Question Two: On the Subject of Virtue

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56; De Virt. q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

582. Principle I. Virtues are in the powers of the soul. - Since virtue is 1. an operative habit, and 2. the perfection of an operative power, and 3. a disposition to the best end, but the end is operation or the thing operated, it follows that it is in an operative power of the soul as in a subject.

583. Principle II. In the intellect considered according to itself there are only virtues in a qualified sense, by which man is perfect under some respect: thus science and art; but insofar as it is moved by the will, there are also in it virtues simply and properly so called, by which man is perfected to the ultimate end: these are prudence and the virtues annexed to it, and in the supernatural order divine faith (q. 56, a. 3).

584. Principle III. In the will there are virtues simply so called, but not all. - For in the will:

a) There are not habits by which we are inclined to choosing our good of reason, proportioned to the will: for the will is appetite, whence from its nature, without a habit, it sufficiently tends toward its proper good; it is rational appetite, therefore it tends to the good of reason, that is, the honorable. Hence in the will there is no virtue for choosing the good of reason in the passions (q. 56, a. 6).

b) Nevertheless there are in the will habits for resisting the passions, namely, continence for resisting passions impelling toward delectable good against right reason, and constancy for resisting passions drawing one back from the good of reason on account of sadness and arduousness; these, however, are not called virtues, because they do not render man perfect: for they do not make the passions obey reason (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

c) Virtues simply so called inhere in the will, by which we are well ordered to an extrinsic good which exceeds the proportion of the one willing, whether as to the individual, such as the good of another, to which justice orders, or as to the species or human nature, such as the divine or supernatural good communicated to us, to which theological hope and charity order: for to these goods the will is not sufficiently inclined from its nature, and therefore virtues which order the affection of man toward God or neighbor are in the will (q. 56, a. 6).

585. Principle IV. In the sensitive appetite there are true virtues. - For in the sensitive appetite:

a) considered in itself there are not habits, nor therefore virtues;

b) but insofar as it is moved by reason and is the immediate principle of human acts, there are in it habits by which the passions obey and are conformed to reason, as fortitude, temperance, meekness, etc.;

c) moreover, those habits are virtues simply so called, because they include no imperfection, and because the good work is consummated in the sensitive appetite, namely, the regulated passion itself (q. 56, a. 4).

586. Principle V. In the other powers there are not virtues. - In the internal senses there are indeed good habits, but these are not virtues, because the good work is not consummated in the internal senses, and therefore those habits are subordinated to others: thus the habit of good memory serves the virtue of science, and a good cogitative power serves prudence. But in the other powers of man (the external senses, vegetative or locomotive powers) there are not properly operative habits, nor therefore virtues (a. 5).