Violence and imputability

Violence or coercion is the using of greater force than can be resisted to compel another to perform some action against his will. In certain connections the person who suffers violence is said in English law to be under duress.

It follows from the definition that violence is from something external to the agent; no one can offer violence to himself; and that the subject resists to the utmost of his power.

If the resistance is only partial, there is violence only under a certain respect (secundum quid).

The elicited acts of the will cannot be forced by violence, for in that case the agent would will and not will at the same time.

The other internal faculties, and much more the external faculties of man, may be subject to violence. If the violence is absolute, the resulting action is involuntary and not imputable to him who suffers violence; if the resistance is only partial, the action will be voluntary to a certain extent, and in the same degree it will be imputable to the agent (Can. 2205, 52215, Sec, 2).

Imputability.—Just as an act may be an act done by man (i.e., higher than the operations of brutes) and yet not be human (i.e., not performed in the manner that is proper to man as man; e.g., an act of reasoning or of decision during a dream, see 23 sqq.), so an act may be moral (i.e., in conformity or disagreement with the standards of right) and yet not imputable as good or bad to the agent (e.g., a prayer or imprecation said by an infant, or the drunkenness of one who did not realize the power of a liquor).

Imputability is that property of an act by which it belongs to its agent, not only in its physical nature as something of himself or as an effect produced by him or in its human quality of subjection to his will, but in its moral character of goodness or badness. From contact with the moral object, the agent takes as his own something of the brightness or defilement of that object, and so becomes chargeable himself with goodness or badness.

The conditions for the imputability of an act are:

(a) the act must be human—i.e., it must be performed knowingly and willingly (see 23 sqq.). One is not chargeable with the quality of the act, if not responsible for its very substance. Example: Titus suffers such intense pain that he does not know what he is saying, and he blasphemes. The morality of blasphemy is not unknown to him, but his present act is not voluntary, and hence is not imputable;

(b) the morality of the act must be known, or be something that should be known, at least in a general way, to the agent; for no one is responsible for what he is wholly ignorant of through no fault of his own. Example: Titus, Caius, Balbus and Sempronius rob the orchard of their neighbor. Titus in good faith thinks he is doing an act of virtue, because the owner owes money to his companions. Caius thinks that some kind of sin is being committed, but he does not know whether it is theft, or gluttony, or what. Balbus thinks that only a venial sin of stealing is being perpetrated. Sempronius, the youngest of the crowd, looks on the whole affair as a part of the day’s sport. All committed theft, and the act is wrong; but Titus and Sempronius were not guilty of sin, since they were in good faith. Caius and Balbus committed sin, the species and degree depending on the knowledge they had or should have had (see 588 sqq.);

(c) the morality of the act must be willed. If the act is good, the goodness must be intended, since a person should not get credit for what he does not wish. Example: Titus does not believe in virtue, and Caius is opposed to helping the poor; but both give an alms to a beggar, the former in order to get rid of the beggar, the latter in order to get rid of some old clothes. Hence, neither wishes or receives credit for the charity done. If the act is bad, the badness is sufficiently intended by the performance of what one knows is forbidden and wrong. The will chooses contact with the evil object, and thus implicitly with the evil of the object. Example: Balbus protests that he does not wish to harm anyone, and then proceeds to calumniate his neighbors. His disavowal of sinful intent does not make him any the less responsible for his calumny.

Imputability may be conceived as making one responsible for the moral quality of an act in three ways: (a) generically, if one should get the credit or diseredit of goodness or badness only; (b) specifically as to kind, if one gets the credit or discredit of a particular category of goodness or badness; (c) specifically as to degree, if one gets the credit or discredit of higher or lower grades of the same virtue or vice, or if one is made guilty of mortal or venial sin. These points will be discussed in the articles on the virtues and vices (see 186 sqq.).

Goodness is imputable as follows:

(a) As regards internal acts, a person is credited with all the goodness of the object, end, and circumstances, in so far as it is known and willed by him. Example: Titus purposes to pray in a penitential posture, in order to obtain the virtue of humility. Hence, he has the credit of worship, mortification and humility through his holy desire. If he thought of the penitential posture, not as a moral circumstance, or if he regretted it, he would have the act, but not the credit of mortification;

(b) As regards external acts, a person is credited with the greater readiness or intensity or duration which, through it, his will gives to what is good. Example: If Titus prays in the manner above described, his good will is intensified, and he has the credit of this increase in the accidental goodness of his act;

(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is not credited with their goodness, if this is merely permitted. Example: Sempronius, who is sorry that thoughts of a better life will go through his mind as a consequence of going to church, has not the credit of those good thoughts;

(d) As regards consequences that were foreseen, or that naturally result from an act, one is not credited with their goodness, unless it was wished. Example: Balbus teaches religion to children because he is paid to do so; Caius does so because it is a good act. The consequence that these children afterwards live virtuously is not morally creditable to Balbus, since he thought nothing about it; but it is a circumstance that increases the goodness of Caius’ act, since he intended his teaching precisely as it is a good work;

(e) As regards consequences that are not natural results of an act, if they were not foreseen or intended, they are not credited to the agent. Example: Titus speaks a simple and ordinary word of good advice to Sempronius, but the impression is so great that Sempronius undertakes and accomplishes extraordinary things, which Titus would not have deemed possible or advisable.

