Those who Impede Another from Obtaining a Good

He who impedes another from obtaining a good is bound to restitution, as follows:

I. If the other has a strict right to the good from which he is impeded, the one impeding is bound to restitution; nor does it matter whether he impedes the other by a means just in itself or unjust. Hence, for example, you are bound to restore to Paul if you persuade Peter, Paul's debtor, not to pay the debts to Paul (St. Alphonsus, III, 582).

II. If the other lacks a strict right to the good from which he is impeded, a distinction must be made:

1. If someone impedes another by a means not unjust - for example by persuading someone not to buy from Paul - he does not act unjustly; and this holds even if from hatred he impedes another from obtaining the good (St. Alphonsus, III, 584, 585).

2. If someone uses an unjust means, for example fear, force, calumny, fraud, lying,¹ a subdistinction must be made:

a) If the unjust means is unjust with respect to him who is impeded from obtaining the good, there is injustice and the obligation of restitution; as if someone, by calumniating a poor man, impedes him from obtaining alms. Make exception, however, if either the one about to confer the good cannot confer it without sin, or the one about to receive the good pursues it illegitimately or is going to abuse it; as if, by calumniating a poor man, you turn someone away either from making a prodigal donation to the poor man, or from giving alms which the poor man would abuse. In these circumstances injustice is absent in relation to the good impeded, although the act can be unjust on another head, for instance because of injured reputation. The reason is that per se someone can be impeded from obtaining a good which cannot be granted to him without sin, or which he himself pursues illegitimately, or which he is going to abuse; this being posited, the impeditive act is not unjust by reason of the good impeded through the act; but it can be unjust by reason of itself, for example by reason of the injury to reputation which it involves (St. Alphonsus, III, 587).

In a case in which someone uses an unjust means with respect to him who is impeded from obtaining the good, restitution must be made according to the certainty or probability by which the other is judged otherwise to have been going to obtain such a good.

b) If the means is directly unjust only with respect to him who was about to confer the good - as if someone by fear impedes another from conferring alms, for example, on Peter - it is disputed whether there is an obligation of restoring to Peter. Now it seems this must be denied, because under no head is it clear that injustice is committed with respect to Peter, neither by reason of the act, which is unjust only with respect to the benefactor, nor by reason of the good from whose attainment Peter is impeded, because Peter does not have a strict right to that good (St. Alphonsus, III, 632).

Objection. Everyone has a right that another not be unjustly impeded from giving a good to him.

Response. What is asserted is not evident, and therefore must be proved.

Nevertheless St. Alphonsus and others think that an obligation of restitution arises if someone impedes another from obtaining a good with precisely this intention, that the other not obtain the good, because the said intention seems to them to bring it about that the act assumes the character of a violent means with respect to him who is impeded from obtaining the good, and thus becomes unjust also with respect to him (III, 633).

¹ Fraud and lying are unjust insofar as, equally with fear, they deprive another of liberty of acting.

671. • Q. 15. Whether he is held to restitution who impeded another from the attainment of some good or benefice?

Resp. 1. Affirmatively, if the neighbor has a strict right to obtaining the thing, for example, in the case of a concourse.

Resp. 2. If the neighbor does not have a strict right to obtaining the thing, one must distinguish: 1. it must be affirmed, if this is impeded by unjust means, for example, by force, fraud, calumny, fear, etc.; 2. but denied, if it is impeded by means just in themselves, for example, by persuasion, prayers, etc. The reason is that no right of another is then violated, neither in itself nor in the means. - Thus commonly. - Hom. apost., n. 61.

Q. 16. Whether you are held to restitution if from an evil intention, for example, from hatred, yet with means unjust of themselves excluded, you turn another away from attaining a good to which he does not have a strict right?

Resp. More probably negatively. The reason is that no injury is inflicted on the neighbor. For an evil intention does not suffice for injury, but an external action is required which is a true and efficacious cause of unjust damage. - St. Lig., n. 584. - Elbel, n. 108. - Antoine, q. 15, and others more commonly against others.

587. 1. He who in any way impedes another from attaining some good to which he has a strict right, whether in a thing or to a thing, commits true injustice, and is bound to restitution proportioned to the damage inflicted.

Thus, e.g., if an advocate impedes a creditor from obtaining payment of a debt; if someone by prayers, persuasions, or other means induces a father to deprive a son of the legitimate part of inheritance to which from civil law he has a strict right.

588. 2. If the question concerns goods for the attainment of which there is no strict right, but only a legitimate power and founded hope, a distinction must be made: (a) he who uses unjust means, force, fear, fraud, calumnies, etc., commits injury and is bound to restitution, because each one has a strict right not to be unjustly impeded from attaining a good which he can legitimately acquire.

