ARTICLE II: ON THE CAUSES REQUIRED FOR DISPENSING

162. Principles. - I. For the liceity of a dispensation some cause is always required. The reason is that otherwise the Superior will not be a faithful dispenser, or he will be imprudent.¹ Therefore he sins who in such a case petitions for dispensation; for he induces the dispenser to an illicit thing, and therefore sins in petitioning by the same kind of sin by which the legislator sins in conceding.

II. But for validity no cause is required on the part of the one conceding, if he dispenses in his own law or in the law of an inferior. The reason is that in this case the Superior can simply repeal the law; otherwise, however, if he dispenses in the law of his Superior, because he is not presumed to have power of dispensing rashly.

III. For validity, on the part of the petitioner, it is required that there be no essential obreption or subreption in the petition, that is, when there is kept silent what necessarily had to be expressed (see, for example, n. 1625, q. 2°), or there is expressed what necessarily ought to have been kept silent,² for example, a false final cause (ibid. q. 1°). - Hence:

1° A dispensation is invalid whenever an error has crept into the petition concerning the motive cause, or concerning the very object of the dispensation, whether this happened by the fault of the speaker or of another, or even from mere inadvertence; if, for example, you put in the petition an impediment of affinity for an impediment of consanguinity, or the 3rd degree for the 2nd; yet otherwise if you put the 2nd for the 3rd, because a lesser grace is contained in the greater of the same genus. - It is valid if, the final cause subsisting, only the impulsive cause is false. An impulsive cause falsely alleged, in bad faith, invalidates "as a penalty of perversity,"¹ and therefore only after the sentence of a judge. Hence, T. I, p. 88, q. 89.

2° The dispensation is valid if an error has crept into the rescript of the Superior, for example, by the carelessness of the secretary, because it supervenes upon a concession already made.

3° The dispensation is valid if the cause, although not subsisting at the time of the petition, subsists at the time of concession, provided the dispensation is in gracious form (§ III after n. 1622), or also in commissary form (ibid.) and the matter is about a grace to be made (n. 151. 6°): but if about a grace already made (ibid.), it must subsist both when the commission is given and when execution is mandated. Id. ib. q. 90.

4° The dispensation is valid, although several false causes, even motive ones, have been set forth together with true and sufficient causes; because where some true motive cause is present, a sufficient foundation for dispensation is supplied.

5° The dispensation is valid in doubt whether a cause that is obreptitious or subreptitious is final or impulsive; true or false; sufficient or insufficient; for in doubt one must stand for the value of the act.

6° A dispensation granted by a Superior is valid, although it had already been denied by an inferior, and no mention was made of this denial. - Indeed, it is probably valid even if, denied by a Superior, it is granted by an inferior; because the power of the inferior is not restricted by the denial of the Superior unless the latter expressly restricted it.²

7° A dispensation obtained for someone unaware or even unwilling is valid when necessity demands this. - But those things which are obtained from the Penitentiary are not valid unless they have been petitioned either by the confessor, or by the penitent, or by blood relatives up to the 4th degree.

163. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are the just causes for dispensing from law?

Resp. Three are commonly assigned: 1) piety: thus he is dispensed from servile works on a feast who applies himself to labors pertaining to divine worship; 2) utility: thus he is dispensed from a simple vow of chastity who is placed in great danger of violating it; 3) difficulty: thus he is dispensed from fasting who cannot observe it without a sufficiently grave inconvenience.

Quaer. 2° Does a Superior dispensing without cause in a grave matter sin GRAVELY?

Resp. 1° Negatively, probably, of itself, as to the legislator; because, prescinding from scandal or the damage of others, there does not appear in this so great a disorder.¹

Resp. 2° Affirmatively as to an inferior, because he is not judged to have been delegated to dispense except for a just cause: and therefore, if he does otherwise, he gravely abuses the power conceded to him.²

Quaer. 3° Is it licit to use a tacit or presumed dispensation?

Resp. to the 1st Affirmatively, provided it can prudently be gathered from some sign.

Resp. to the 2nd Negatively, because the Superior ought to know that concerning which there is question; nevertheless a license can be presumed,³ if from conjectures there exists a certainly probable consent of the Superior (n. 1163. R. to the 2nd).

Quaer. 4° Is it licit to petition for, or to concede, a dispensation in doubt whether the cause is sufficient?

Resp. to the 1st Affirmatively, because it does not pertain to subjects to judge concerning the sufficiency of the cause, but only sincerely to set forth the matter to the Superior.⁴

To the 2nd Affirmatively likewise. The reason is that otherwise the burden imposed upon Superiors would become intolerable, and both the one dispensing and the petitioners would be exposed to innumerable scruples.⁵

Quaer. 5° What in doubt whether the case needs dispensation?

Resp. 1° A dispensation is not required in a doubt, whether positive or negative, whether the case is comprehended under the law, as is plain from what was said on Probabilism; for the extension of the law to that case remains uncertain. Make exception for a positive doubt concerning the existence of a diriment impediment of marriage, since in ecclesiastical impediments alone, which are doubtful by a doubt of law, the Church is presumed to supply (n. 60. I.).¹

2° But in doubt whether the cause is sufficient for excusing from the law without dispensation, a distinction must be made. Namely, in a positive doubt (n. 48. under 1) a dispensation is to be petitioned (n. 66. 2°), unless at the same time there is a doubt whether perhaps the observance of the law would gravely harm (n. 67. 1°. c). - But in a doubt founding an opinion only singularly probable for liberty, it is not to be petitioned (n. 66. 2°).

Quaer. 6° Is a dispensation extorted by fear valid?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided a cause for dispensing exists, nor is it established that in the Superior the intention of dispensing was altogether lacking, and besides any other cause of nullity is absent.

Quaer. 7° Is a dispensation valid which is given in good faith, when the cause that was thought to be present and sufficient is nevertheless not really so?

Resp. If there is question of a dispensation given by an inferior, St. Alphonsus, speaking of dispensation in vows,² follows the opinion of those who deny it, and this on account of the certain principle that an inferior invalidly dispenses without sufficient cause (n. 162. II.). But this reason has force also as to human laws. Yet the one dispensed can acquiesce in the dispensation as long as he is not certain of the non-existence or insufficiency of the cause.