Evil is imputable as follows:

(a) As regards the internal act, a person is guilty of all the evil of the object, end and circumstances, as far as it is known and willed by him. Example: Balbus wishes he could steal all the possessions of Caius, and thereby drive the latter to suicide. Balbus has committed theft and murder in his heart;

(b) As regards the external act, one is guilty of all the circumstances of greater willingness, etc., which it adds to the internal act. Example: If Balbus actually steals from Caius and causes his death, his malice is shown to be very strong and to extend to the evil consequences of his external acts;

(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is guilty of the evil they entail, if one could and should have prevented it. Example: Balbus is guilty of the blasphemies he foresees will take place when he has taken too much drink, for he could and should have kept sober.

(d) As regards the evil consequences of acts, foreseen or natural, one is responsible for the evil, if one could and should have prevented it. Examples: Titus knows that a beggar will use profane language if denied an alms, but Titus cannot spare the money and is not responsible for what happens. Sempronius blasphemes in the company of many, and is therefore guilty of the sin of scandal, since he has no right to blaspheme;

(e) As regards the evil consequences of acts that could not have been foreseen, they are not imputable. Example: Balbus steals fifty cents from Caius, and the latter is so heartbroken that he commits suicide. Balbus is not responsible for the suicide, since such a thing was far from his thoughts when he stole.

It was just said (102, d) that when two results, one good and one evil, follow an act, the evil is imputable if it could and should have been prevented. It is not always easy, however, to determine at once when the evil result should be prevented, and, as cases of double effect are many, it will be useful to give rules that are more particularized, and that enable one to decide when it is lawful to do that from which will follow an act indirectly willed, or a consequence that is evil.

It is lawful to perform an action from which an evil effect is foreseen when the following conditions are present:

(a) the action willed itself must be good or at least indifferent; for clearly, if the action is bad, it is also unlawful;

(b) a good effect must also follow from the act, and it must not be caused by the evil effect; for the end does not justify the means. Thus, it is not lawful to take what belongs to others in order to give alms, for the evil effect (stealing) results from the act (taking) immediately; whereas the good effect (almsgiving) results only mediately through the theft;

(c) the agent must intend only the good effect, since it is unlawful to wish evil. Thus, if one foresees that one’s virtuous life will cause the sin of envy in a neighbor, this evil result of one’s virtue must not be entertained by one as something pleasing;

(d) the agent must have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the evil result that follows his act. Evil should not even be permitted, unless there is adequate compensation in the good that is intended.

To judge whether a reason for permitting an evil effect is proportionately grave, the following rules should be kept in mind:

(a) the greater the evil that results, the greater must be the good that is intended. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a robber in order to save a small amount of money: but it is lawful to kill an aggressor, if this is necessary in order to save one’s life;

(b) the greater the dependence of the evil effect on one’s act, the greater must be the reason for performing the act. Example: Titus gives permission to his class to play a game against another class, foreseeing quarrels and disputes between the teams. Less reason is required for granting the permission, if Titus knows that higher authority will grant it, should he refuse it;

(c) the more nearly the evil effect follows upon the act, the greater must be the reason for the act, Thus, less reason is required to direct a person who looks like a heavy drinker to the city than to direct him to a bottle of strong drink;

(d) the more certain it is that the evil effect will follow, the greater is the reason required for placing its cause. For example, one who speeds in an automobile on an unfrequented road, does not require the same excusing cause as one who speeds on a thoroughfare where many other cars are passing;

(e) the more obligation one has to prevent the evil effect, the graver is the reason required for placing its cause. Thus, since parish-priests, lawgivers, superiors and policemen are bound by their office to prevent moral disorders, a far greater cause is required in them, than in persons who have no such charge, for doing what will have an evil consequence.

3. So that he who suffers force cannot do the contrary: for if he can act against it, force or violence is now not had; for force or violence ought to be against the inclination of the will. But that which someone admits in himself, although he can remove it, certainly is not against the inclination of the will. “When someone is coerced by some agent, so that he cannot do the contrary, this is called necessity of coercion.” Thus St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 82. a. 1. Under this head force or violence can be distinguished as twofold, absolute and total, in a certain respect and partial, according as namely someone can in no way do the contrary, or can at least attempt and do something against it, for lessening the force and violence. Yet resistance altogether absolute and continuous to the coercion inflicted is not always required for avoiding fault, when namely on one side it would be useless, but on the other the matter is less dangerous. Thus martyrs led to the temples of pagans did not sin, although they walked on their own feet. But in every case one must resist as much as is required for averting proximate danger of sin and scandal, and injury to religion. Likewise someone can be excused from resistance to be opposed on account of fear of graver harm; nevertheless it is always necessary that internally, as much as he can, he resist sin by will. Wherefore, for bearing judgment concerning fault from omission of resistance, it must be considered not only whether someone could have resisted, but also whether he ought to have resisted. Therefore he who, resisting or acting contrariwise as much as he can, suffers force; or even resisting nothing and doing nothing contrary, because he can do nothing, because he is bound to nothing, cannot be called a cooperator and accomplice.

6. Now force or violence cannot be inflicted upon the will as regards its own acts. “As regards the proper act itself (namely elicited) of the will, violence cannot be inflicted upon it. And the reason of this is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle.... But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. Indeed, if acts of the will are elicited by the will itself, as by an active intrinsic principle, since the will is their active intrinsic principle, the same acts cannot be from an extrinsic, violent principle; for violent is that which is from an extrinsic principle, with the thing suffering not contributing force. “No one can will something unwillingly, because one unwilling to will cannot will.” St. Anselm, On Free Choice, cap. 6. Nevertheless, in the common mode of speaking, force is said to be inflicted upon the will when force is applied so that the purpose of the will is changed, which indeed cannot happen without a proper act of the will.

