The Granting of Dispensation

For dispensation there is required an act truly placed and manifested. It is said:

I. An act truly placed. This is clear from the nature of dispensation, which is a relaxation of law. But a relaxation of law cannot have place without an act of the Superior truly placed. Therefore a merely presumed act does not suffice; in other words, in order to act licitly, it is not enough that someone persuade himself: "If the superior knew, he would dispense," or: "If I sought a dispensation, I would obtain it." But sometimes it is licit to act from presumed license, as was explained in n. 144 (St. Alphonsus, I, 187).

A dispensation extorted by fear is valid, provided a just cause of dispensing exists and "it is not established that the superior dispensed without the mind of dispensing; for fear does not remove the voluntary, as force does. Moreover, the obtaining of such a dispensation is even licit if fear is justly struck into the prelate: namely, if the subject threatens that he will complain before the supreme superior, or that he will bring a just accusation concerning some crime of his" (St. Alphonsus, I, 184). These things, however, you should not extend to absolution from censures (can. 2238).

II. An act manifested, whether orally, or in writing or by rescript, or even by silence. This latter has place: first, when the Superior sees that the law is not being observed by the subject and is silent, although he can conveniently contradict; second, when he imposes or permits something which cannot licitly be done without dispensation. Concerning rescripts, by which dispensation is more often granted, we shall speak specifically in the appendix.

117. Principles. - I. For the liceity of a dispensation some cause is always required. The reason is that otherwise the Superior will not be a faithful dispenser, or will be imprudent. - St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 97, art. 4.

Therefore he also sins who in such a case seeks a dispensation; for he induces the dispenser to an illicit thing, and therefore sins in seeking by the same kind of sin as the legislator in conceding.

II. But for validity no cause is required on the part of the one conceding, if he dispenses in his own law or in the law of an inferior. The reason is that he who can bind can also loose; but it is otherwise if he dispenses in the law of his Superior, because he is not presumed to have received the power of dispensing rashly. - Thus commonly.

III. For validity on the part of the petitioner it is required that there be no essential obreption or subreption in the petition, or one which falls upon the motive cause, because the Superior does not dispense except under a tacit condition, namely, If the prayers rest on truth. - St. Lig., no. 185.

118. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether a Superior dispensing without cause in a grave matter sins gravely?

I answer 1. No, probably per se, as to the legislator; because, scandal or damage to others being set aside, so great a disorder does not appear in this. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., no. 178, against others.

I answer 2. Affirmatively as to the inferior, because he is not considered delegated to dispense except from a just cause: and therefore if he does otherwise, he gravely abuses the power conceded to him ¹. - St. Lig., no. 180.

¹ Understand abuse and thence grave fault from its kind; for abuse of this sort, if it happens in a matter of light moment, or in a law which does not oblige under grave fault, will not exceed venial fault. But not only does an inferior dispensing rashly in the law of the Superior sin, but also he who uses such a dispensation. The reason is that such a dispensation is invalid, and therefore does not remove the obligation of the law.

QUESTION 2. Whether it is licit to use a tacit or presumed dispensation?

I answer to the first affirmatively, provided it can be prudently gathered from some sign. - Thus commonly.

I answer to the second no, because the Superior ought to know that concerning which the matter is being treated; nevertheless permission can easily be presumed when there is question of matters of lesser moment, and it is beside the law, not however against the law. - St. Lig., no. 187.

QUESTION 3. Whether it is licit to seek, or concede, a dispensation in doubt whether the cause suffices?

I answer to the first affirmatively, because it does not belong to subjects to judge concerning the sufficiency of the cause, but only to expose the matter sincerely to the Superior. - St. Lig., no. 178.

To the second likewise affirmatively. The reason is that otherwise the burden imposed on Superiors would become intolerable, and would be liable to innumerable scruples both as to the one dispensing and as to those seeking. - St. Lig. ibid. ².

² ** In this place St. Alphonsus (book 1, no. 178) affirms that the Superior can dispense if he doubts whether the cause is just.... It would be otherwise, he adds, if he doubted whether the cause is present. These things indeed, if the reason of the whole context is had, would seem to have been said of the legislator, or of one having equal power.

But elsewhere (book 1, no. 192), treating of an inferior prelate, he teaches that he can dispense in doubt whether a sufficient cause for dispensing is present. Which words do not sufficiently explain whether they are referred to a doubt whether the cause is present, or rather to a doubt whether the cause which is present is sufficient. And indeed they would seem to have to be taken in the latter sense, lest this sentence disagree with those things which have been brought from no. 178, especially since otherwise it would seem to attribute greater power to an inferior prelate than to the legislator. But those things which he has in book 3, no. 251 seem to stand in the way; there he says the dispensation has force if it is doubtful whether a cause was present, or whether it was sufficient: since these things are said of dispensation from a vow, they cannot be understood of the legislator. It remains therefore that a reason be sought for fittingly composing all these things with one another.

