§ 2. On Concupiscence and Added Habit

In order we shall speak about concupiscence, then about the added force of habit; then about certain supplementary observations.

We shall hand down the notion and divisions of concupiscence, then its effects.

I. Notion. In this place, concupiscence will be understood to be a movement of the appetitive sensible power which is from the imagination of good ¹.

Therefore it comprises the passions of the lower appetite. By that appetite we are inclined to pursue sensible good and consequently to flee sensible evil. It is an aid to us; and, in our present condition, also an impediment. It is an aid insofar as it joins attraction to the various necessities of the body, which must be served, and to various duties; insofar as, by a consonant movement, it confirms the will and obeys it. It is an impediment when, anticipating the judgment of reason, it is borne by blind impulse into the delightful even when forbidden. And then there is had concupiscence in the stricter signification, which is that tinder, deplored by the Apostle, of depraved desires and the stimulus of sins. The will has the duty and noble pursuit of coercing this and of ruling the passions.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 30, art. 1; and in I. 3 Sent., d. 20, q. 1, art. 1.

Divisions. Therefore antecedent concupiscence is distinguished, which precedes the consent of the will and draws it to consenting; and consequent concupiscence, which, in the order of causality, follows the act of the will, and that in two ways: by mere resultance, by which higher acts overflow into the lower powers, as when we are sensibly moved by affection toward God or Christ; or by studious excitation, as when St. Ignatius, in the contemplation on the Passion of the Lord, exhorts us to excite ourselves with great effort to sorrowing, sadness, and weeping. (Spiritual Exercises, Third Week, on the Last Supper.)

I. Effect on the voluntary. There can be so great a force of concupiscence that it permits no deliberation to exist. What we do thus cannot be voluntary or free in itself (1, 2, q. 77, art. 7), but only in the cause, if we voluntarily approached the occasion.

This case excepted, the act toward which we are borne by antecedent concupiscence is less wholly from the will; and consequently, the greater and stronger the concupiscence is, the less per se is the act voluntary. Yet because concupiscence exercises no efficiency upon intellect and will, but merely strikes the intellect by the allurements of the object and intentionally snatches the will, both these faculties remain intact and preserve free choice. Wherefore in the struggle they can resist and seek helps for themselves.

Certainly the act contrary to concupiscence is fully voluntary; but since it is wholly freed from the influence of concupiscence, this is not the proper place concerning it.

Consequent concupiscence by resultance is accustomed to demonstrate an intense will, and thus is said to increase the voluntary. Although sensibility, according to temperament itself and the condition of the body, is readier for act in one person, slower in another.

Finally, consequent concupiscence by direct intention increases the voluntary, since it makes the very movement of concupiscence voluntary.

II. Effect on merit and sin.

Antecedent concupiscence per se does not remove but diminishes the merit of a good act to which we are sensibly enticed, and the sin to which we are drawn, by the same account by which it diminishes the voluntary.

Consequent concupiscence by resultance strictly increases merit or sin only when we consent to it, as we are accustomed to consent when concupiscence conspires with the will; consequent concupiscence by direct intention necessarily increases merit or sin.

Habit, just as through facility of acting it begets inconsiderations and forgetfulnesses, so also it generates a propensity for repeating similar acts. Hence, once habit has been strengthened, virtue sometimes brings it about that even in sleep we repel depraved suggestions. On the contrary, an evil propensity sometimes seems to have become so great that, for some time, persons habituated seem to labor through their own fault under a certain moral impotence of avoiding every grave sin.

Moral impotence is that which indeed leaves sufficient liberty for acting rightly in individual acts, yet in such a way that, if the whole series is considered, that is, in the case, if the series of temptations unfolds itself, in moral estimation it is certain that man will fail or sin in some things. Pious perseverance then will either obtain a greater grace, or gradually restore normal conditions, so that there is no longer need of special aid.

Medicinal grace. So great is the present infirmity that for overcoming grave temptations we need grace which is called medicinal, insofar as it makes man unimpeded for conquering temptations. Yet that grace, at least in the just and the faithful, is actual grace itself of the supernatural order. And we greatly doubt whether purely medicinal graces should ever be admitted.

1. On depraved movements and phantasms. Since deliberation concerning the end of man can be established only in the higher faculties, disorder concerning the end, or mortal sin, cannot per se be had in the sensitive part. Wherefore if someone experiences depraved movements or lustful phantasms of which he is not the cause, and behaves passively, that is, neither repels nor admits them, per se he is not gravely blameworthy. Yet if they are graver or incentive, he will have to elicit at least an act of displeasure, lest he incur proximate danger of consent, or even turn his attention to other things. This indirect and quiet resistance is often more efficacious and useful than direct resistance through even exterior acts, which disturbance is accustomed to accompany. Yet he is to be praised who physically restrains or, by inflicted pain, extinguishes a shameful movement, although this is not commanded per se. Indeed, to oppose continuous resistance to a lasting temptation, even by the mere dissent of the will, is not necessary. And for those who are accustomed to be troubled by temptations, this counsel will often be more useful: that outside temptation, for example in the morning barely awake, they strengthen the mind by purpose and prayer, diligently guard the senses, and then, in temptation, attempt to apply the mind, without anxiety, to honorable things, customary studies, and business. It will also be especially useful to foster the love of charity by meditation and by devotion to the Blessed Virgin, and to exercise acts of humility and mortification of the senses. Even when the danger of consent has been shut off, he who permits inordinate movements which he can easily impede seems to sin venially on account of that tolerated inordination.

Catholic authors agree more practically than speculatively. Cf. Laymann, l. 1, tr. 3, c. 6, n. 8; La Croix, l. 5, n. 109-112.

2. One must not speak in the same way about movements of the will toward an evil thing: not to break them off after full advertence would be to continue those same movements and consequently render them deliberated; which in grave matter would be grave. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 83.

Passive Resistance or Not. In carnal temptations and in those against faith, a certain kind of positive resistance is utterly to be rejected, namely, that the temptation be voluntarily excited in order then to repel it strongly. Nor, where there is graver danger of mortal fault, is a voluntary quasi-repetition of any temptation to be advised. But in less dangerous matters of impatience, moderate aversion, anger, envy, gluttony, etc., it will be lawful to excite concupiscences and, as it were, provoke them to battle, in order to defeat them more strongly, until full victory is won. It will also help to oppose contrary acts to the passions. (Cf. the book Il combattimento spirituale, c. 13.)

Consequent affections are not fictitious. Today there are not lacking those who think that the sensible affections which are obtained by voluntary effort toward good and holy things are artificial and almost fictitious, as though the spontaneous movement of the senses alone were natural. But if the natural unity and perfection of man subjects the lower appetites to the higher, nothing is more natural in man than that sense should follow the command of reason and will. Only then will the excitation be fictitious, if it has been effected by false reasons or by an insincere will.