7. Hence it is clear that in a twofold sense acts elicited by the will can be understood to be coerced: namely first, so that they are called violent or coerced by violence or coercion as by an active principle, which cannot be; secondly, so that they are called violent or coerced by violence or coercion as by a motive. For just as fear can move or impel someone to doing something which otherwise he would not do, so also external force and coercion. Becanus, Tr. 1. C. 2. q. 10. n. 40.

12. Wherefore, when some passion is simply violent, because namely the force inflicted upon it is irresistible, and someone resists and repels by will in every way in which he can, it is simply and contrarily involuntary, and therefore not human, nor imputable. But when it is only violent in a certain respect, because namely it was not altogether unconquerable, and according to his powers someone does not resist and repel it by his will, then the account of the voluntary is not taken away, and therefore neither the account of a human and imputable act, but it is only diminished according to the greater or lesser force inflicted, according to the greater or lesser resistance and repugnance. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 18.

To be free, an action must proceed (1) from internal inclination, without constraint; (2) from a full knowledge of the end intended, and (3) from indifference of the will.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 5 sqq., qu. 76 sq.

An action that is performed without constraint is called spontaneous. Obstacles to spontaneity are: 1. VIOLENCE. —By violence (vis, violentia, coactio) is meant the state of being driven by some external force which the agent is unable to resist. Since the will itself cannot be subjected to violence, its interior acts (actus eliciti s. interiores) are never forced. The only acts that can be affected by force are those mediate acts known as imperati.² Acts performed under absolute compulsion, the subject resisting internally, are involuntary (actus simpliciter involuntarii). When the compulsion is not absolute, the acts performed under it are more or less voluntary, according to the degree of resistance offered.³

² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 4: "An act of the will is twofold: one is immediately its own, as elicited by it, namely to will; the other is an act commanded by the will and exercised through another power, such as walking and speaking. These are commanded by the will but exercised through a motive power. Therefore, with respect to acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence insofar as the exterior members can be prevented by violence from executing its command. But with respect to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be inflicted upon it. The reason is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior knowing principle, just as natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle but without knowledge. What is coerced or violent, however, is from an exterior principle. Hence it is contrary to the nature of an act of the will itself that it be coerced or violent, just as it is contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or of the motion of a stone that it be borne upward. For a stone can be carried upward by violence, but it cannot be that this violent motion comes from its natural inclination. Similarly, a man can be dragged by violence, but that this should be from his will is contrary to the nature of violence." —Cfr. St. Anselm, De Lib. Arbitr., c. 5: "A man cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will while unwilling to will." (Migne, P. L., CLVIII, 496). God can ex nolente facere volentem per gratiam efficacem (St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 19), and, by His omnipotence, cause the human will to act or abstain from acting; but He cannot properly speaking compel it, because He cannot cause it to will and not to will the same thing at one and the same time. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4: "It does not belong to divine providence to corrupt the nature of things, but to preserve it." —IDEM, De Veritate qu. 22, art. 8: "God can change the will by necessity, yet He cannot coerce it."

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 5. —That internal compulsion (necessitas) destroys the freedom of the will has been indirectly defined by the Church. Cfr. Prop. Damnat. Baii, prop. 46: "Voluntariness does not belong to the nature and definition of sin." Prop. 67: "Man sins, even damnably, in that which he does necessarily." —Prop. Damnat. Jansenii, prop. 3: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity is not required in man; freedom from coercion suffices." —Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandro VIII. (7 Dec., 1690), prop. 1: "In the state of fallen nature, for formal sin and demerit that freedom suffices by which the act was voluntary and free in its cause—original sin and the will of Adam sinning." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1046, 1067, 1094, 1291). —Cfr. Th. Müncker, Der psychische Zwang in seinen Beziehungen zu Moral und Pastoral, Düsseldorf 1922.

2. IGNORANCE. —When a man has no knowledge of the end intended, he is said to be ignorant. Moral ignorance may therefore be defined as a lack of that knowledge which a person ought to have in order to perform the duties of his office or vocation. It is impossible to will a thing that lies outside the scope of one's knowledge.⁴ If a man unknowingly directs his action towards such an object, that action is in so far forth involuntary (involuntarium).⁵

⁴ "Quod latet, ignotum est," "Ignoti nulla cupido," are Scholastic axioms.

⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arbitr., III, c. 19, n. 53: "It is not charged to you as a fault that you are unwillingly ignorant, but that you neglect to seek what you do not know." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1297).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 76, art. 2-3.

Ignorance may be culpable or inculpable (culpabilis s. inculpabilis), vincible or invincible (vincibilis s. invincibilis).

Invincible ignorance is that which cannot be overcome by the use of ordinary intelligence. It involves no moral responsibility.

Vincible ignorance, on the other hand, —the kind that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary intelligence, —may, in certain circumstances, diminish moral responsibility, but never entirely abolishes it; for whatever is done in a state of vincible ignorance, is willed at least indirectly, and to that extent is voluntary.

Ignorance due to gross negligence is called crass or supine (ignorantia crassa); when means are used to foster it, it is called affected (ignorantia affectata). Both crass and affected ignorance are sinful.⁶

⁶ Cfr. Job XXI, 14; John IX, 41; XV, 22.