Meanwhile (book 1, no. 180) St. Alphonsus weighs the doctrine which he attributes to Soto, Laymann, Sanchez, Azor, and the Salmanticenses, namely that a dispensation is valid if the Superior by error judges the cause just: which words in the obvious sense are referred to an error by which a cause is thought just which is not just. Yet the holy Doctor seems (ibid., no. 181) to have understood them of a Superior who dispenses without cause, and he denies against the aforesaid Authors that the dispensation is valid, just as previously against the same authors (no. 180) he had said that the opposite must be held. But it is displeasing that after the Salmanticenses (On Law, ch. 5, no. 71) he exhibits the aforesaid Authors as though they taught that a dispensation is valid even without any cause, although conceded in good faith. For they, and indeed in those places which are indicated by the Salmanticenses, do not speak of the absence of any cause whatsoever, but of a cause which by error was judged just, when it was not such. Besides, the holy Doctor in the place to which he sends readers in both places, namely book 3, no. 251, comprehends each hypothesis; and he pronounces that the dispensation is invalid if afterward it is certainly found that no cause was present, or not a sufficient one. Concerning this sentence it will be useful to intimate that Palaus, whom the holy Doctor professes to follow (cited no. 251), certainly alleges several writers for the defense of his opinion; nevertheless they discuss by no means the hypothesis of a cause which is afterward detected as less sufficient, but only the hypothesis of no cause. And in reality, if this is extended also to a cause which afterward is found less sufficient, perhaps there will be someone to whom that which the holy Doctor has (book 1, no. 192) will appear difficult, namely that the one dispensing is not obligated to an examination concerning the full sufficiency of the cause when he doubts about this; and again (book 3, no. 251) that men after obtaining a dispensation are not held to inquire about its value. For how can solicitude of examining and inquiring concerning the sufficiency of the cause be absent, when there must be no dispensation if perhaps that is lacking?

QUESTION 4. What in doubt whether the case needs dispensation?

I answer 1. Dispensation is not required in positive doubt, or when it is probable that the case is not comprehended by the law, as is clear from the things said about probabilism; for the extension of the law to that case remains uncertain.

2. But in doubt whether the cause is sufficient for excusing from the law without dispensation, it is controverted. For some contend that dispensation is required. Yet others better deny. - Thus St. Lig., no. 192 ³.

³ This question seems to fall back into the preceding one, namely, What in doubt whether the case needs dispensation? But St. Alphonsus briefly responds (book 1, no. 192): Whether the doubt is positive or negative, the subject can use his liberty.

** Against this little note VV. (page 910) oppose these words of the same St. Alphonsus (book 1, no. 97): In doubt whether the cause is sufficient for excusing you from the law..., it is truer that you are held to the law.

I answer. Since the Author makes the question concerning positive doubt, the little note also must be understood thus, namely concerning a cause which is probably sufficient for excusing from the law. This being posited, VV. must either show that the second question does not fall back into the first; or they must inquire how those two sentences of St. Alphonsus cohere with each other. Indeed Sanchez, whom St. Alphonsus alleges for himself after the Salmanticenses, establishes the contrary if the doubt is positive (Decalogue, book 1, ch. 10, no. 35).

QUESTION 5. Whether a dispensation extorted by fear is valid?

I answer affirmatively, provided a cause for dispensing exists, and it is not clear that in the Superior the mind of dispensing was altogether lacking, and otherwise any other cause of nullity is absent. - St. Lig., no. 184.

119. Resolves. - 1. A dispensation is invalid whenever in the request an error has crept in concerning the motive cause, or concerning the very object of the dispensation, whether by fault of the petitioner or of another, or even if this happened from mere inadvertence; for example, if in the petition you put an impediment of affinity for an impediment of consanguinity, or the third degree for the second; but otherwise if you put the second for the third, because the lesser grace is contained in the greater of the same genus.

2. A dispensation has force if an error has crept into the rescript of the Superior, for example, by carelessness of the secretary, because it supervenes upon the concession already made, and the Superior concedes thus: Let it be done as is sought.

3. A dispensation conceded from a just cause to some wicked man whom the Superior reputed upright has force, even if, the wickedness being known, he would not have dispensed; the reason is that uprightness is not reputed a motive cause, but merely an impulsive one. - It also has force if a false cause at the time of the petition becomes true at the time of concession; but not vice versa. Except unless someone was moved on account of uprightness.

4. A dispensation has force, although several false causes, even motive ones per se, were set forth with true and sufficient causes; because where some true motive cause is present, a sufficient foundation of dispensation is supplied.

5. A dispensation granted by a Superior has force, although it had already been denied by an inferior and no mention is made of this denial. - Indeed it probably has force even if, denied by a Superior, it is granted by an inferior; because the power of the inferior is not restricted by the denial of the Superior, unless he expressly restricts it. - Suarez, On Laws, book 6, ch. 22. - Lacroix, no. 811.

6. A dispensation obtained for someone who is ignorant of it or even unwilling has force, when necessity requires this. - St. Lig., no. 186.

For legitimate dispensation, that is, for dispensation which is at the same time valid and licit, several things are required: either a) on the part of the one conceding, or b) on the part of the one asking, or of the subject to be dispensed.

237. PRINCIPLES. I. For valid dispensation there is required, on the part of the subject to be dispensed: that the petition be neither subreptitious nor obreptitious, as regards the motive causes set forth, and that the dispensation be accepted by the one dispensed. The reason: otherwise the will of the one conceding is lacking (cf. n. 239).

We said 1. That it be neither subreptitious nor obreptitious, in the sense explained above, n. 228.

But in matrimonial matters, although the Sacred Congregations require that all things be faithfully declared, nevertheless a dispensation is valid if, for a lesser degree, a greater is indicated. See the things to be said n. 2051, 4. Cf. Genicot-Salsmans, II, n. 524.

2. As regards the motive causes set forth, but not as regards impulsive causes.

For motive causes are given, which pertain intrinsically to the matter, and render the dispensation legitimate and fitting in itself, for example, poverty alleged so that someone may be freed from a vow of giving 1000 gold pieces. Impulsive causes are also given, which, taken from extrinsic circumstances, dispose the Superior toward the act of dispensing, for example, nobility alleged so that someone may more easily obtain a dispensation.

