The Subject of Inherence of Virtues

I. In asking about the subject of inherence of virtues, we inquire which powers of the soul can be perfected by virtues; for virtues are in their subject as perfecting accidents. I said the powers of the soul; for from the notion of virtues handed down, it is easily clear that their proximate subject of inherence is not the soul itself, but its powers. For virtue imports the perfection of a power; and perfection is in that of which it is the perfection (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 1). Therefore, just as sanctifying grace, which is an entitative habit, inheres in the soul itself, so virtues, which are operative habits, have the powers of the soul as their proximate subject of inherence.

Now it is clear that the intellect alone is the subject of intellectual virtues, since these regard only truth, i.e., the object of the intellect alone. Hence it remains to inquire which powers can be the subject of virtues strictly so called. Now only those powers can be the subject of these virtues which both consummate the honorable good, i.e., actively concur in constituting it, and in their activity are not determined to that good. For powers which either do not consummate the honorable good, or are determined to it, cannot be perfected by virtues.

Hence the subjects of inherence of virtues are:

1. The will. That the will consummates the honorable good is clear in itself. Moreover, although the will by reason of its power is determined to good in general and to its own good, nevertheless it is not determined to the good owed to another; therefore it can be perfected by virtues which render it capable of desiring the due good promptly, uniformly, and delightfully (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 6).

2. The intellect, both speculative and practical.

a) The speculative intellect, which under the motion of the will, or freely, tends toward truth, manifestly consummates the honorable good. Moreover, although the said intellect can attain truth, nevertheless it is not determined to this, but has itself indifferently either to truth or to falsity; therefore it can be perfected by virtues by which it may uniformly, promptly, and delightfully attain truth.

b) The practical intellect, which under the motion of the will judges what must be done in a particular case, likewise, as is clear, consummates the honorable good. Moreover, since it is not determined to judging rightly, it can be perfected by virtues by which it may uniformly, promptly, and delightfully form a right judgment (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 3).

3. The sensitive appetite, both irascible and concupiscible, which under the motion of the will have themselves rightly toward sensible good, likewise consummate the honorable good. Moreover, since of themselves they are often opposed to reason, they can be perfected by virtues by which they may uniformly, promptly, and delightfully conform themselves to reason (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 5).

But the other powers of the soul, for example, the apprehensive internal senses, such as imagination, memory, and common sense, are not the subject of virtues, because they do not consummate the honorable good, but rather prepare for the acts of the powers which are consummative of that good (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 5).

II. Which virtues the enumerated powers are in fact the subject of will be stated in its own place.

The Parts of Fortitude.—As has been said above, the parts of a virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).

(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree (e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).

(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers (i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack, requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes one perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of fortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul be not thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued opposition).

(c) The potential parts of fortitude are the four just named, but as exercised in reference to minor dangers.

Greatness of Soul.—Greatness of soul or nobility (Latin, magnanimitas) is a virtue that inclines one to aspire after excellence in things most honorable, but to esteem and use honors themselves with moderation.

(a) The first act of this virtue is aspiration. It desires the higher manifestations of every virtue—the things that are more difficult and that befit a generous and elevated spirit, such as great austerity, great labor, great sacrifice, etc. Thus, it resembles fortitude, for both virtues are exercised in difficult circumstances.

(b) The second act of this virtue is moderation. It esteems honors at their true worth, for it is greatly concerned to possess the higher honors (i.e., good repute before God and godly men), knowing that these are solid and lasting, but it is less concerned about lower honors (i.e., the esteem and applause of the world), knowing that these are frail, fleeting, and common to good and bad alike. Hence, the great of soul are not elated in prosperity or dejected in adversity. This virtue here differs from fortitude, since fortitude is concerned with dangers, which are unpleasant, while greatness of soul is occupied with honors which are pleasant.

Comparison between Greatness of Soul and Humility.—Greatness of soul and humility are different, but not contrary.

(a) Thus, greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as worthy of great things, when one is indeed worthy of them on account of gifts bestowed by God (Luke, i. 46). Hence, the great of soul put the good above the profitable, they do not busy themselves unduly about lesser things, they are slow to ask and quick to grant favors, they are not outdone in generosity, they are not subservient before the mighty, and they are familiar only with friends. But if they are truly great of soul, they are also humble, knowing that the good is from God, and that of themselves they are weak and sinful.

