Article II. On the Causes Required for Dispensing

117. Principles. - I. For the liceity of a dispensation some cause is always required. The reason is that otherwise the Superior will not be a faithful dispenser, or will be imprudent. - St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 97, art. 4.

Therefore he also sins who in such a case seeks a dispensation; for he induces the dispenser to an illicit thing, and therefore sins in seeking by the same kind of sin as the legislator in conceding.

II. But for validity no cause is required on the part of the one conceding, if he dispenses in his own law or in the law of an inferior. The reason is that he who can bind can also loose; but it is otherwise if he dispenses in the law of his Superior, because he is not presumed to have received the power of dispensing rashly. - Thus commonly.

III. For validity on the part of the petitioner it is required that there be no essential obreption or subreption in the petition, or one which falls upon the motive cause, because the Superior does not dispense except under a tacit condition, namely, If the prayers rest on truth. - St. Lig., no. 185.

118. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether a Superior dispensing without cause in a grave matter sins gravely?

I answer 1. No, probably per se, as to the legislator; because, scandal or damage to others being set aside, so great a disorder does not appear in this. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., no. 178, against others.

I answer 2. Affirmatively as to the inferior, because he is not considered delegated to dispense except from a just cause: and therefore if he does otherwise, he gravely abuses the power conceded to him ¹. - St. Lig., no. 180.

¹ Understand abuse and thence grave fault from its kind; for abuse of this sort, if it happens in a matter of light moment, or in a law which does not oblige under grave fault, will not exceed venial fault. But not only does an inferior dispensing rashly in the law of the Superior sin, but also he who uses such a dispensation. The reason is that such a dispensation is invalid, and therefore does not remove the obligation of the law.

QUESTION 2. Whether it is licit to use a tacit or presumed dispensation?

I answer to the first affirmatively, provided it can be prudently gathered from some sign. - Thus commonly.

I answer to the second no, because the Superior ought to know that concerning which the matter is being treated; nevertheless permission can easily be presumed when there is question of matters of lesser moment, and it is beside the law, not however against the law. - St. Lig., no. 187.

QUESTION 3. Whether it is licit to seek, or concede, a dispensation in doubt whether the cause suffices?

I answer to the first affirmatively, because it does not belong to subjects to judge concerning the sufficiency of the cause, but only to expose the matter sincerely to the Superior. - St. Lig., no. 178.

To the second likewise affirmatively. The reason is that otherwise the burden imposed on Superiors would become intolerable, and would be liable to innumerable scruples both as to the one dispensing and as to those seeking. - St. Lig. ibid. ².

² ** In this place St. Alphonsus (book 1, no. 178) affirms that the Superior can dispense if he doubts whether the cause is just.... It would be otherwise, he adds, if he doubted whether the cause is present. These things indeed, if the reason of the whole context is had, would seem to have been said of the legislator, or of one having equal power.

But elsewhere (book 1, no. 192), treating of an inferior prelate, he teaches that he can dispense in doubt whether a sufficient cause for dispensing is present. Which words do not sufficiently explain whether they are referred to a doubt whether the cause is present, or rather to a doubt whether the cause which is present is sufficient. And indeed they would seem to have to be taken in the latter sense, lest this sentence disagree with those things which have been brought from no. 178, especially since otherwise it would seem to attribute greater power to an inferior prelate than to the legislator. But those things which he has in book 3, no. 251 seem to stand in the way; there he says the dispensation has force if it is doubtful whether a cause was present, or whether it was sufficient: since these things are said of dispensation from a vow, they cannot be understood of the legislator. It remains therefore that a reason be sought for fittingly composing all these things with one another.