But go to the point: Falsity and reticence then only render a dispensation invalid if they regard motive causes, because the consent of the Superior depends on truth, which in these alone is sought and required (I, n. 185).

These things are rightly said if the matter concerns a dispensation given. But if someone is committed to giving it, and he discovers that falsity is present in the impulsive causes, he ought to recur again to the one delegating, so that he may licitly use the faculties. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 265.

3. That the dispensation be accepted. The reason: ordinarily the Superior intends to make a grace only to one consenting. These things Sanchez, Wernz (apud Linz. Quart. Schrift, 1911, p. 127), and this opinion is more common and more conformable to the decrees of the Holy See. Therefore, if a dispensation is sought for one not knowing or unwilling, it is necessary that his consent be added (I, 186, 10.).

238. From these things you will gather: 1. A dispensation granted from a true cause to some wicked man whom the one dispensing judged upright is valid, although it would have been the case that he would not have dispensed if he had known his wickedness. The reason is, because uprightness is not held as a motive cause, but merely as impulsive; unless the opposite is positively clear.

2. A dispensation is valid if, among several false causes, one true cause is alleged which suffices for dispensing. Likewise, in doubt whether a cause obreptitiously alleged was motive or impulsive, true or false, sufficient or insufficient: because after the fact one must stand for the value of the act.

3. A dispensation is valid if a cause, false at the time of petition, has become true at the time of concession; but not vice versa (cf. n. 2052). Hence it is valid, for example, if in the rescript of the one dispensing an error has crept in from the carelessness of an amanuensis; because it supervenes upon a concession already made. Cf. Pyrrh. Corrad., Praxis dispens. Apost., l. 7, c. 6, n. 24. If the matter concerns a grace to be made, the causes ought to be true at the time when the commissary fulminates the dispensation.

4. A petition does not become subreptitious for this reason, that before a Superior of higher Order the denial on the part of the Superior of inferior grade is kept silent.

239. II. For valid dispensation, on the part of the one conceding, it is required that he could and willed to dispense. The reason is clear of itself.

It is required 1. THAT HE COULD, according to the things set forth n. 230 ff. Wherefore it must be noted that a subaltern Superior cannot validly dispense in the law of a Superior without a just cause; because he is not presumed to have received the power of dispensing rashly and inequitably. It is otherwise, however, if a Superior wills to dispense in his own law or in the law of an inferior; because the law itself depends entirely on his will. It must be noted besides that the faculty of dispensing has not been taken away from a subaltern Superior by the fact that his Superior denied dispensation to the one seeking it. Except if his express will as regards this is clear.

Hence: 1. The Supreme Pontiff dispenses validly, but a Bishop invalidly, without a just cause, in the common law of the Church, for example, in fasting, abstinence, etc. Therefore St. Thomas rightly teaches (Quodl. 4, 13, c. fin.) that the Pope can dispense that a priest consecrate the Body of Christ without sacred vestments.

2. In the law of God, for example, in vows and oaths, a dispensation made without cause is always invalid (cf. n. 135, 1.). But if a cause is indeed present, yet insufficient, the dispensation will be valid when some commutation has been added (III, 254; H. Ap., V, 40).

3. A dispensation is valid if a subaltern Superior dispenses even in bad faith, judging that a cause does not underlie, which nevertheless in reality exists. On the contrary, it is invalid if he thinks that a cause underlies, which in reality does not subsist, or certainly does not suffice; because the value of the dispensation does not depend on knowledge, but on the existence of the cause, so that the good or bad faith of the one dispensing makes nothing to the matter. Thus St. Alphonsus with Palaus, against Busenbaum and others (I, 181; III, 251; H. Ap., II, 53).

It is required 2. THAT HE WILLED, and signified his will in some way, as is commonly taught. Whence a dispensation presumed concerning the future is not valid, for example, if he knew, he would dispense; because a future will, or one which would be, is not absolutely a will, and therefore does not suffice for dispensation from law, as being strictly to be interpreted, although it suffices for license, as being broadly to be interpreted. Moreover, in matters of lesser moment, one can sometimes proceed more easily by way of epikeia.

Nevertheless, a tacit dispensation is valid, namely from a just presumption of the present will of the Superior. Thus, for example, a Superior who sees a subject act against the law and does not correct him when he could easily do so, is judged to dispense; because in these circumstances, if he does not will to dispense, he is held to speak. But it is otherwise if he cannot correct without inconvenience (I, 187; H. Ap., II, 49).

Note. 1. A dispensation mentally conceded to an absent person is not valid, unless the dispensed person has been made more certain that the one conceding, at such an hour, for example, after he had sought from the Superior the faculty of dispensing, fulminated the dispensation. This mode of acting is full of dangers: whence ordinarily illicit (Gennari, Quest. de mor., q. 262).

2. A dispensation extorted by fear is valid, whenever a just cause of dispensing exists: provided it is not clear that the Superior dispensed without the mind of dispensing; for fear does not take away the voluntary. Nor is it illicit to obtain a necessary dispensation through fear, provided fear is justly struck, for example, by threatening recourse to a Superior if the inferior denies dispensation (I, 184; H. Ap., II, 54).

Do not, however, extend the things here set forth to absolution from censures, which, if it has been given under the influence of fear unjustly struck, is invalid (n. 1287).

240. III. For licit dispensation, both in the one conceding and in the one obtaining, a just cause is required. The reason for the former is, because otherwise the Superior commits acceptance of persons, and gives occasion for complaints, while one is exempted from law without cause, but others are pressed by the same (I, 178). The reason for the latter is, because otherwise the subject asks for an illicit thing, and is guilty of that sin to which he induces the Superior. Cf. Lehmkuhl, Cas. consc., n. 118.