(b) Greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as superior to lower things, for it makes one loathe anything that would be unbecoming the gifts one has received from God. Hence, as St. Thomas says, the noble character does not flaunt his ideals, nor obtrude himself into places or offices of honor; he does not complain or remember injuries; he is not haughty with inferiors but gentle and considerate with all; in manner he is quiet and unhurried, speaks sincerely, and is not much given either to praise or to blame others. But though the noble person despises all that is petty, he is not proud; and hence he can see the good that is in others, and he reveres those who are superior to himself.

Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.—The vices opposed to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.

(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities, taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in good faith and from inculpable ignorance.

(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is a just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary, seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25). This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not per se mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously sinful (e.g., if one’s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments) or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).

(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269). The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575 sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded, and their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man. The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g., those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity, like ambition, is per se only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes one boast of one’s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others, or neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are the publication by word or deed of one’s own true or pretended exploits (boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in pronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of intellect which make one hold obstinately to one’s views (stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others (discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention), sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 50.

563. A natural entitative habit is not found in the soul, because the soul is the form completing human nature, and therefore it cannot be disposed to something more perfect according to nature; but there can be found in it a supernatural habit by which it participates in a superior nature: thus through sanctifying grace it participates in the divine nature. - But in the body there is found a natural entitative habit by which it is more or less perfect in its being: such are health, sickness, beauty, deformity, leanness, etc.

564. Principle. Operative habit inheres in an indifferent operative power, that is, one not wholly determined to one thing. - It is proved:

1. It inheres in an operative power. For an operative habit is that which immediately determines to operation; but that must be determined to operation which is the principle of operation.

2. It inheres in an indifferent power. For that which can be disposed in several ways in itself can be ordered and determined in diverse ways to acting.

Hence it is in the powers of the soul which can operate in diverse ways:

1. in the will, which, as a rational power, can be ordered in diverse ways to acting and to a determined good of reason, and of itself is indifferent to acting well or badly;

2. in the intellect, which is in potency to all intelligible things, and undetermined to things not evident;

3. in the sensitive powers, not indeed when they operate from the instinct of nature (thus they are determined to one thing), but when they operate from the command of reason, according as they can be ordered to diverse things and disposed well or badly. But since:

a) the sensitive appetite operates more from the command of reason (and thus is more indifferent) than the internal senses, it follows that habit is found more in the sensitive appetite;

b) nevertheless habits are found in the interior senses, by which man becomes good in memory, or cogitative, or imaginative; but

c) they are not found in the external senses, because by nature they are wholly determined to one thing.

565. Operative habits properly so called are not in the powers of the body, which do not properly operate, but are mere instruments of the soul. For:

a) Operative habit per se does not inhere in the powers of the body, namely, the exterior members, or vegetative powers, or motive powers according to place, because by nature they are determined to one thing.

b) But insofar as they are moved by the soul, in them, and also in the external senses, properly operative habits cannot be, because they do not properly operate, but are mere instruments of the soul, which principally operates in them and which they obey at command.

c) Yet they are said to be in them secondarily, because in them there can be qualities and passive dispositions by which they are materially disposed to serving promptly the operations of the soul. Thus, for example, the motive powers according as the nerves are loosened or contracted; the vegetative powers according as they become accustomed to abstinence or to the use of a determined food.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56; De Virt. q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

582. Principle I. Virtues are in the powers of the soul. - Since virtue is 1. an operative habit, and 2. the perfection of an operative power, and 3. a disposition to the best end, but the end is operation or the thing operated, it follows that it is in an operative power of the soul as in a subject.

583. Principle II. In the intellect considered according to itself there are only virtues in a qualified sense, by which man is perfect under some respect: thus science and art; but insofar as it is moved by the will, there are also in it virtues simply and properly so called, by which man is perfected to the ultimate end: these are prudence and the virtues annexed to it, and in the supernatural order divine faith (q. 56, a. 3).