Meanwhile (book 1, no. 180) St. Alphonsus weighs the doctrine which he attributes to Soto, Laymann, Sanchez, Azor, and the Salmanticenses, namely that a dispensation is valid if the Superior by error judges the cause just: which words in the obvious sense are referred to an error by which a cause is thought just which is not just. Yet the holy Doctor seems (ibid., no. 181) to have understood them of a Superior who dispenses without cause, and he denies against the aforesaid Authors that the dispensation is valid, just as previously against the same authors (no. 180) he had said that the opposite must be held. But it is displeasing that after the Salmanticenses (On Law, ch. 5, no. 71) he exhibits the aforesaid Authors as though they taught that a dispensation is valid even without any cause, although conceded in good faith. For they, and indeed in those places which are indicated by the Salmanticenses, do not speak of the absence of any cause whatsoever, but of a cause which by error was judged just, when it was not such. Besides, the holy Doctor in the place to which he sends readers in both places, namely book 3, no. 251, comprehends each hypothesis; and he pronounces that the dispensation is invalid if afterward it is certainly found that no cause was present, or not a sufficient one. Concerning this sentence it will be useful to intimate that Palaus, whom the holy Doctor professes to follow (cited no. 251), certainly alleges several writers for the defense of his opinion; nevertheless they discuss by no means the hypothesis of a cause which is afterward detected as less sufficient, but only the hypothesis of no cause. And in reality, if this is extended also to a cause which afterward is found less sufficient, perhaps there will be someone to whom that which the holy Doctor has (book 1, no. 192) will appear difficult, namely that the one dispensing is not obligated to an examination concerning the full sufficiency of the cause when he doubts about this; and again (book 3, no. 251) that men after obtaining a dispensation are not held to inquire about its value. For how can solicitude of examining and inquiring concerning the sufficiency of the cause be absent, when there must be no dispensation if perhaps that is lacking?

QUESTION 4. What in doubt whether the case needs dispensation?

I answer 1. Dispensation is not required in positive doubt, or when it is probable that the case is not comprehended by the law, as is clear from the things said about probabilism; for the extension of the law to that case remains uncertain.

2. But in doubt whether the cause is sufficient for excusing from the law without dispensation, it is controverted. For some contend that dispensation is required. Yet others better deny. - Thus St. Lig., no. 192 ³.

³ This question seems to fall back into the preceding one, namely, What in doubt whether the case needs dispensation? But St. Alphonsus briefly responds (book 1, no. 192): Whether the doubt is positive or negative, the subject can use his liberty.

** Against this little note VV. (page 910) oppose these words of the same St. Alphonsus (book 1, no. 97): In doubt whether the cause is sufficient for excusing you from the law..., it is truer that you are held to the law.

I answer. Since the Author makes the question concerning positive doubt, the little note also must be understood thus, namely concerning a cause which is probably sufficient for excusing from the law. This being posited, VV. must either show that the second question does not fall back into the first; or they must inquire how those two sentences of St. Alphonsus cohere with each other. Indeed Sanchez, whom St. Alphonsus alleges for himself after the Salmanticenses, establishes the contrary if the doubt is positive (Decalogue, book 1, ch. 10, no. 35).

QUESTION 5. Whether a dispensation extorted by fear is valid?

I answer affirmatively, provided a cause for dispensing exists, and it is not clear that in the Superior the mind of dispensing was altogether lacking, and otherwise any other cause of nullity is absent. - St. Lig., no. 184.

119. Resolves. - 1. A dispensation is invalid whenever in the request an error has crept in concerning the motive cause, or concerning the very object of the dispensation, whether by fault of the petitioner or of another, or even if this happened from mere inadvertence; for example, if in the petition you put an impediment of affinity for an impediment of consanguinity, or the third degree for the second; but otherwise if you put the second for the third, because the lesser grace is contained in the greater of the same genus.

2. A dispensation has force if an error has crept into the rescript of the Superior, for example, by carelessness of the secretary, because it supervenes upon the concession already made, and the Superior concedes thus: Let it be done as is sought.

3. A dispensation conceded from a just cause to some wicked man whom the Superior reputed upright has force, even if, the wickedness being known, he would not have dispensed; the reason is that uprightness is not reputed a motive cause, but merely an impulsive one. - It also has force if a false cause at the time of the petition becomes true at the time of concession; but not vice versa. Except unless someone was moved on account of uprightness.

4. A dispensation has force, although several false causes, even motive ones per se, were set forth with true and sufficient causes; because where some true motive cause is present, a sufficient foundation of dispensation is supplied.

5. A dispensation granted by a Superior has force, although it had already been denied by an inferior and no mention is made of this denial. - Indeed it probably has force even if, denied by a Superior, it is granted by an inferior; because the power of the inferior is not restricted by the denial of the Superior, unless he expressly restricts it. - Suarez, On Laws, book 6, ch. 22. - Lacroix, no. 811.

6. A dispensation obtained for someone who is ignorant of it or even unwilling has force, when necessity requires this. - St. Lig., no. 186.