Thus, e.g., he who by fraud impedes an uncle from making a testament in favor of a nephew; - he who by calumnies prevents a rich man from bestowing alms upon such a poor man; - he who, by defaming a servant, keeps him away from the service which he deservedly hoped for; - a merchant who, in order to sell his own goods, lowers the goods of others by lies, or, by intercepting their letters, supplies the goods which were being sought from them, etc.

(b) But he who uses means in no way unjust, but only prayers, services, persuasions, etc., does not sin against justice, nor is he bound to restitution; for by doing this, he uses his own right.

Thus, e.g., he who by prayers induces a testator not to leave an inheritance to such a non-necessary heir, but rather to another more beloved to himself; he who by persuasions moves a bishop not to confer a benefice or ecclesiastical office upon such a priest, - indeed the more worthy, but by no means having a right to it, - but rather upon another less worthy.

589. 3. If someone impedes another from attaining a good of which this latter is unworthy, he does not do injustice, nor is he bound to restitution, because the unworthy person has no right to that good, but on the contrary ought to be kept away from it, on account of the public good.

Thus those who reveal to superiors the hidden delicts of someone, lest an office be conferred upon him for which he is unfit; - a woman who turns a prodigal husband away from making a donation to someone who pretends that he himself is poor.

590. Corollaries. 1. Those who pretend to be poor, while in fact they are not, and thus obtain abundant alms, unjustly extort money from donors, and must restore to the donors themselves who were deceived, if this can conveniently be done, or to other poor persons or pious works, according to the presumed intention of the donors. -

But if they are poor, and merely pretended to be a little poorer than they in fact are, they are not bound to restitution, since this mode of acting is for the most part understood by the rich, and does not induce a substantial error.

What has been said of the poor can be applied to all those who, under a feigned title, extort gifts, money, or legacies.

2. If the damage regards a right to a thing or a legitimate hope, restitution must be made according to the estimation of prudent men.

Question 10. Whether he is held to restitution who prevented another from obtaining some good?

Resp. 1st. Affirmatively, if the one impeded has a strict right to that good. 2nd. If he does not have a strict right to obtaining the good, one must distinguish: Affirmatively, if by unjust means he is impeded from obtaining the good; for anyone has a strict right not to be impeded unjustly from the obtaining of a good of which he is not unworthy. In this case restitution must be made according to the certainty or probability by which he is judged otherwise to have been going to obtain such a good. Negatively, if he is impeded by means just in themselves, because then no right of another is violated. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 61. - Lacroix, n. 69. - Laymann, l. III, tract. II, cap. VII.

Hence he exists as obligated to restitution toward a son who induces the father to exclude him from an inheritance to which by civil law he has a strict right. Likewise he is held to restitution who, by lies scattered against a poor man, prevents alms from being given to him. Those sellers also are held to restitution who unjustly detract from other sellers and from the merchandise for sale among them, in order that they may turn buyers away from them and entice them to themselves.

Whether he who impedes someone from the attainment of some good is held to restitution.

Note. The good that can be impeded either is owed to one's neighbor by commutative justice, inasmuch as he has a perfect right and in re to it, as to a benefice after its collation and confirmation, possession not yet acquired; or a right to the thing whereby he could reclaim it at law and make it his own, as to a benefice after election or presentation, or to a thing promised or bought but not yet delivered. Or it is not owed to him by commutative justice, but he has toward it only a certain moral right, whether from distributive justice, or from gratitude, or from the good will of him on whom it depends.

I suppose as certain that he who impedes someone from attaining a good owed to him by commutative justice, in whatever way he impede it, even by prayers or persuasions alone, without force or fraud, is held to restitution; because he violates commutative justice and the strict right of another.

I say 1° : He who without force, fraud or guile, but by prayers alone, persuasions, counsels, blandishments and similar means, impedes someone from attaining a good not owed to him by commutative justice, but either from distributive justice alone, or from another's gratuitous will, although already determined upon giving, is not liable to restitution : because he does not sin against commutative justice, nor violate the strict right of another; for that determined will of the giver does not confer strict right. Whence, just as the former could change his will without injury to the donee, so can another induce him to this change of will without injury to him.

I said, « a good owed by distributive justice alone, » such as benefices and public offices, which since they are principally ordered to the common good, and not to the private advantage of the particular persons to whom they are conferred, are not owed to these except by distributive justice. Otherwise of the public good, which is principally instituted for the utility of individuals, such as the public treasury, pious foundations, revenues from common goods ; for these are owed to individuals by commutative justice, inasmuch as each one has some strict right to his own part.