3. FEAR. —Fear (metus) is a disturbed condition of the mind caused by real or imaginary danger. Fear does not always destroy free-will, but generally diminishes accountability.⁷

⁷ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 6; qu. 41-44; St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 20—22.

Fear is grave or slight (metus gravis s. levis) according to the nature of the danger by which it is caused. As fear, generally speaking, does not exercise compulsion, the actions which it inspires are voluntary, though the degree of their imputability varies in proportion to the disturbance excited in the mind. Both canon and civil law regard acts inspired by grave and unjust fear as void.⁸ If serious evil or danger suddenly overwhelms a man, so as to deprive him momentarily of the use of reason, the acts he performs in that state are involuntary; in other words, a man may sometimes be so disturbed by fear that free-will is suspended.

⁸ Cfr. J. Laurentius, S.J., Instit. Iuris Eccl., Freiburg 1903, pp. 458 sqq.; E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, London 1906, p. 345.

4. CONCUPISCENCE. —Concupiscence (concupiscentia), in the general sense of the term, is any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object.⁹ More particularly, it is that inordinate inclination to evil which is in human nature since the fall of Adam and Eve.¹⁰

⁹ Cfr. Catechismus Romanus, P. III, c. 10, qu. 5: "It must be known that concupiscence is a certain agitation and force of the mind by which men, impelled, seek pleasant things that they do not have."

¹⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 30, art. 1-3: "Concupiscence is the appetite for a delightful good ... according to sense, ... the sensitive appetite, a passion of the sensitive appetite." Cfr. qu. 77, art. 1 and 7. —St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 23-25; Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 203, 217, 245, 261 sqq., 283 sqq.

Concupiscence may precede or follow the action of the will. In the former case it is called antecedent; in the latter, consequent.

Antecedent concupiscence (concupiscentia antecedens) is involuntary when it completely impedes the use of reason, and in that case there is no accountability. Men are often "blinded by passion." When the use of reason is not entirely suspended, the guilt of an evil act may be greatly diminished by passion.¹¹ Thus, to kill a man in a rage is less criminal than to murder him in cold blood.

¹¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 7: "Sometimes passion is so great that it entirely takes away the use of reason, as is evident in those who become insane through love or anger; and then, if such passion was voluntary from the beginning, the act is imputed as sin because it is voluntary in its cause. ... But if the cause was not voluntary but natural, as when someone through illness or some similar cause falls into such a passion as entirely takes away the use of reason, the act is rendered wholly involuntary and consequently is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, passion is not so great that it entirely interrupts the use of reason; and then reason can exclude the passion by turning to other thoughts, or prevent it from obtaining its effect, because the members are not applied to action except by consent of reason. Hence such passion does not entirely excuse from sin." (Cfr. qu. 10, art. 3; qu. 73, art. 6).

Consequent concupiscence (concupiscentia consequens) may to some extent obscure the light of reason, but as a rule increases the malice of evil acts ¹² because it is either deliberately excited by the will or, at any rate, willed in its cause.¹³

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 7: "Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but rather makes something voluntary. For something is called voluntary because the will is borne toward it; through concupiscence the will is inclined to will what it desires, and therefore concupiscence tends more to make something voluntary than involuntary." —Qu. 77, art. 1: "A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot directly draw or move the will, but it can do so indirectly, and in two ways: first, by a certain distraction ... and secondly, on the part of the will's object, which is the good apprehended by reason."

¹³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 6: "Consequent passion does not diminish sin, but rather increases it, or more properly is a sign of its magnitude insofar as it shows the intensity of the will toward the sinful act. And so it is true that the greater the lust or concupiscence with which someone sins, the more he sins." —IDEM, De Veritate, qu. 26, art. 7: "Consequent passion itself in the lower appetite is a sign that the movement of the will is intense. For in a passible nature the will cannot be strongly moved toward something without some passion following in the lower part. Hence Augustine says that while we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions, we do not live rightly." —The passage of St. Augustine here referred to by the Angelic Doctor is De Civitate Dei, XIV, c. 9, n. 4 (Migne, P. L., XLI, 451).

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, qu. 76 sq. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., Freiburg 1904, pp. 73 sqq. —A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, pp. 48 sqq. —Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus Theol. Mor., Vol. I, tr. 1, c. 3-6. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 41 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 59 sqq. —F. P. Kenrick, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, pp. 7 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 177 sqq., 184 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, Bruges 1922, pp. 69 sqq., 77 sqq., 81 sqq.

63. Notion. Violence (coercion, force), or the violent, is that which proceeds from an extrinsic principle, while he who suffers force is altogether resisting.^48a From this definition it follows that two things are required for a violent act, namely: 1. that it proceed from an extrinsic principle; 2. that it occur with complete repugnance, that is, external and internal, on the part of him who suffers force. Hence no one is able to inflict violence upon himself; for he is not an extrinsic principle to himself. Sometimes even vehement fear is called violence in a certain respect, but here we speak of physical and absolute violence, or of violence in the strict sense, concerning which the following principles are valid:

^48a Concerning the difference between the violent, the coerced, the necessary, and the involuntary, see Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 5.

64. Principle 1. No internal act of the will can be extorted by any external violence.

The reason is that the will is a spiritual faculty whose essential mode of operating is liberty. But it is repugnant that the same act should be at the same time free, as elicited by the will, and at the same time coerced, as caused by a violent external principle. Wherefore violence can indeed attack, but not conquer, an unwilling will.