584. Principle III. In the will there are virtues simply so called, but not all. - For in the will:

a) There are not habits by which we are inclined to choosing our good of reason, proportioned to the will: for the will is appetite, whence from its nature, without a habit, it sufficiently tends toward its proper good; it is rational appetite, therefore it tends to the good of reason, that is, the honorable. Hence in the will there is no virtue for choosing the good of reason in the passions (q. 56, a. 6).

b) Nevertheless there are in the will habits for resisting the passions, namely, continence for resisting passions impelling toward delectable good against right reason, and constancy for resisting passions drawing one back from the good of reason on account of sadness and arduousness; these, however, are not called virtues, because they do not render man perfect: for they do not make the passions obey reason (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

c) Virtues simply so called inhere in the will, by which we are well ordered to an extrinsic good which exceeds the proportion of the one willing, whether as to the individual, such as the good of another, to which justice orders, or as to the species or human nature, such as the divine or supernatural good communicated to us, to which theological hope and charity order: for to these goods the will is not sufficiently inclined from its nature, and therefore virtues which order the affection of man toward God or neighbor are in the will (q. 56, a. 6).

585. Principle IV. In the sensitive appetite there are true virtues. - For in the sensitive appetite:

a) considered in itself there are not habits, nor therefore virtues;

b) but insofar as it is moved by reason and is the immediate principle of human acts, there are in it habits by which the passions obey and are conformed to reason, as fortitude, temperance, meekness, etc.;

c) moreover, those habits are virtues simply so called, because they include no imperfection, and because the good work is consummated in the sensitive appetite, namely, the regulated passion itself (q. 56, a. 4).

586. Principle V. In the other powers there are not virtues. - In the internal senses there are indeed good habits, but these are not virtues, because the good work is not consummated in the internal senses, and therefore those habits are subordinated to others: thus the habit of good memory serves the virtue of science, and a good cogitative power serves prudence. But in the other powers of man (the external senses, vegetative or locomotive powers) there are not properly operative habits, nor therefore virtues (a. 5).

D. Thomas, q. 56.

[Certain things are to be presupposed.

I suppose 1° that virtue is not subjected in the essence of the soul, but in its powers: partly because virtue is the perfection of a power, partly because it is an operative habit. But every operation of the soul takes place immediately through a power¹. ¹ Here q. 56, a. 1, o.

I suppose 2° that there is no virtue in the vegetative powers, nor in the members and external senses; for these are neither determined to one mode of acting, and, their due natural disposition being posited, they have no difficulty in their acts. And if by use they seem to acquire some facility, this is not caused from a habit of virtue, but only from the removal of impediments, just as external instruments become by very use more polished and apt.

I suppose 3º that there is no virtue in the interior apprehensive senses; because virtue is a perfect habit by which nothing happens except good and perfect operation: whence it must be that virtue be in that power which is consummative of the good work. But the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive apprehensive powers, but such powers are as it were preparatory to intellective cognition. Therefore in such senses there are not virtues whereby truth is known, but rather in the intellect¹. ¹ Ibid., a. 5, o.

Nor does it stand against this that there are virtues in the sensitive appetite, as we shall say presently. The disparity is that the sensitive appetite is moved by the will, and therefore the work of the appetitive virtue is consummated in the sensitive appetite, and on this account the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. But the sensitive apprehensive powers stand rather as moving with respect to the intellect; for phantasms stand to the intellective soul as colors to sight, and therefore the work of cognition terminates in the intellect. Wherefore cognitive virtues must be placed in it, and not in sense². ² Ibid., ad 1.

I suppose 4º that the intellect, even considered in itself, is the subject of intellectual virtues³; because the intellect in itself is indifferent, not indeed with an indifference of liberty, but of perfectibility in order to its object; for it can attain it well or ill, namely attain the true or the false under the reason of true; and there is no small difficulty in the inquiry and attainment of truth. Whence it needs habits which perfect it with respect to these things. And these are understanding, wisdom, science, and art. ³ Ibid., a. 3, o.?

But, because those virtues give only the faculty of operating well in their own genus, they do not render the act morally good and honest, nor do they make man simply good, but secundum quid and with an addition, as good philosopher, good grammarian, good smith; therefore intellectual virtues are not called virtues simply, but secundum quid, because the name of virtue was primarily imposed to signify the principle of moral rectitude¹. ¹ Ibid.