But greater is the difficulty, whether at least he who does it with the mind of harming is not liable to restitution. Whence

I say 2° : He who by the aforementioned lawful means, without force or guile, impedes someone from attaining a good not owed to him by justice, even if he do so with the mind of harming, from hatred, vengeance, etc., is not bound to restitution. This is common opinion with Soto, Navarro, Lessius, Laymann, Silvius, Serra ³⁸⁸ , etc., against certain ancients, among whom among recent authors Daelman adheres. ³⁸⁸ Ita etiam S. Lig., lib. IV, n. 584.

The reason is that the mind of harming, through an act which of itself and in these circumstances is not invasive of the strict right of another, is not against justice, but only against charity, nor does it make otherwise that the external act, which of itself and in these circumstances is not unjust, become unjust; for intention does not change the external act. But the obligation of restoring arises from an external violation of justice.

It is confirmed by the example of a judge who, condemning the accused according to the order of law from hatred and the mind of harming, does not sin against justice, and is not held to restitution.

You will say : According to the laws, if you cut the veins in your field through which water is conveyed to another's well, with the mind of harming, you are bound to restitution ; if with the mind of your own utility, you are not bound. Likewise, if you reveal someone's crime with the intention of defaming him, you sin against justice and are liable to restitution ; otherwise if from the intention that the guilty man be corrected, or that damage to an innocent be avoided. Therefore similarly in our case.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is because, in the cases objected, the act is by its nature and in these circumstances invasive of another's right, not in our case. But when the act is by its nature and in these circumstances invasive of another's right, yet so that on account of some reasonable cause we are permitted to do it, having ourselves only permissively toward the other's damage, then, if the intention of harming be present, we sin against justice and are bound to restore ; if absent, we do not sin, nor are we liable for the damage. The reason is that, for anyone to sin against justice and be liable for damage, there is required and suffices that he be the voluntary cause of a damage unjustly inflicted. But when someone through an act invasive of another's right intends his damage, and not some utility to which he has a right, nothing is lacking for him to be reckoned the voluntary cause of this damage inflicted groundlessly and unjustly. But when he does not intend the damage, but some utility to which he has a right, he is not reckoned the voluntary cause of the damage, but holds himself only permissively toward it. And thus stand the examples in the objection.

I say 3° : He who by force or fear, fraud or guile, detraction, lies and similar unjust means, impedes someone from attaining a good, although not owed by justice, but hanging upon another's free will, sins against justice and is bound to restitution of the damage according to the proportion of hope or certainty of having such a good : so that, if it were not yet settled that it be given to him, he is not bound to equality, but to some compensation, weighing the conditions of the persons and of the business, according to the judgment of a prudent man ; if it were settled that it be given to him, he is bound to equality, full certainty being supposed, otherwise, as was said, according to the proportion of certainty ^{389 389} Here q. 62, a. 2, ad 4.

The reason of the conclusion is that the impeder thus inflicts damage upon another through true injustice. For although that other does not have strict right to this good, he nevertheless has from nature strict right to seek it, pursue it and obtain it. Likewise he has the right not to be cast down and impeded from that prior right by force, fear, fraud, guile, lies and similar unjust means. Therefore he who by these unjust means impedes him injures his right, and consequently sins against justice and is bound to restitution, according to the said proportion of certainty or hope of obtaining that good.

But ask why he who impedes by prayers or persuasions is not equally bound to restitution, seeing that he also casts down one pursuing his right of obtaining.

I answer, the disparity is because, prayers or persuasions alone being posited, the giver remains in liberty of giving, and the recipient in liberty of pursuing; but force or guile being posited, the liberty either of the giver or of the recipient is taken away.

JUSTICE is violated not only by taking away goods acquired, but also by impeding their being acquired; and this is the third head, from which the debt of restitution arises; concerning which the holy Doctor says something in the Speculum Animae, cap. 1. where he describes five ways of doing damage, and from the four first he places the obligation of restoring; for the goods of others, whether possessed or to be possessed, are impeded by doing, commanding, counseling, helping, and dissimulating; but of this last he says that a mortal sin is often not committed, unless hatred, or some other wicked disposition toward one's neighbor, arises; for commonly this dissimulation happens from fear and pusillanimity; while one fears that the wrath of wrongdoers be excited against him, and redound to his own loss; whence from this no one is held to restitution: Otherwise it would have to be said of him on whom the duty lay by his office to coerce such wrongdoers; since here he is bound by the bonds of Justice to guard the goods entrusted to him by office; but others are bound to it by charity, wherefore they can licitly even dissimulate, when they probabilistically believe that by reproving they will not profit; as D. Augustine has it, lib. 1. de civitate Dei, in the Seraphic Doctor, at the place cited: If anyone for this reason spares the wicked in rebuking and reproving them, lest they become worse, it does not seem to be an occasion of covetousness, but the counsel of Charity.