Hence the old Roman law briefly established: "a coerced will is a will"; and St. Anselm says elegantly:⁴⁹ "One cannot will unwillingly, because one cannot will while not willing to will, for everyone willing wills his very willing." St. Thomas⁵⁰ teaches: "Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as also to the natural ... just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something contrary to nature, so in knowing things it makes something be contrary to the will. But that which is contrary to nature is said to be unnatural, and similarly that which is contrary to the will is said to be involuntary; whence violence causes the involuntary." Indeed St. Bonaventure⁵¹ teaches that not even by God Himself can violence be inflicted upon the will. "Therefore the will can be induced by a created agent; but it cannot be changed by another except by an uncreated agent; but it cannot be coerced by anyone." St. Thomas says the same:⁵² "God can change the will by necessity, yet He cannot coerce it." Nor does this detract from the full dominion of God; for although God cannot inflict violence upon the human will, since this is repugnant (just as generally God can do nothing which is intrinsically repugnant), nevertheless by various modes He is able infallibly to move even our rebellious wills and to change them at His nod.

⁴⁹ De lib. arbitr. c. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 158, 496).

⁵⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 5.

⁵¹ In II, dist. 25, pars 2, a. un., q. 5.

⁵² Quaest. disp. de verit. q. 22, a. 8.

65. Principle 2. External acts of the will, that is, all acts which can be commanded by the will, can be caused by extrinsic violence.

The reason is that these acts (at least if you except the proper act of the intellect) are exercised by means of a sensible organ. But an extrinsic principle can act violently upon a sensible organ, however much the will inwardly resists. Thus, for example, the eyes can be compelled to seeing, the ears to hearing, notwithstanding the resistance of the will. In a psychopathic state a man pronounces certain words and performs certain movements, although the will resists (Zwangsreden, Zwangshandlungen). Thus likewise a luxurious delectation can be violently produced by an external agent, however much the will resists. Hence also the devil can violently produce obscene images in the phantasy, and by means of those phantasms indirectly move (but not coerce) both the will and especially the intellect. But the devil cannot directly move the human intellect nor know its thoughts without the consent of man. God alone can directly coerce the intellect of man.⁵³

⁵³ Cf. S. theol. I, q. 57, a. 4 and I-II, q. 80, a. 2.

66. Corollaries. From what has been said it follows:

1. Internal acts are morally imputed, however much a man has suffered violence; for they remain voluntary. For example, a man sins who under a most vehement diabolical temptation consents to morose delectation.

2. External acts caused by violence are not imputed,⁵⁴ provided the man has restrained internal consent and has manifested his displeasure also externally. The reason is that such acts are altogether involuntary. Hence, for example, a woman who is violently oppressed immodestly does not sin, provided that inwardly she does not consent and also seriously manifests her displeasure outwardly. - Authors are accustomed here to ask whether a woman in this case is bound rather to suffer death than her own violation. That a woman in these circumstances can rather choose death than her own violation, all teach, both because, on account of the great delectation following from a libidinous act, some danger of interior consent is present, and because bodily integrity is a great good, which by some is equated with life. - Some deny, others affirm, that a woman then is bound to prefer death. St. Alphonsus⁵⁵ says concerning this matter: "The first opinion (namely, the negative), speaking speculatively, does not seem to lack its probability. Yet it must not be denied that the second, affirmative opinion is altogether to be urged in practice; at least because of the danger of consent, which can easily be present in that permission." It seems to me that this case pertains rather to fear than to violence. For a woman under fear of death is accustomed to be induced to permitting rape. Besides, the denying opinion is safe in practice; for there does not seem to be such a proximate danger of sinful consent, since the woman (inwardly abhorring that act with all her strength) will be so sorrowful because of the unspeakable disgrace that she will perceive no carnal delectation, as the example of the woman, even pagan Lucretia, oppressed by Tarquin, shows. Moreover, fear and disturbance of spirit will be so enormous in those circumstances that the use of reason is considered very much diminished. Whence no strict obligation exists of preferring death to violent oppression.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 103, § 1, and c. 2205, § 1.

⁵⁵ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 368.

⁵⁶ Thus also Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 6.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 4 and 5.

68. Violence, which is called coercion when it is exercised toward a being that has knowledge, is properly a motion which proceeds from an extrinsic principle, with the patient resisting, that is, with that which suffers force resisting. It is said:

1. From an extrinsic principle, and thus the violent differs from the natural and the voluntary, which are from within: for nothing properly inflicts violence on itself, for otherwise it would at the same time tend and not tend toward the same thing;

2. With the patient resisting, that is, while the one suffering resists with every effort. For if something is naturally or voluntarily disposed, or not indisposed but indifferent, to suffering that which is from without, the passion will be natural or voluntary or permitted, not violent.

Hence violence is distinguished as a) violence strictly so called, or absolute and perfect, when the patient resists as much as he can, for example death inflicted on one who defends his life; and b) violence broadly so called, imperfect and in a certain respect, when he resists but not as much as he can, for example death inflicted on a martyr.

It differs a) from the necessary, to which it adds that it is from an extrinsic principle, while the necessary can also be from within;

b) from the involuntary, because this can be from within, from the knowledge of evil or defect of knowledge of the end. Indeed, every violent thing is necessary, and, if there is question of a knowing being, involuntary; but not conversely;

c) from that which is called moral violence: with properly so called physical violence (which by St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, is called sufficient and compelling) there is not to be confused the improperly so called or moral (it is called insufficient and impelling), which is inflicted by threatening and rebuking and which coincides with grave fear instilled, especially when something would not be impeded by resisting but would then be effected by external force, e.g., departure from a house made by someone who otherwise is expelled by military hand.