But truly, if the intellect, both speculative and practical, be considered as moved by the will, whose office it is to move the other powers to their acts, and which is the principle of all moral good — for therefore man acts morally well because he has a good will: then in the intellect there can be virtues simply so called, and thus prudence is in the intellect.

I suppose 5º that there are in the will virtues in order to the supernatural good, such as charity toward God, and in order to the good of one's neighbor, because each good is not sufficiently proportioned to the will. For the supernatural good exceeds the proportion of the will with respect to species, since it is above the whole species of nature; the good of another exceeds it with respect to the individual, because by this very fact that the will is rooted in this supposit through individual difference, it is determined to the proper good of the supposit, according to that word of the Philosopher: « To each his own good is amiable ². » ² *Ibid.

There remains therefore difficulty with respect to two things, namely: whether there are virtues in the will concerning the good of one's own supposit, and in the sensitive appetite as moved by the will³? ³ Ibid., a. 6, o.

Therefore

I say 1°: There are not in the will virtues concerning the good of one's own private reason, but these are in the sensitive appetite, as will presently be proved. This is against the Scotists and certain others.

It is proved. Virtues are placed in a power when the power is not of itself complete, perfect, expeditious, and proportioned to its object, and thence suffers difficulty in attaining it. But the will concerning the good of the reason of one's own supposit is complete, perfect, expeditious, and proportioned. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The will, as rational appetite, is nothing else than the very inclination to the good of reason. Therefore it is inclined either to no good or to its own good completely, perfectly, expediently, namely since it is proportioned to it with respect to species — and that is insofar as natural — and with respect to the individual. By what reason it is proved that the will is complete and proportioned not only to its own physical good, as certain will have it, but also to its own moral and honest good; because it is essentially a rational inclination, consequently to its own good consonant with reason.

You will object 1°: The will suffers difficulty in attaining the good of its own reason in the matter of temperance and fortitude. Therefore it needs to be perfected by virtues.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The will suffers difficulty in attaining the good of its own reason intrinsically and per se, I deny; it suffers difficulty extrinsically and per accidens, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. Therefore this difficulty does not arise from the fact that the will is not sufficiently complete and proportioned of itself to this good, both with respect to species and with respect to the individual, but from some extrinsic impediment, namely from the immoderation of the passions. But that this difficulty be removed, a virtue in the will is not required, but it suffices that the impediment be removed by the moderation of the passions, which is done through the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the sensitive appetite, where those passions reside.

You will object 2º: The will is capable of vice inclining to evil adverse to reason. Therefore also of virtue toward good consonant with reason.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is: the will in itself is inclined to the good consonant with reason, and yet from repetition of evil acts vice is acquired inclining to the good contrary to reason. But it is in itself completely and perfectly inclined and proportioned to the proper good consonant with reason. Whence, however often such acts of good be repeated, no more is virtue acquired than by frequent descents a habit would be acquired in a stone inclining it downward. But if the will suffer any difficulty, it is removed through the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the appetite, or overcome through the habits of continence and constancy in the will.

I say 2°: The sensitive appetite, as born to obey reason, is the subject of virtue, namely temperance and fortitude¹. This is common opinion against the Scotists. ¹ Here q. 56, a. 4, o.

I said, « as born to obey reason »; because the sensitive appetite, considered in itself and as common to man and brute, certainly is not the subject of virtue². ² Ibid.

It is proved. An act proceeding from one power moved and another moving cannot be perfect unless both powers be well disposed: as the act of the artisan cannot be fitting unless artisan and instrument be well disposed. But although the moving will is in itself well disposed to the proper good of reason, as I said, yet the sensitive appetite is not so disposed when moved, which since it is subject to the will not despotically but politically only, often departs from reason, and without the perfection of virtue superadded obeys it only with difficulty and with repugnance. Therefore³. ³ *Ibid.?