Of the other ways, by which one who impedes his neighbor's good is held to restitution, I shall speak in the following doubts.

It is first SUPPOSED, by the common consent of all, that he who by prayers, blandishments, or other like means persuaded someone, who was going to give liberally to one person, to give rather to another, is not compelled to restitution; because as yet Justice is acquired against no one, against whom an offense could be committed; and this is intimated in the last law, C. si quis aliquem testari prohibuerit; wherefore if by prayers you persuade Caio, about to make a testament, to leave a legacy rather to Titio than to another, you are not held to restitution.

It is SUPPOSED second, according to Caietanus, Paludanus, Sylvestrus, and others in Azorius p. 3. lib. 4. cap. 9. quaestito 4., that he who in any way impeded the worthy man from an office or benefice, so that it be possessed by the unworthy, is held to make good a double loss: namely, to the Church, or the Republic, to which the unworthy man is preferred; and to that worthy man who is rejected out of regard for him; since each has equally acted against Justice, depriving both, whether the benefice or the minister. So an undue loss is inflicted on both.

It is SUPPOSED third, as certain, that he is held to restore who, even without force, fraud, or wicked intention, impeded another from acquiring a good to which he had some right of commutative Justice, whether that right was the perfect one, which they call Ius in re, (as Nauar. note, cap. 17. num. 89. Valentia quaest. 6. punct. 5. col. 923.) obtained by dispensation among the living, or by testament, or by legitimate collation, or confirmation, or by another legitimate way.

Or whether it was the imperfect right, which they call Ius ad rem acquired (as Nauar. and Valentia say) by just promise, purchase, stipulation, election, presentation, apposition, concourse, expectancy, regress, access, auxiliary help, primogeniture, or by another title of this kind; from which one can legitimately petition the Judge that the free faculty be made and preserved for him of progressing to the acquisition of the perfect right, and consequently of the real possession of it itself. The holy Doctor expressed this twofold way in these words: Damage can be done in a twofold way, either by impeding a good possessed; behold the first: or one to be possessed; behold the other.

The REASON is, because he violates Commutative Justice: Therefore he is held to restore; and indeed, if he has a perfect right, the impeder is held to restore the whole; but if the right was imperfect, he will be held to what is estimated pro rata for the certainty of the benefit, etc., with what must be computed being computed.

Valentia then POSITS as certain that he is held to restore who by fraud, deceit, or force impeded another, even an unworthy one, from a good to which he had no right from distributive or commutative justice; But this is not proved to me, because if he has no right, the matter does not concern justice, which is owed to the unworthy; and although one sins against Charity by unjustly revealing someone's hidden crime; yet since the sin is only against charity, no obligation of restitution arises from it.

But they ASK: Whether from this an obligation of restitution arises, because out of some evil affection of hatred, and with a wicked end, he impeded another from acquiring goods, whether he had a right to it or none at all.

Scotus AFFIRMS, 4. dist. 15. quaest. 6. art. 3. Palud. quaest. 2. art. 2. Richard. art. 5. quaest. 4. ad 7. and they ascribe the same to D. Thom. art. 2. ad 4.

The OPPOSITE opinion Adrianus teaches, de Restit. Sotus lib. 4. de Iust. quaest. 6. num. 3. Couar. relect. in Reg. Peccatum p. 2. §. 7. Nauar. cap. 17. n. 70. Valentia quaest. 6. punct. 5. col. mihi 924. Caietanus art. 2. Caspensis disp. 1. sect. 10. num. 116. Couar. epist. 4. p. 2. cap. 6 §. 7. This, which the holy Doctor supposes in speculo animae, cap. 1. and 2., where he derives the obligation of restitution from the mere doing of damage, is without controversy true; and therefore things done out of hatred he indeed places as opposed to charity, but not to justice, and consequently not liable to restitution, as the authors alleged argue, and Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 2. num. 64. citing Scotus loc. cit. and others.

S. Bonav. indeed CONCEDES, loc. cit. and to others to be referred in disputation 34., that material detraction, which is not out of hatred, or envy, or anger, is not mortal. Yet it does not exempt from the obligation of restitution one who does damage in that way; just as if someone playing, or without reflection, pushed another into a river, where he was submerged; the pusher would be held to pull him out, if he could; or if someone threw another's purse, not with a wicked mind but in play, into a hidden place; for even if he did not sin by throwing it, he would nevertheless be held to restore it.