraments there is some spiritual operation, through the mediation of a material operation which signifies it; as through bodily washing in Baptism an interior spiritual washing is made. Whence, since in matrimony there is a certain spiritual conjunction, insofar as matrimony is a sacrament, and a certain material one, according as it is unto the office of nature and of civil life, it must be that the spiritual is made by divine power through the mediation of the material. Whence, since the conjunctions of material contracts are made by mutual consent, it must be that the matrimonial conjunction also be made in this way."

797. Matrimonial consent must be mutually furnished by an act of the will and be borne unto matrimony. Hence it can be defined: an act of the will between able persons, legitimately manifested (i.e., according to the manner prescribed for validity), by which each party hands over and accepts the right over the body, perpetual and exclusive, in order to acts of themselves apt for the generation of offspring (can. 1081, § 2).

Although the will of each is necessary, nevertheless there is not required in each party a twofold act formally distinct; but it can be done by one act, by which one indivisibly consents to his own obligation, which he offers to the other, and by which at the same time he virtually accepts the obligation of the other.

Therefore consent explicitly and formally is not borne unto carnal intercourse, but unto the right and power to intercourse; implicitly and virtually unto intercourse. For intercourse is not of the essence of matrimony, but its effect and operation: the essence is the mutual transference of mutual power over the other's body in order to intercourse of itself apt for the generation of offspring. Therefore consent explicitly and formally is not borne unto intercourse, but unto the power to it; and thus consequently, implicitly and virtually unto intercourse itself. Hence St. Thomas, q. 48, a. 1:

"The consent which makes matrimony is consent unto matrimony, because the proper effect of the will is the thing willed itself. Whence, just as carnal intercourse has itself toward matrimony, so the consent which causes matrimony is toward carnal intercourse. But matrimony... is not essentially carnal conjunction itself, but a certain association of man and wife in order to carnal intercourse... according as there is given to them power toward one another with respect to carnal intercourse... Whence they rightly said... that to consent unto matrimony is to consent unto carnal intercourse implicitly, not explicitly: for it must not be understood except as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, because the power of carnal intercourse, to which consent is given, is the cause of carnal intercourse, as the power of using one's own thing is the cause of use."

For 1) consent unto some thing is explicitly borne only unto that which is of the essence, and only implicitly unto the effect to which it is ordered as to a cause.

Yet 2) one who consents to that which is essentially ordered to something consents implicitly to that thing; but one who consents unto matrimony consents to that which is essentially ordered to carnal intercourse; therefore he implicitly consents to intercourse. For the right and power to intercourse is essentially ordered to use, as potency to act and cause to effect.

Whence 3) the consent is null if, by the force or condition of the contract, they exclude intercourse.

These things are to be understood insofar as they are on the part of the contract, so that by force of the contract they consent implicitly to intercourse and in no way exclude it; - but not insofar as they are on the part of the contracting parties, who at the same time can, one or both, have an opposed intention, namely, of not exercising intercourse, or even enter another pact about this. As is clear from the matrimony of the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph.

Once consent has been validly furnished, by that very fact matrimony is present.

798. Corollaries. - 1. Mutual consent is the efficient cause of matrimony in two ways:

a) of matrimony, as it is a contract and sacrament, in becoming. Thus consent, insofar as it is internal, is the cause of external consent, so that it is not only the efficient cause but also the intrinsic formal cause of the contract and sacrament: for intention is of the essence of the contract and sacrament;

b) of matrimony in fact, or of the conjunction of man and woman and of the sacred bond. Thus consent as expressed by words is the efficient and extrinsic cause of matrimony: it is not of its essence, but is necessary so that this cannot be without it.

2. Scotus teaches, in IV d. 27, q. 2, n. 2: "It must not be said that consent is the proper efficient cause of that bond. But it is a previous disposition, just as to be baptized and to be ordained is a previous disposition to the character." - On the contrary, consent truly effects the bond as principal cause; and that, moreover, the bond is sacred and confers grace, of this it is the instrumental cause, insofar as the contracting parties are ministers of Christ.

