1. On Violence

63. Notion. Violence (coercion, force), or the violent, is that which proceeds from an extrinsic principle, while he who suffers force is altogether resisting.^48a From this definition it follows that two things are required for a violent act, namely: 1. that it proceed from an extrinsic principle; 2. that it occur with complete repugnance, that is, external and internal, on the part of him who suffers force. Hence no one is able to inflict violence upon himself; for he is not an extrinsic principle to himself. Sometimes even vehement fear is called violence in a certain respect, but here we speak of physical and absolute violence, or of violence in the strict sense, concerning which the following principles are valid:

^48a Concerning the difference between the violent, the coerced, the necessary, and the involuntary, see Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 5.

64. Principle 1. No internal act of the will can be extorted by any external violence.

The reason is that the will is a spiritual faculty whose essential mode of operating is liberty. But it is repugnant that the same act should be at the same time free, as elicited by the will, and at the same time coerced, as caused by a violent external principle. Wherefore violence can indeed attack, but not conquer, an unwilling will.

Hence the old Roman law briefly established: "a coerced will is a will"; and St. Anselm says elegantly:⁴⁹ "One cannot will unwillingly, because one cannot will while not willing to will, for everyone willing wills his very willing." St. Thomas⁵⁰ teaches: "Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as also to the natural ... just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something contrary to nature, so in knowing things it makes something be contrary to the will. But that which is contrary to nature is said to be unnatural, and similarly that which is contrary to the will is said to be involuntary; whence violence causes the involuntary." Indeed St. Bonaventure⁵¹ teaches that not even by God Himself can violence be inflicted upon the will. "Therefore the will can be induced by a created agent; but it cannot be changed by another except by an uncreated agent; but it cannot be coerced by anyone." St. Thomas says the same:⁵² "God can change the will by necessity, yet He cannot coerce it." Nor does this detract from the full dominion of God; for although God cannot inflict violence upon the human will, since this is repugnant (just as generally God can do nothing which is intrinsically repugnant), nevertheless by various modes He is able infallibly to move even our rebellious wills and to change them at His nod.

⁴⁹ De lib. arbitr. c. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 158, 496).

⁵⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 5.

⁵¹ In II, dist. 25, pars 2, a. un., q. 5.

⁵² Quaest. disp. de verit. q. 22, a. 8.

65. Principle 2. External acts of the will, that is, all acts which can be commanded by the will, can be caused by extrinsic violence.

The reason is that these acts (at least if you except the proper act of the intellect) are exercised by means of a sensible organ. But an extrinsic principle can act violently upon a sensible organ, however much the will inwardly resists. Thus, for example, the eyes can be compelled to seeing, the ears to hearing, notwithstanding the resistance of the will. In a psychopathic state a man pronounces certain words and performs certain movements, although the will resists (Zwangsreden, Zwangshandlungen). Thus likewise a luxurious delectation can be violently produced by an external agent, however much the will resists. Hence also the devil can violently produce obscene images in the phantasy, and by means of those phantasms indirectly move (but not coerce) both the will and especially the intellect. But the devil cannot directly move the human intellect nor know its thoughts without the consent of man. God alone can directly coerce the intellect of man.⁵³

⁵³ Cf. S. theol. I, q. 57, a. 4 and I-II, q. 80, a. 2.

66. Corollaries. From what has been said it follows:

1. Internal acts are morally imputed, however much a man has suffered violence; for they remain voluntary. For example, a man sins who under a most vehement diabolical temptation consents to morose delectation.

2. External acts caused by violence are not imputed,⁵⁴ provided the man has restrained internal consent and has manifested his displeasure also externally. The reason is that such acts are altogether involuntary. Hence, for example, a woman who is violently oppressed immodestly does not sin, provided that inwardly she does not consent and also seriously manifests her displeasure outwardly. - Authors are accustomed here to ask whether a woman in this case is bound rather to suffer death than her own violation. That a woman in these circumstances can rather choose death than her own violation, all teach, both because, on account of the great delectation following from a libidinous act, some danger of interior consent is present, and because bodily integrity is a great good, which by some is equated with life. - Some deny, others affirm, that a woman then is bound to prefer death. St. Alphonsus⁵⁵ says concerning this matter: "The first opinion (namely, the negative), speaking speculatively, does not seem to lack its probability. Yet it must not be denied that the second, affirmative opinion is altogether to be urged in practice; at least because of the danger of consent, which can easily be present in that permission." It seems to me that this case pertains rather to fear than to violence. For a woman under fear of death is accustomed to be induced to permitting rape. Besides, the denying opinion is safe in practice; for there does not seem to be such a proximate danger of sinful consent, since the woman (inwardly abhorring that act with all her strength) will be so sorrowful because of the unspeakable disgrace that she will perceive no carnal delectation, as the example of the woman, even pagan Lucretia, oppressed by Tarquin, shows. Moreover, fear and disturbance of spirit will be so enormous in those circumstances that the use of reason is considered very much diminished. Whence no strict obligation exists of preferring death to violent oppression.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 103, § 1, and c. 2205, § 1.

⁵⁵ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 368.

⁵⁶ Thus also Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 6.