Things to be noted. 1. A Superior can sometimes, from a just cause, concede that which is sought without a sufficient cause. Thus, for example, an undisciplined religious who seeks without cause a relaxation of his simple vows can be dispensed by the Superior on account of the common good, and is in reality released from the vows.

2. The sin of a primary Superior who dispenses without a just cause in his own law, with scandal and notable damage of others excluded, does not exceed venial, because acceptance of persons is not of itself grave fault (I, 178).

But a Superior of inferior grade, if he dispenses in the law of a Superior without cause, except if smallness of matter is present, sins mortally. The reason is usurpation of a power not conceded to him, and especially disturbance of order, from the fact that the subject uses an invalid dispensation (cf. n. 239). St. Alph., I, 180.

3. A just cause of dispensing is that which is proportioned to the gravity of the law from which dispensation is given. Nor, however, is a cause so grave required that it already of itself exempts from the law. It is enough if it is such that the one to be dispensed can be exempted from the common obligation without acceptance of persons. For some causes of themselves excuse from the precept, say of fasting, of the Divine Office, etc.; and these do not need dispensation, if they are certainly or at least probably just (cf. n. 173). But others suffice for dispensation, yet need it. CAUSES of this kind, indeed to be weighed by prudent judgment, are generally either necessity, for example, scandal to be avoided; or piety, for example, copious alms in aid of the Church, as practice bears for matrimonial dispensations; or finally utility, whether common or private. Indeed, a sufficient cause can be the dignity of the one asking, because it pertains to the good of the Church to have eminent persons grateful; or even the dignity of the Superior, that he may show himself benign. This also must be noted, that if several causes are present, of which none suffices separately, all can suffice together (I, 195).

241. Questions. IT IS ASKED 1. Whether, when a just cause stands, the Superior is held to dispense?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the cause is only sufficient so that dispensation is licit, but not owed, the Superior can concede it and deny it, or concede it to one and deny it to another; because just as dispensation is expedient for the good of the subject, so also the observance of law is expedient for the common good.

2. If the cause is such that it renders dispensation owed or necessary, the Superior is held to dispense. Otherwise he would sin, gravely or lightly according to the matter (I, 179; H. Ap., II, 52).

And here it must be noted that dispensation is owed either from the disposition of right, which, when such a cause exists, decrees that it must be granted; or from the necessity of the common good, for example, for preventing scandal; or from justice, for example, for avoiding grave danger of soul; or finally from charity, when someone much needs dispensation, and this can be conceded without detriment to discipline.

IT IS ASKED 2. Whether it is lawful for a subject to seek, and for a Superior to concede, dispensation from a doubtful cause?

Resp. 1. It is lawful TO SEEK, and once dispensation has been obtained, the subject can be secure, if he has set forth the cause in good faith; because it belongs to the Superior to judge concerning the sufficiency of the cause (I, 186). But what if he obtained it illicitly? See n. 244.

2. It is lawful TO CONCEDE, in doubt whether the cause is sufficient; because the power of dispensing, unless it is of mere commission, is to be interpreted broadly; and, in doubt, the one dispensing is not obliged to an examination concerning the full sufficiency of the cause. But it is otherwise in doubt whether some cause is present. Yet in each doubt, the dispensation made is presumed valid, until the truth appears to the contrary (I, 178, 192; cf. III, 251; ed. G., I, p. 534).

Note. Since the doubt here concerns the existence of the cause of dispensation, the conclusion concerning the validity of the dispensation had to be different from before, n. 234, II, b, where the doubt concerns the cases themselves, whether namely they need dispensation.

NB. In these formulae are indicated, by way of example, the causes which occur more frequently: but in the supplicatory petition those very causes must be alleged which really exist in the particular case; otherwise the dispensation will be invalid (cf. n. 2049).

Supplicatory letters are sent to the Bishop, who himself (if he has the faculty) will concede the dispensation, or will take care that it be obtained from the Holy See.

1. For Requesting The Dissolution Of Solemn Betrothals.

Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord,

James N. and Anna N. of this parish N., on the day 15 May of the year 1886, contracted solemn betrothals between themselves. But now the bridegroom (or bride) desires to rescind them. Wherefore he/she most humbly supplicates Your Most Illustrious Lordship, that you deign to dissolve them (or to obtain their dissolution from the Holy See). The cause of this resolution is the grave quarrels and lawsuits arisen between the parents of the betrothed persons: or the greatest injury or ignominy inflicted by the bridegroom upon the bride, or conversely, etc.

With the highest reverence and devotion, as is fitting, I remain

Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord,

Your Most Illustrious Lordship's most submissive

N. N., Pastor of Church N.

Paris, on the day 1 July 1886.

2. For Requesting Dispensation From SIMPLE VOWS Emitted In Some Religious Congregation.

Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord,

Clelia N., 27 years of age, most humbly sets forth to Your Most Illustrious Lordship that, on the day 20 January 1880, in the Congregation of Nuns N., she publicly and in perpetuity emitted the three simple vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity. But since, three months ago, the Superioress freely consenting,² and, as the petitioner testifies, the confessor advising, she departed from that Congregation, she is now sought in honorable matrimony by a pious man.

Wherefore she most humbly supplicates Your Most Illustrious Lordship, that you deign to dispense with her over the said vows (or to obtain dispensation from the Holy See), that she may be able licitly to enter matrimony and to ask and render the conjugal debt. The causes are, both that the return of the petitioner to the Congregation is altogether impossible, and that, since matters have already come to this, the disposition of the petitioner and the manner of her life seem sufficiently to demonstrate that the conjugal state will be more salutary for her than religious life or celibate life in the world.