It is confirmed. Virtue must be placed in a subject capable and needy. But the sensitive appetite, as born to obey reason, is capable of virtue and needs it. Therefore. — Proof of the first part of the minor. That a power be capable of virtue there is required 1º that it can be directed by a superior; 2º that it be not determined to one mode of acting; 3º that it be elicitive of a perfect act. But the sensitive appetite 1° can be moved and directed by superior reason; 2º is not determined to one mode of acting, namely conformably to reason, but often deviates from it; 3° can elicit a perfect act, namely when its passions are moderated by temperance, fortitude, and the other virtues annexed. Therefore. — Proof of the second part of the minor. The sensitive appetite suffers grave difficulties in moderating the passions of the concupiscible and irascible. Therefore it needs virtues to overcome them.

You will say: Virtue is a good quality of the mind. But the sensitive appetite does not pertain to the mind. Therefore.

I answer. By mind in the definition of virtue is taken widely every faculty which participates reason. But the sensitive appetite, as moved by the will, participates reason. Therefore.

For the solution of objections there must always be held before the eyes the dependence of the sensitive appetite upon the will, by which actually moved, it participates reason concerning the singular honest good, that is, the election of the will, and perfect liberty, and through the same is regularly ruled by prudence existing in the practical intellect.]

The will can also control the sensitive appetites or passions; and, as these are of two kinds, the concupiscible and the irascible, the relation of the passions to the will gives rise to two classes of virtues and vices. Accordingly, the moral virtues are reducible to four heads, called the four cardinal virtues; namely, justice, a habit belonging directly to the will; prudence, dwelling in the intellect; temperance, regulating the concupiscible passions, and fortitude, commanding the irascible passions.

75. I. Justice perfects the will, inclining it to choose always that which tends to our true good and the attainment of our last end. As such it is a general virtue, and includes all the virtues. In a more restricted sense, justice inclines us to give to every one his due — to God by the virtue of religion, to our parents by filial piety, to our benefactors by gratitude. To other men we give their due by acts of what is commonly understood as justice. This, in turn, is of two kinds: commutative justice, by which we give to other men quid pro quo, i.e., an exact equivalent in return for what they give us; distributive justice, a virtue of the ruler, by which he distributes the honors, rewards, burdens, etc., of the community according to the merits and conditions of his subjects.

76. II. Prudence perfects the intellect, directing it to discern on all occasions what is best suited for the attainment of our last end. Thus defined, prudence is a general virtue, which includes: (a) Clear-sightedness, or a quick, accurate perception of the true value of means to an end; (b) Caution, which bids us take time to notice difficulties and to provide against them; (c) Self-distrust which disposes us to examine matters with care, and to accept the advice of others, especially if our own case is in question.

77. When clear-sightedness is perverted to the attaining of a morally bad end, it degenerates into the vice of craftiness or cunning; when carried to excess, caution becomes timidity, self-distrust turns into pusillanimity, and docility is changed into simplicity. In these, as in other matters, it is the part of prudence to indicate the proper mean, or middle course between excess and defect — "virtus in medio," "virtue holds the middle course" — the golden mean between too much and too little. "Avoid extremes" is an important maxim in moral conduct.

78. III. Temperance governs the sensible appetites in the use of things that especially attract them — namely, sensible pleasures. The will can restrain these appetites and accustom them to follow the guidance of reason. When this is brought about, they are said to be well ordered, and as such they contribute to man's perfection. The virtue of temperance does not consist in an entire abstinence from what the sensible appetites crave, but rather in the golden mean of moderate use. A higher degree of restraint belongs to the virtue of mortification. Still, the golden mean of temperance cannot be kept perfectly without constant checks upon the cravings of the passions — that is, without sometimes practising mortification by denying ourselves allowable pleasures. Concupiscence is like a fiery horse, which must be early broken in and controlled ever afterwards with a firm hand.

79. IV. Fortitude is the virtue by which the will commands the irascible passions to attempt what is lofty, though the means are arduous and even perilous, and to bear evils with composure. It thus embraces courage and patience. To attempt what is lofty is magnanimous; to contemn difficulties in the way is brave. Cowardice is the absence of fortitude; but fortitude, when carried to excess, i.e., beyond the bounds prescribed by prudence, grows into rashness. Thus, fortitude, like other virtues, must adhere to the golden mean. In this or that person, each of these four virtues may have different degrees of strength; nevertheless, no virtue can be perfect without the companionship of the others.