69. Can Violence Be Inflicted on the Will? - There is a twofold act of the will: one immediately elicited by it, namely, to will; the other commanded by it, exercised through another power, for example voluntarily to think, to walk, to speak. As to the former, violence cannot be inflicted on the will: for an elicited act is the very inclination of the will to something, proceeding from an intrinsic knowing principle; but a violent act proceeds from an extrinsic principle. Therefore it is impossible for an act of the will to be violent. And indeed, the violent is against the inclination of the patient; but the elicited act of the will, since it is the inclination of the will itself, cannot be against its own inclination. Hence Anselm says, De libero arbitrio, chapter 6: "No one can unwillingly will something, because he cannot will while unwilling to will." - But as to commanded acts, it can suffer violence, insofar as by violence our external or internal powers are moved against the command of the will, or are impeded lest they execute it, for example the foot lest it make a step, the eye, by closing it, lest it see, etc. Hence:

a) No one can coerce the will itself, not even God Himself.

b) God alone, as cause both of the will and of the act itself, can change it, that is, transfer it from one thing into another and make the unwilling willing, and the one willing this to be willing that; nevertheless He then does not inflict violence, or coerce the will against its inclination, but makes one inclination of the will succeed another.

c) God, angels, and the devil can, against the will, move the intellect, imagination, and sensitive appetite toward some object; in this case that movement with respect to these faculties is not violent, but it is violent with respect to the will.

d) All these, and men, can move the exterior members and external senses against the will.

70. Principles. The violent is directly opposed to the voluntary, and therefore makes the involuntary: for the violent (when it is inflicted on a knowing being) is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the willing subject; but the voluntary is from within, that is, from the proper inclination of the will (cf. can. 2205, § 1).

"Common to the voluntary and the natural," says St. Thomas, a. 5, "is that each is from an intrinsic principle" (i.e., from the proper inclination of the agent); "but the violent is from an extrinsic principle" (against the inclination of the subject). "And because of this, just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something be against nature" (unnatural), "so in knowing things it makes something be against the will... which is called involuntary."

Hence that which happens from an extrinsic principle:

1. If the subject resists externally and internally as much as he can, is absolutely violent and altogether involuntary;

2. If he resists externally, but consents internally, it is not voluntary nor involuntary, but willed;

3. If he does not consent nor resist, or does not resist as much as he can, but bears himself passively, while he ought not to resist or to resist more, it is not voluntary but permitted;

4. If he does not consent, but neither does he resist as much as he ought, it is indirectly voluntary (no. 60, II);

5. If he does not resist as much as he can but consents, it is violent in a certain respect but simply voluntary, yet less so the greater the violence was or the more he resisted. For the voluntary is "in one way according to action, when someone wills to do something; in another way according to passion, when someone wills to suffer something from another. Hence when an action is inflicted by someone exterior, while there remains in him who suffers the will of suffering, it is not simply violent, because although he who suffers does not contribute by acting, nevertheless he contributes by willing to suffer; hence it cannot be called involuntary" (a. 5, ad 2).

A girl oppressed by force, if she resists as much as she can, is oppressed involuntarily; if she does not resist as much as she ought or if she consents, voluntarily and culpably; if she does not resist as much as she can but as much as she ought, not involuntarily but permissively. Danger of consent being excluded, she is not bound to resist by useless means, or extraordinary means (the killing of the aggressor), or even by shouting if there is danger of notable harm, e.g., death, excessive shame: in these cases the oppression is not voluntary. But if internally she consents, externally she resists as much as she ought, the external oppression is not therefore truly voluntary, but only willed.

Force or violence is coercion which is brought upon someone by an extrinsic and free cause, his will resisting. But the will is said to resist when, both exteriorly, that is, by the aid of means extrinsic to itself, for example, by prayers dissuading, by threats deterring, by repelling force with force, etc., and interiorly, that is, in itself and by an interior affection, it resists as much as it can.

Acts elicited by the will can in no way be forced, because, as St. Thomas says: "it is against the account of the act of the will itself that it be forced or violent." But the other acts extrinsic to the will, whether they are completed by the external powers, or by the internal powers as by phantasy and the sensitive appetite, if they are posited from absolute violence, are not voluntary, and therefore not sinful; but if from violence in a certain respect, they are more or less voluntary according to the greater or lesser difficulty of resisting, or according to the greater or lesser affection with which one suffers force. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 4. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 17 and 18.

In canon law.

§ 1. Acts which a person, whether physical or moral, posits from extrinsic force, which cannot be resisted, are held as not done (Can. 103).

You Will Resolve. 1st. A woman who resists in every way the violence which is brought upon her sins in no way, even if intercourse occurs; because no one sins wholly unwillingly.

2nd. Women suffering force sin gravely if, through faintheartedness or vain fear, for example, of offending the aggressor, etc., they do not resist as much as they can, even with the danger of consent excluded, because while they resist less than is fitting, they equivalently consent to the violation of themselves, and cooperate in the crime of another.