3. The Scholastics ask: whether consent can be supplied by another, for example by God, or whether there can be matrimony without the consent of the spouses? It is certain that consent cannot be supplied by the human power of parents, of the state, or of the Supreme Pontiff, as is expressly said by Pius VI, by Pius XI, and in can. 1081, § 1, both because no one has direct power over the bodies of subjects; - and because the right of disposing concerning one's own body in order to matrimony is a primary natural right, which precedes every society and human power; - and because this would harm the common good, since unions without consent and love have a most unfortunate outcome and necessarily tend toward ruin, whence the very ends of matrimony would be frustrated. - But the question is whether God can supply it, which question is reserved by the code, since it speaks only of human power. Now:

a) Certainly God could, by his efficacious motion, make those unwilling to be willing, and those not consenting freely consenting unto matrimony.

b) It is certain that God cannot supply matrimony in becoming, or in the character of a contract, so that matrimony would be contracted without the mutual consent of the spouses; because consent is of its intrinsic notion, and a contract essentially is mutual consent.

c) As to matrimony in fact, or as to the conjugal bond, it seems rather that it should be affirmed that God, without the mutual consent of the spouses, can effect such a bond. For since he is the supreme lord of bodies and souls, he can hand over to the man perpetual dominion over the body of the woman in order to generation, and conversely; from which handing over there results a bond of conjunction between both equivalent to the matrimonial bond. Whence Adam and Eve could have been created united by a matrimonial bond, even if they had not consented to it.¹

¹ Modern jurists are accustomed to deny this, but their arguments rather regard matrimony in becoming.

Nor does it stand in the way that God cannot establish a relation, such as that conjunction is, without a foundation. For in the case the foundation of this relation would be real, although diverse, namely, the efficacious will of God handing over the dominions of the bodies.

4. The conditions required for the validity of consent are the same as in other contracts. Therefore it is necessary to speak of the qualities required that this consent subsist, and of the vices which can impede or invalidate it.

Canon I. Concerning those whom the will of their parents has bound from the first years of infancy to the office of clericate, we establish that this is to be observed: that as soon as they have been tonsured or handed over to the ministry of readers, they ought to be educated in the house of the Church, under episcopal presence, by one placed over them. But when they have completed the eighteenth year of their age, their will concerning seeking marriage is to be examined by the bishop before the sight of the whole clergy and people. If, with God inspiring, the grace of chastity has pleased them, and they have promised that they will preserve the profession of their chastity without conjugal necessity, these, as seekers of the narrowest life, are to be subjected to the most gentle yoke of the Lord, and first, the proof of their profession having been had, they are to receive the ministry of the subdiaconate from the twentieth year ... Yet they must beware lest at any time, forgetful of their promise, they run either to earthly nuptials or to furtive concubitus. But if perhaps they have done this, let them be condemned as guilty of sacrilege and be held strangers from the Church. But to those whom their own will, at the time of the interrogation, has persuaded to the desire of marrying, we cannot take away the license conceded by the Apostles, in such a way that when, placed in marriage at a more advanced age, they have promised by equal consent that they will renounce the works of the flesh, they may aspire to sacred orders.

Canon XXII. Let no one dare, by command of power, to claim another's daughter (that is, to vindicate her for himself), lest the marriage, which is impiously coupled against the will of the parents, be judged like captivity; but as has been prohibited, let it not be admitted. In those who have perpetrated such things, let the severity of excommunication be imposed according to the measure of the crime.

The liberty of private persons against the impotent lust of those who are in high place is defended by the Fathers. A marriage contracted against the will of the parents is called impious.

For the marriage of slaves, the will of parents or masters is required by these Fathers, as we have seen from Basil. Cf. what was said there at Canon XL.

Canon VI. Let no one presume to abduct a widow or the daughter of another outside the will of the parents, or judge that she is to be sought by the king's favor. But if he has done this, similarly removed from the communion of the Church, let him be punished with the condemnation of anathema.

Canon X. Widows to whom it has pleased to hold chastity shall not be forced by any force to come to repeated nuptials. But if, before they profess continence, they have chosen to marry, let them marry those whom they have chosen by their own will to have as husbands. Let a like condition also be had concerning virgins, lest they be forced to receive husbands apart from the will of their parents or their own will.