I testify etc. as in the following formula.

3. For Requesting Dispensation Over An Impediment Of KINSHIP, AFFINITY, Etc., For Matrimony To Be Contracted.

Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord,

Livius N., 30 years of age, and Clara N., 25 years of age, of the Diocese N., from the Parish N., desire to enter matrimony between themselves. But there stands in the way the impediment of affinity of the first degree of the equal line, because the petitioner intends to marry the brother of her deceased husband; or of consanguinity of the third and second unequal degree, of the collateral line, as is clear from the appended schema;³ or of spiritual kinship, because the male petitioner received the offspring of the female petitioner in Baptism, or held it in Confirmation.

Wherefore they most humbly supplicate Your Most Illustrious Lordship, that you deign to dispense over these impediments (or to procure a dispensation from the Holy See), since it cannot be that the matrimony not be contracted; or because the female petitioner, burdened with two minor children, needs the help of a man, and the male petitioner is said to be especially suitable for this; or because occult carnal copula was admitted only because of mad lust; or because the petitioners confess that they committed the same copula in hope of more easily obtaining a dispensation, and from which offspring is believed to have been conceived; or for repairing, avoiding, preventing damages; or because so grave and continual a danger of sins is present between them, that this matrimony of theirs must be held as the only (or necessary, very opportune) remedy of salvation; or because attempts to turn them away from this matrimony have become altogether useless; or because there is a founded fear lest, if dispensation is denied, they may complete the civil forms only; or because they are now about to contract, as they say, civil matrimony, etc.

I testify that the petitioners, worshipers of the Catholic faith, are of such wealth that in all they possess about 3000, 4000, 50,000 francs in reality and as many in expectation; or that they are so poor and miserable that, living by the labor of their hands alone, they can pay no tax. Nevertheless they will pay 12, 15, 20 francs for the expenses to be made at Rome, which they have deposited with me.

With the highest, as is fitting, etc.

N. N., Pastor N.

At place N., on the day 25 Feb. 1886.

4. - For Requesting Dispensation Over The Impediment Of MIXED RELIGION.

Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord,

Tullia N., Roman Catholic, 30 years of age, of this parish N., desires to enter matrimony with Albert N. from region N., attached to the Lutheran sect, and persevering in his errors at least up to this point.

The non-Catholic party before me, as is clear from the declaration appended to this petition, promised under faith of oath that all infants of either sex to be born from that matrimony are to be baptized and educated in the Roman Catholic faith, and that to them, as also to the other party, the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion will be altogether free. Besides, the Catholic party promised that she will take care according to her powers that, insofar as it will be in her, the man be converted to the true faith. Wherefore she most humbly supplicates Your Most Illustrious Lordship, that for her over this impediment a dispensation of the Holy See be procured because of the following causes: First, the attempts that the Petitioner renounce such matrimony are vain; second, because the civil forms concerning matrimony are certainly soon to be fulfilled; third, because there is a founded hope of the conversion of the non-Catholic party, etc. The Catholic party has already deposited with me 25 francs for the expenses to be made.

With the highest, as is fitting, etc.

Formula Of The Declaration Of The Non-Catholic Party.

"I the undersigned, dwelling in N., declare with oath, first, that the sons of each sex to be born from my matrimony with N. N., a Roman Catholic, will be baptized in the Roman Catholic religion; second, that I will always permit to my said consort and to all my sons and daughters the free exercise of Roman Catholic worship.

"In faith of this I have subscribed this present declaration by my own hand."

N. N.

Letters are sent to the Most Eminent Cardinal Prefect of the SACRED PENITENTIARY, either directly, or through the diocesan Curia. This intervention of the Curia can be used, if no danger of undue manifestation underlies it. - Nevertheless let the letters be closed and sealed, as the Sacred Penitentiary recently admonished. - But they are to be inscribed:

To the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord

Lord Cardinal Major Penitentiary.

Or in French: To His Eminence the Cardinal Grand Penitentiary, Rome.

1. For Requesting The Dissolution Of Occult BETROTHALS.

Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord,

Peter and Mary inconsiderately contracted occult betrothals. But once it has been discovered that Peter, whom she had not sufficiently known, is ruined in morals, and her mind has been totally alienated from the said Peter, so that in no way does she wish to marry him, and the matrimony would probably be unhappy, Mary requests that dispensation be given to her concerning the occult betrothals, that she may be able freely to enter another matrimony.

May Your Eminence deign to direct the response to me, the undersigned, her confessor, as follows: (let the exact address of the Response be given. - If recourse has been made through the diocesan Curia, he will say thus: May you deign... to direct, through the agent of the episcopal Curia N... in the City).

Reverently kissing the hands of Your Eminence, with the highest devotion, as is fitting, I remain

Your Eminence's

Most obedient and most devoted

N. N.

Paris, on the day...

2. For Requesting Dispensation From A Vow.

Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord,

Berta, twenty years old, vowed perpetual chastity (OR entrance into an approved Religion). But since she is in grave danger of incontinence, and because of the immense stimuli of the flesh distrusts that she can conduct a continent life, she most humbly supplicates for commutation or dispensation of the vow, that thence she may be able to enter matrimony, an opportune occasion of which offers itself to her.

May you deign, etc.