But if you ask whether this resistance ought to be so great that it reaches even to crying out, a distinction is needed: if there is present proximate danger of consent, the woman is bound to cry out, despising whatever damage the aggressor threatens to her, because formal sin must absolutely be avoided. But with this danger excluded, again a distinction must be made: if the aggressor does not seek intercourse, being content only with touches and other things of this sort, then, according to St. Alphonsus, it is very probable that there is not such an obligation, even if fear of a damage less than death is cast upon her. The reason is that such an obligation cannot arise either by reason of preserving virginity, which by hypothesis remains intact, or by reason of charity, which does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. But if intercourse is sought, then, according to the same holy Doctor, the opinion which holds that a violated woman is not bound to cry out, while fear of death stands, is not lacking in probability, but only speaking speculatively; for practically it scarcely seems possible that this woman would not consent to venereal delight. Cf. St. Alphonsus, on the fifth precept of the Decalogue, n. 368; on the sixth precept of the Decalogue, n. 430.

3rd. Sometimes resistance wholly absolute and continuous against inflicted coercion is not required, namely when on the one hand it would be useless, and on the other hand there is question of a less dangerous matter. Thus martyrs led to pagan temples did not sin, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required for averting the danger of scandal, or injury to religion.

The things established in these two chapters concerning the human act receive splendid confirmation from those things which the new Code decrees concerning delicts, or external violations of law to which a canonical sanction has been added.

Question 1. On what things does the imputability of a delict depend?

Response. The imputability of a delict depends on the malice of the delinquent, or on his fault in ignorance of the violated law or in omission of due diligence; wherefore all causes which increase, diminish, or remove malice or fault, by that very fact increase, diminish, or remove the imputability of the delict (Can. 2199).

§ 1. Malice here is the deliberate will of violating the law, and to it there is opposed, on the part of the intellect, defect of knowledge, and on the part of the will, defect of liberty.

§ 2. Once an external violation of law has been posited, malice in the external forum is presumed until the contrary is proved (Can. 2200).

Namely, such is the fault to be imputed as is the deliberate will of violating the law; defect of knowledge diminishes the account of the voluntary according to the measure of ignorance, just as defect of liberty also diminishes actual imputation; in equal manner omission of diligence flows into fault. These things notwithstanding, once an external violation of law has been posited, the deliberate will of violating the law, or malice, is supposed, unless the contrary is proved. Therefore the subjective elements of a delict are discretion of mind and liberty of will; when these are lacking, there cannot be given an intention of committing a delict, or the foundation of imputability.

Question 2. Who are, and who are presumed to be, incapable of delict? In what manner does voluntary and involuntary drunkenness stand toward the imputability of a delict? In what manner weakness of mind?

Response. § 1. Those are incapable of delict who actually lack the use of reason.

§ 2. Those habitually insane, although sometimes they may have lucid intervals, or in certain reasonings or acts may seem sane, are nevertheless presumed incapable of delict.

§ 3. A delict committed in voluntary drunkenness is not devoid of some imputability, but this is less than when the same delict is committed by one who is fully master of himself, unless, however, drunkenness was sought expressly for perpetrating or excusing the delict. But when the law is violated in involuntary drunkenness, imputability is wholly absent if the drunkenness takes away the use of reason entirely; it is diminished if only in part. The same is to be said of other similar disturbances of mind.

§ 4. Weakness of mind diminishes the imputability of a delict, but does not wholly remove it (Can. 2201).

This canon is an application of the preceding one to various cases, and first indeed to those lacking the use of reason, who cannot intend a delict and therefore are simply incapable of it. For how shall he be constituted guilty who does not know what he is doing? By equal reason the habitually insane are presumed incapable of delict; they should rather be cared for and pitied than punished, c. 14, C III. 9. Drunkenness stands in diverse ways toward the imputability of a delict, which certainly will not be lacking when the drunkenness was voluntary, although it is less than when a man is fully master of himself, unless the drunkenness was directly sought for perpetrating the delict. Involuntary drunkenness indeed removes fault; weakness of mind does not remove the use of reason, but plainly diminishes it and liberty, and thus imputability.

Question 3. Does ignorance affect the imputability of a delict?

Response. § 1. The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself.

§ 2. Ignorance only of the penalty does not remove the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat.

§ 3. Those things which are established concerning ignorance are also valid concerning inadvertence and error (Can. 2202).

This canon is an application of canon 2199 to defect of knowledge, which is opposed to imputability. For if ignorance of the violated law is inculpable, the very fact of violation is inculpable. But if, however, ignorance of the law is culpable, the violation will be culpable; and indeed the culpability of the latter follows the culpability of the former. Ignorance only of the penalty leaves the violation of the law intact; and therefore in no way removes imputability. But since such a violation does not carry with it contumacy against the punishing authority, imputability is diminished. Nevertheless a sinner of this sort has posited the cause of some punishment.

Question 4. Is imputability diminished from the omission of due diligence?

Response. § 1. If someone violates a law from omission of due diligence, imputability is diminished according to a mode to be determined by a prudent judge from the circumstances; but if he foresaw the matter and nevertheless omitted the cautions for avoiding it which any diligent man would have employed, the fault is proximate to malice.

§ 2. A fortuitous case which cannot be foreseen, or which when foreseen cannot be met, exempts from any imputability (Can. 2203).

If, therefore, some unjust damage occurs which could and ought to have been foreseen by the one omitting diligence, the infliction of damage is imputable according to the measure of the diligence omitted. The law directly obliges me to avoid voluntary violation; indirectly it also obliges lest from my action there follow the same damage which would follow from voluntary violation. And hence omission of diligence is imputable, as, for example, in homicide arising from omitted diligence of taking care lest it be done by the action. It belongs to the judge to determine the mode by which imputability is diminished.