Canon LXIV. Abductors of virgins and widows, who afterward also, with the will of the parents, as if betrothing them under the name of dowry, have led them into marriage, are to be subjected to public penance; and after public penance has been completed, as the Bishop shall have foreseen, lest they fall into worse things, coming together again, let them take care henceforth to be devoted to alms and to whatever other works of religious and salvific conversation, until by consent they are able to abstain from the conjugal work. But sons from a blameworthy conjunction of this sort, procreated even less laudably before marriage, shall in no way be promoted to ecclesiastical dignity; nor shall those generated from such a marriage be applied to ecclesiastical orders, unless perhaps either the greatest utility or necessity of the Church demands them, or an evident prerogative of merits commends them.

Canon LXV. But those who have not yet taken into marriage, with the will of the parents, under the aforesaid name of betrothal or dowry, those whom they had abducted, when this constitution has been promulgated into the ears of all (those, namely, who did that before this constitution was known; see the following canon), are to be separated from their conjunction and subjected to public penance; but the abducted women are to be restored legally to their parents. But after public penance has been completed, if age and incontinence have demanded it, let them be associated in a legitimate marriage pleasing to both parties. For in these things we do not constitute a rule, but, to use the words of great Leo, we judge what is more tolerable. But if one of the married persons has died, the one who did public penance and has survived shall not presume to repeat marriage, unless perhaps the bishop shall have foreseen that some indulgence should be conceded, so that he can remove a graver offense.

Canon LXVIII. Concerning those who abduct the betrothed women of others, or accept them with the consent of the parents, let the ancient and synodal sentence be observed (cf. Canon XI of the Council of Ancyra). And even if perhaps such an outcome is known to be found in the Church, that, for the competence of salvation and religion, the Pontiffs ought to treat some matter more humanely ... by no means, so that we may descend to the greatest indulgence, shall the acceptor of another's betrothed woman pass without public penance, and let him legally pay a fine to the betrothed man.

You see that the Franks always had this especially at heart: that nuptials be made with the consent of parents.

Caius, a young Catholic of an honorable and moderately wealthy family, had recently obtained the position of bank manager. In the town where he lived he formed a familiarity with Titia, a Catholic girl who was indeed of honorable condition but very poor. Caius and Titia soon mutually promised marriage to each other in writing. When Caius’s superiors heard this, they indicated to Caius’s parents that the matter greatly displeased them, because they did not wish the manager of such a place to be joined in marriage, especially such a marriage. The parents, lest their son be dismissed from the position, forbade him to enter marriage with Titia. Caius therefore, in a letter sent to Titia, sought permission to withdraw, but received a rather bitter reply from her mother that Titia was wasting away with continual tears, and that her confessor said Caius was bound under grave obligation to fulfill the promise quickly. Having received the reply, Caius approached his own confessor, who asks:

1. What are betrothals, what right do they produce, and when must they be fulfilled?

2. Are children under parental authority bound to consult their parents about entering marriage?

3. Must the command of parents that a betrothal be broken be obeyed?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is betrothal, what right does it give, when is it to be fulfilled?

Betrothal is a mutual and legitimate promise of future marriage between persons who may marry lawfully. As it is a contract in a serious matter, an engagement to marry gives a right in justice to have the contract executed. If the time for execution was fixed, the appointed time must be kept; otherwise the marriage must take place within a reasonable time.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 251 ff. ’ Ibid., 257. 2 Ibid., 257.

2. Are children bound to consult their parents with regard to marriage?

Yes, certainly. The marriage of a child is a very important family affair on which depends not only the happiness of the parties immediately concerned, but to some extent the happiness and welfare of the whole family. The parents have a right to be consulted about so important a family affair.²

3. Are children bound to obey their parents when they bid them break off an engagement?

Children are bound to break off an engagement at the bidding of their parents if the parents have good ground for their action. The parents will have good ground when the match is not desirable on account of the character of the other party, and even on account of inferiority in rank if this will be the cause of grave family dissensions and troubles. Otherwise children are not bound to obey their parents and break off an engagement to which there is no valid objection.²

4. The case. If it would cost Caius a great deal, and seriously interfere with his happiness to give up his betrothed, he would not be bound to obey his parents. He might with a safe conscience elect to be faithful to his engagement, and abide by the consequences. However, the question in the case is rather whether he is bound to do this, or whether he may break off the engagement on account of the opposition of his parents and his employers. He may break it off with a safe conscience. The opposition of his parents to the match is not unreasonable, and he may be guided in the matter by their wishes if he likes. Caius, then, is at liberty to decide for himself whether he will keep to his engagement or break it off.