3. For Requesting Dispensation Over An OCCULT Impediment, For Matrimony To Be CONTRACTED.

Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord,

Julius intends to enter matrimony with Titia, and the negotiation concerning this is already known to all. But there stands in the way the impediment of AFFINITY from illicit copula with Caja, sister of Titia, and indeed occult; or: there stands in the way the impediment of CRIME arisen from carnal copula had between them, while the matrimony of Julius with his prior wife stood, with a promise of matrimony given and accepted, neither however plotting; or with the plotting of each against the life of Berta, wife of Julius; or with the plotting of Julius alone against the life of his wife; which promise was the true cause of the spouse-killing: which impediment is altogether occult, nor is it feared that it will be manifested.

Wherefore they most humbly supplicate Your Eminence, that you deign to dispense with them over that impediment, that they may be able to enter matrimony, both because all things have been prepared for matrimony, so that they cannot rescind the negotiation without scandal, and because the civil forms have already been fulfilled, and because now the time of childbirth is at hand, etc.

May you deign, etc.

4. For Requesting Dispensation Over TWO Impediments, One PUBLIC, The Other OCCULT.

Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord,

Publius and Augusta, consanguineous in the second degree, conquered by mad lust, had intercourse with each other. But since Augusta is now sought in matrimony by Tullius, brother of Publius, she desires to marry him, both because she is of superadult age, namely twenty-six years old, and because from this union harmony of families will probably come about.

Wherefore the female petitioner supplicates that, notwithstanding the said affinity from illicit copula, dispensation over the consanguinity having first been obtained, she may be able licitly and validly to contract matrimony with the same Tullius, and to remain in it once contracted.

May you deign, etc.

5. For Requesting Convalidation Of An INVALID DISPENSATION, On Account Of The Defect Of Subreption Or Obreption.

Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord,

Sempronius and Tertia intend to enter matrimony with a dispensation of the Holy See obtained and fulminated over the impediment of consanguinity of the second degree of the equal collateral line. But the said dispensation remains null on account of an occult impediment because of illicit copula with Caja, sister of Tertia; or on account of falsely alleged copula, without fault of the petitioners, etc.

Wherefore they most humbly supplicate Your Eminence, that for that dispensation obtained, but invalid, you deign to concede the grace Perinde valere. The causes are, both because there is founded fear lest they fulfill the civil forms only, and because otherwise scandals and most grave evils would follow, etc.

May you deign, etc.

6. For Requesting Dispensation Over An Occult Impediment For REVALIDATING A Contracted Matrimony.

Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord,

Caja, conscious (or ignorant) of the impediment, contracted in the face of the Church with Titius, by whose brother she had already been known. Wherefore, since they cannot be separated without scandal or damage to offspring, and the impediment is occult, she most humbly supplicates for the remedy of absolution and dispensation.

May you deign, etc.

7. For Requesting Dispensation IN RADICE.

Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord,

Lucretia contracted and consummated matrimony in the face of the Church with the true and sincere consent of Valerius, which is asserted still to persevere. But the matrimony is invalid on account of fornicating copula with the brother of Valerius, of which impediment Valerius is altogether unaware. The impediment is altogether occult, nor is it feared that it will be manifested; and concerning it no dispensation was requested. The petitioner with foundation fears lest, if renewal of consent is asked from the putative spouse in whatever manner, he refuse. Wherefore the petitioner, who desires duly to remain in the marriage, and to legitimate the offspring, humbly supplicates Your Eminence that you deign to procure from the Supreme Pontiff a dispensation in the root of the aforesaid matrimony, or a sanation, but that the response be directed to me the undersigned, etc.

8. For Requesting Absolution From Censures.

Titius, a priest (or pastor), sacrilegiously absolved (or pretended to absolve) one female penitent (or two, three, etc.) an accomplice in a base sin, once (or twice, thrice, etc.). Thereafter, although knowingly entangled in excommunication, he continued for fifteen days to celebrate Mass and administer the Sacraments. But now, sincerely penitent for his offenses, and the occasion of sin removed, he most humbly supplicates for the remedy of absolution and dispensation. - (NB. If he had already been absolved at another time and had relapsed, this ought to be expressed.)

May you deign, etc.

9. - For Requesting Dispensation Over An Irregularity.

Titius, a priest, has incurred an IRREGULARITY on account of occult homicide (or abortion, or violation of censure, etc.), and since danger of infamy threatens him if he abstains from celebrating, therefore he supplicates, etc. (as above) (H. A. XVIII, 87).

NB. The petition is directed either to the Bishop, or to the Sacred Penitentiary according to the diversity of the case; indeed, to the Datary, if the case is public.

10. - For Requesting The Faculty Of Absolving From Reserved Cases.

Most Reverend Vicar General,

Having recently been approved for two years by the Most Reverend Ordinary for receiving the confessions of the faithful, while I was furnishing ears to those confessing, a reserved case occurred to me; and since it seems expedient that the penitent return to me, by these letters I humbly supplicate that the aforesaid faculty be conceded to me, at least for this and a few occasions.

Or in the following manner:

Since on account of the frequent concourse of people the penitents, otherwise duly disposed, can scarcely be dismissed without absolution and approach another confessor, I humbly supplicate, etc.

Or also:

Although I am approved for absolving from cases reserved by the Most Reverend Ordinary, nevertheless a case occurred to me specially excepted in the letters of approbation. Since the penitent otherwise is duly disposed, yet I ought to fear lest he shrink from presenting himself, for the grace of absolution, before one having a faculty of this kind, by these letters I most humbly ask the Most Reverend Vicar General, that he deign to grant to me this special power of absolving for this occasion (or: for a few occasions), etc.

NB. Other FORMULAE are found in Jos. Schneider, Manuale sacerd., Appendix I.

162. Principles. - I. For the liceity of a dispensation some cause is always required. The reason is that otherwise the Superior will not be a faithful dispenser, or he will be imprudent.¹ Therefore he sins who in such a case petitions for dispensation; for he induces the dispenser to an illicit thing, and therefore sins in petitioning by the same kind of sin by which the legislator sins in conceding.