But if the agent foresaw the matter and neglected it, his fault is proximate to malice. Thus the Most Holy Eucharist is to be guarded under faithful custody with keys employed, lest a sacrilegious hand extend itself to it for carrying out wicked things; the fault of a priest foreseeing such a sacrilege, yet omitting diligence by employing cautions lest the crime occur, is proximate to the fault of deliberate violation of the law, or malice.

Of the unknown there is no desire, nor imputability; wherefore it is not imputable to anyone that which followed by chance from his action, and which was neither foreseen nor could have been foreseen.

Question 5. What is the influence of passion upon the imputability of a delict?

Response. Passion, if it has been voluntarily and deliberately excited or nourished, rather increases imputability; otherwise it diminishes it more or less according to the diverse heat of passion; and it wholly removes it if it precedes and impedes every deliberation of mind and consent of the will (Can. 2206).

In these circumstances the influence of passion upon imputability is varied. If passion has been deliberately excited and nourished, it increases affection and hence the voluntary; if it has not been such, it is not in the full power of man; wherefore according to the greater or lesser heat it is less or more voluntary; indeed it can be that it not only precedes every consent of the will and deliberation of the mind, but also simply impedes it, in which case it removes imputability.

You will resolve. - 1st. Lesser age, unless something else is established, diminishes the imputability of a delict, and by so much the more the nearer it approaches to infancy (Can. 2204).

The reason is that in minors there is not that perfect reason, by defect of which full malice seems to be absent from their crimes. Cf. Clement XIII, Quemadmodum, n. 5. And the nearer age approaches to infancy, by so much the less must the delict be held imputable. Hence, in children, much is usually left which in others of more advanced age human laws say must be more severely corrected, as c. 2, X, V. 23. On account of the defect of the age in which the excess was committed, rigor is to be tempered by mildness.

2nd. § 1. Physical force which takes away every faculty of acting wholly excludes a delict.

§ 2. Grave fear also, even only relatively grave, necessity, indeed even grave inconvenience, for the most part wholly remove a delict, if there is question of merely ecclesiastical laws.

§ 3. But if the act is intrinsically bad, or tends toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward damage of souls, the causes spoken of in § 2 indeed diminish the imputability of the delict, but do not take it away.

§ 4. The cause of legitimate defense against an unjust aggressor, if due moderation is preserved, wholly removes a delict; otherwise it only diminishes imputability, just as also the cause of provocation does (Can. 2205).

Concerning force the matter is clear: it removes the foundation of imputability.

The reason for the second paragraph lies in this, that ecclesiastical laws and other human laws do not oblige with great inconvenience, unless the act is intrinsically bad, or tends toward contempt of the faith, etc. Certainly the excuse of necessity does not extend itself to freeing someone from the obligation of not blaspheming, of not perjuring; wherefore also the reason for the third paragraph is clear. But the fourth paragraph is evident from this, that he who so defends himself in no way sins, provided that he does not exceed the limits of just defense.

Four causes of the involuntary are commonly assigned: violence, fear, concupiscence and ignorance. But note, once for all, that when it is said that violence, or fear, or concupiscence, or ignorance cause the involuntary, the sense is not that violence, fear, concupiscence, or ignorance physically influence the act of will, upon its very involuntariness so to speak, but that they move physically or morally toward an act which simply or relatively is contrary to the inclination of the will; whence that involuntariness is caused by love of some opposite good. Thus, e.g., while one is moved by fear of shipwreck to cast goods overboard, that casting is involuntary in a certain respect [secundum quid], because it repugns to the affection which the one casting has for preserving his goods; whence the involuntary found in that casting is not caused by fear, but by love of his goods.

The proper sense, therefore, of these questions is, that acts from violence, fear, concupiscence and ignorance are involuntary simply or in a certain respect, inasmuch as they suppose in the agent an inclination simply or in a certain respect contrary to the present act toward which they move. I suppose that violence cannot be inflicted upon the will as to elicited acts, well indeed as to commanded acts.

The first part stands, because the violent, which is from an extrinsic principle with the patient resisting, is against the inclination of the patient. But an act elicited by the will is not from an extrinsic principle but intrinsic, namely from the will, nor against the inclination of the patient, since it is nothing else than the very inclination of the will toward its object. Whence St. Anselm rightly said, de Lib. arbit., cap. 6: « No one unwilling can will anything, because he cannot will, unwilling to will. »

Plain also is the second part, because the members, or exterior powers, can be moved by force from without or impeded against the command of the will ¹, as if, e.g., the will wished to see, one could forcibly close the eyes, and if it wished not to see, one could force open the eyes: and so of the rest. Therefore. ¹ Here q. 6, a. 4, c.

Of these commanded acts the question is whether violence causes the involuntary in them. Wherefore

I say: Violence causes the involuntary simply, or the act done under violence is involuntary simply.

Understand the conclusion of absolute violence, which one cannot overcome with all legitimate effort employed, not of violence in a certain respect, which one could conquer if he resisted as much as he morally can.

It is proved of the conclusion. The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle and consequently according to inclination; the violent is from an extrinsic principle and against the inclination of the patient; for we defined it « that which is from an extrinsic principle with the patient resisting ». Therefore what is violent is not voluntary.