Section II. On the Subject of Inherence of Virtues

I. In asking about the subject of inherence of virtues, we inquire which powers of the soul can be perfected by virtues; for virtues are in their subject as perfecting accidents. I said the powers of the soul; for from the notion of virtues handed down, it is easily clear that their proximate subject of inherence is not the soul itself, but its powers. For virtue imports the perfection of a power; and perfection is in that of which it is the perfection (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 1). Therefore, just as sanctifying grace, which is an entitative habit, inheres in the soul itself, so virtues, which are operative habits, have the powers of the soul as their proximate subject of inherence.

Now it is clear that the intellect alone is the subject of intellectual virtues, since these regard only truth, i.e., the object of the intellect alone. Hence it remains to inquire which powers can be the subject of virtues strictly so called. Now only those powers can be the subject of these virtues which both consummate the honorable good, i.e., actively concur in constituting it, and in their activity are not determined to that good. For powers which either do not consummate the honorable good, or are determined to it, cannot be perfected by virtues.

Hence the subjects of inherence of virtues are:

1. The will. That the will consummates the honorable good is clear in itself. Moreover, although the will by reason of its power is determined to good in general and to its own good, nevertheless it is not determined to the good owed to another; therefore it can be perfected by virtues which render it capable of desiring the due good promptly, uniformly, and delightfully (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 6).

2. The intellect, both speculative and practical.

a) The speculative intellect, which under the motion of the will, or freely, tends toward truth, manifestly consummates the honorable good. Moreover, although the said intellect can attain truth, nevertheless it is not determined to this, but has itself indifferently either to truth or to falsity; therefore it can be perfected by virtues by which it may uniformly, promptly, and delightfully attain truth.

b) The practical intellect, which under the motion of the will judges what must be done in a particular case, likewise, as is clear, consummates the honorable good. Moreover, since it is not determined to judging rightly, it can be perfected by virtues by which it may uniformly, promptly, and delightfully form a right judgment (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 3).

3. The sensitive appetite, both irascible and concupiscible, which under the motion of the will have themselves rightly toward sensible good, likewise consummate the honorable good. Moreover, since of themselves they are often opposed to reason, they can be perfected by virtues by which they may uniformly, promptly, and delightfully conform themselves to reason (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 5).

But the other powers of the soul, for example, the apprehensive internal senses, such as imagination, memory, and common sense, are not the subject of virtues, because they do not consummate the honorable good, but rather prepare for the acts of the powers which are consummative of that good (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 5).

II. Which virtues the enumerated powers are in fact the subject of will be stated in its own place.