II. But for validity no cause is required on the part of the one conceding, if he dispenses in his own law or in the law of an inferior. The reason is that in this case the Superior can simply repeal the law; otherwise, however, if he dispenses in the law of his Superior, because he is not presumed to have power of dispensing rashly.

III. For validity, on the part of the petitioner, it is required that there be no essential obreption or subreption in the petition, that is, when there is kept silent what necessarily had to be expressed (see, for example, n. 1625, q. 2°), or there is expressed what necessarily ought to have been kept silent,² for example, a false final cause (ibid. q. 1°). - Hence:

1° A dispensation is invalid whenever an error has crept into the petition concerning the motive cause, or concerning the very object of the dispensation, whether this happened by the fault of the speaker or of another, or even from mere inadvertence; if, for example, you put in the petition an impediment of affinity for an impediment of consanguinity, or the 3rd degree for the 2nd; yet otherwise if you put the 2nd for the 3rd, because a lesser grace is contained in the greater of the same genus. - It is valid if, the final cause subsisting, only the impulsive cause is false. An impulsive cause falsely alleged, in bad faith, invalidates "as a penalty of perversity,"¹ and therefore only after the sentence of a judge. Hence, T. I, p. 88, q. 89.

2° The dispensation is valid if an error has crept into the rescript of the Superior, for example, by the carelessness of the secretary, because it supervenes upon a concession already made.

3° The dispensation is valid if the cause, although not subsisting at the time of the petition, subsists at the time of concession, provided the dispensation is in gracious form (§ III after n. 1622), or also in commissary form (ibid.) and the matter is about a grace to be made (n. 151. 6°): but if about a grace already made (ibid.), it must subsist both when the commission is given and when execution is mandated. Id. ib. q. 90.

4° The dispensation is valid, although several false causes, even motive ones, have been set forth together with true and sufficient causes; because where some true motive cause is present, a sufficient foundation for dispensation is supplied.

5° The dispensation is valid in doubt whether a cause that is obreptitious or subreptitious is final or impulsive; true or false; sufficient or insufficient; for in doubt one must stand for the value of the act.

6° A dispensation granted by a Superior is valid, although it had already been denied by an inferior, and no mention was made of this denial. - Indeed, it is probably valid even if, denied by a Superior, it is granted by an inferior; because the power of the inferior is not restricted by the denial of the Superior unless the latter expressly restricted it.²

7° A dispensation obtained for someone unaware or even unwilling is valid when necessity demands this. - But those things which are obtained from the Penitentiary are not valid unless they have been petitioned either by the confessor, or by the penitent, or by blood relatives up to the 4th degree.

163. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are the just causes for dispensing from law?

Resp. Three are commonly assigned: 1) piety: thus he is dispensed from servile works on a feast who applies himself to labors pertaining to divine worship; 2) utility: thus he is dispensed from a simple vow of chastity who is placed in great danger of violating it; 3) difficulty: thus he is dispensed from fasting who cannot observe it without a sufficiently grave inconvenience.

Quaer. 2° Does a Superior dispensing without cause in a grave matter sin GRAVELY?

Resp. 1° Negatively, probably, of itself, as to the legislator; because, prescinding from scandal or the damage of others, there does not appear in this so great a disorder.¹

Resp. 2° Affirmatively as to an inferior, because he is not judged to have been delegated to dispense except for a just cause: and therefore, if he does otherwise, he gravely abuses the power conceded to him.²

Quaer. 3° Is it licit to use a tacit or presumed dispensation?

Resp. to the 1st Affirmatively, provided it can prudently be gathered from some sign.

Resp. to the 2nd Negatively, because the Superior ought to know that concerning which there is question; nevertheless a license can be presumed,³ if from conjectures there exists a certainly probable consent of the Superior (n. 1163. R. to the 2nd).

Quaer. 4° Is it licit to petition for, or to concede, a dispensation in doubt whether the cause is sufficient?

Resp. to the 1st Affirmatively, because it does not pertain to subjects to judge concerning the sufficiency of the cause, but only sincerely to set forth the matter to the Superior.⁴

To the 2nd Affirmatively likewise. The reason is that otherwise the burden imposed upon Superiors would become intolerable, and both the one dispensing and the petitioners would be exposed to innumerable scruples.⁵

Quaer. 5° What in doubt whether the case needs dispensation?

Resp. 1° A dispensation is not required in a doubt, whether positive or negative, whether the case is comprehended under the law, as is plain from what was said on Probabilism; for the extension of the law to that case remains uncertain. Make exception for a positive doubt concerning the existence of a diriment impediment of marriage, since in ecclesiastical impediments alone, which are doubtful by a doubt of law, the Church is presumed to supply (n. 60. I.).¹

2° But in doubt whether the cause is sufficient for excusing from the law without dispensation, a distinction must be made. Namely, in a positive doubt (n. 48. under 1) a dispensation is to be petitioned (n. 66. 2°), unless at the same time there is a doubt whether perhaps the observance of the law would gravely harm (n. 67. 1°. c). - But in a doubt founding an opinion only singularly probable for liberty, it is not to be petitioned (n. 66. 2°).

Quaer. 6° Is a dispensation extorted by fear valid?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided a cause for dispensing exists, nor is it established that in the Superior the intention of dispensing was altogether lacking, and besides any other cause of nullity is absent.

Quaer. 7° Is a dispensation valid which is given in good faith, when the cause that was thought to be present and sufficient is nevertheless not really so?

Resp. If there is question of a dispensation given by an inferior, St. Alphonsus, speaking of dispensation in vows,² follows the opinion of those who deny it, and this on account of the certain principle that an inferior invalidly dispenses without sufficient cause (n. 162. II.). But this reason has force also as to human laws. Yet the one dispensed can acquiesce in the dispensation as long as he is not certain of the non-existence or insufficiency of the cause.

386. For dispensation there is required a will of dispensing, present or antecedent; but a presumed future will is not sufficient, which is not an absolute will, for example: if the superior knew, he would dispense. And in this way dispensation is distinguished from license: for in this case the action is not prohibited simply, but only lest it be done without the consent of the superior, for which presumed consent suffices; but when the action is absolutely prohibited and therefore evil, there is necessary at present a will which takes away the prohibition and the malice. This can be manifested 1) expressly, by words, writings, signs; or 2) tacitly from facts: a) if the superior knows that action is being taken against the law and does not contradict, although he easily can and ought, so that from the circumstances his silence cannot be explained except on the supposition of dispensation; b) if with certain knowledge he commands or concedes what cannot be done without dispensation, for example, the Pontiff knowingly gives a benefice to an irregular person, or commands meats to be eaten on a forbidden day.

387. For dispensation there is required a just cause, known and examined by mature counsel. - For a) if the dispenser dispenses according to his own will, he will be either unfaithful or imprudent: unfaithful if he does not have a just cause, for he orders to a particular good a power given unto edification on account of the common good, and thus turns it into destruction, while he disturbs the right order of society and, by committing acceptance of persons, gives occasion for complaints, exempting one while others are pressed by the law; imprudent if he is ignorant of the reason for dispensing. Moreover b) because to exempt from law him who is not to be exempted from law is acceptance of persons; c) because it is disgraceful and against natural law that a part without cause should not be conformed to the whole. Hence:

1. If a just cause is lacking, a) and it is done in the law of a superior, the dispensation is illicit as an abuse of another's power, and indeed gravely or lightly according as the law obligates under grave or under light matter, and ordinarily invalid because the superior is not judged to commit the power of dispensing without cause, which he could not concede without sin (can. 84, § 1);

b) if it is done in one's own law, the dispensation is valid because positive law does not bind without the will of the superior, but it is illicit gravely or lightly according to the degree of disturbance that follows: although it is a sin of acceptance of persons, which is grave from its genus, against distributive and legal justice, and which is apt to generate scandal and harm the common good, nevertheless more often in a particular case it will in fact be light, because ordinarily it is not very harmful; yet it is grave if notable scandal arises, or harm to the one dispensed, or a burden upon others;

c) a subject knowingly asking for dispensation without legitimate cause sins gravely or lightly, according as he induces the dispenser to grave or light sin (even if the superior is in good faith); nevertheless, by using the dispensation, if it is valid and scandal is excluded, he does not sin.

2. If only knowledge of the cause is lacking: a) if it is done in the law of a superior, the dispensation is illicit, and also invalid if the delegating superior placed examination of the cause as a condition of dispensation, or also a just cause and the cause is lacking; otherwise validity is probable;

b) if it is done in one's own law, the dispensation is valid but illicit;

c) if, diligence having been applied, it is not certain but probable that the cause suffices, the dispensation is licitly and validly granted, because in morals evidence cannot always be had, but a prudent and probable reason suffices (can. 84, § 2).

In doubt concerning the validity of a dispensation it is judged valid: one must stand for the value of the act.

388. A just cause of dispensing can be: necessity, for example, grave pain of the head or weakness from fasting; piety, for example, the service of worship for dispensing from an irregularity; or utility at least mediately redounding to the common good, whether intrinsic or extrinsic.

Intrinsic utility is preservation, difficulty, or inconvenience of observing the law united to it per accidens, for example, preservation from scruples or temptations, the difficulty of a journey in winter. Extrinsic utility is the good of the one dispensing, for example, that he show himself liberal or kind; the good of the one dispensed, for example, utility in view of good merit, the dignity of the petitioner; the common good, for example, for forestalling excessive transgressions, for increasing common gladness. Thus also the payment of money for the utility of the Church, the compensation of merits, the reconciling of peace.

1. Nevertheless the use of every cause, if the one dispensing is not the legislator, is not always permitted. Namely, one must see in what way the faculty has been delegated and within what limits it is contained.

How great a cause is required must be determined with attention to the moment of the law, the quality of the person, the circumstances of time, etc., so that, all the circumstances being considered, it appears fitting to reason. It is, namely, like a cause with a double effect: the good coming from the dispensation must compensate the evil caused by it. But the cause need not be so great that it certainly excuses of itself from the observance of the law, or probably if the superior cannot be approached, because then there is no need of dispensation, since the law has probably ceased; nor can it be minimal or just any small cause, but an intermediate cause suffices.

The cause of dispensation need not exist when the dispensation is asked for or when it is granted inchoatively (for example, mandatorily), but when it is granted definitively and effectively, or is executed (can. 41). Moreover it must remain until use is begun and during use, if it was given for an act morally divisible and revocable and the cause by its nature is temporary; whence the dispensation is given under the tacit condition that the cause continue, for example, dispensation from recitation of the hours or fasting on account of infirmity. But it need not remain if it was given for an act morally indivisible and irrevocable, and the cause by its nature is perpetual and therefore, if it ceases, it is per accidens; whence the dispensation is given absolutely, for example, dispensation from an irregularity on account of poverty is valid even if the poverty has ceased; dispensation from an impediment of marriage for legitimating offspring is valid even if, after the dispensation has been granted, the offspring dies.