14. On Scrupulous Conscience

1. "Titius, a cleric, had completed a rather long journey with the intention of receiving the order of presbyterate; but when he entered the church, this thought occurred to him: Behold, you have not yet elicited a formal and sufficient intention for the reception of the presbyterate, for that recently made does not yet avail. For this reason he proposed that he wished to elicit an actual intention during the actual conferral of the order; but when it came to the actual reception, Titius, perhaps from distraction, elicited no further intention. Therefore, having returned home on the day before his first Mass, agitated by scruples, he said that he could not celebrate with a safe conscience, because through defect of intention he had not been validly ordained."

Q. 1. What is scrupulous conscience, and can it be a rule of morals? 2. What judgment is to be made of Titius?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 158 seqq. To the second: "It is easily clear that Titius must be held not only as scrupulous, but almost as foolish, since from no foundation, or certainly from a wholly empty one, he doubts concerning the sufficiency of his intention and concerning the value of the order received. For what could seem more foolish than to make long journeys, undergo examination, and, after confession and other preparations have been made beforehand, dispose himself for the reception of order, and nevertheless doubt concerning the sufficiency of his intention?" Elbel 220.

The same judgment seems to be made concerning one to be ordained who is very anxious whether he is in the state of grace, does not wish to receive sacred orders in the state of sin, and in fact receives them; since the will then predominant is the will of receiving sacred orders.

The same also must be said concerning those scrupulous priests "who are more anxious than is fitting concerning the sufficiency of intention around the administration of the sacraments. Indeed we have found that there are men of this sort, who, called to a sick person, visit him and absolve him after confession; likewise those who, asked by parents, baptize a recently born child; likewise those who, solicited by a penitent that they be willing to receive his confession, immediately enter the confessional, and thus without further express intention administer the requested sacraments; but afterwards, agitated by scruples, they begin to doubt whether they had sufficient intention, and whether they are not held to rebaptize an infant of this sort again, etc. Let them note, I say, this very common doctrine of theologians: that for the valid administration of a sacrament, a formal explicit intention is by no means necessary, but a virtual one suffices, such as they are certainly convinced to have when they immediately comply with those requesting the administration. For when, asked by someone, for example, that you receive his confession, you immediately enter the confessional, receive the confession, impose penance, and finally say: I absolve you, etc.; do you not by that very fact show that you have the mind of administering the sacrament? Would you not yourself judge foolish whoever doubted about this?" Elbel 222.

Finally those are also disturbed without reason concerning confessions made, that they lacked sincere sorrow and purpose, and did not confess integrally, because they experienced dryness of spirit in themselves, or also a certain natural repugnance toward confession while they were confessing, and were ignorant of the species of sins. For sorrow and purpose are acts of the rational will, which can well exist in the will without any sensible effect and sign in the body. Likewise, natural repugnance and shame in explaining sins is not an argument that one has not confessed integrally. And this is to be noted here, that this repugnance and shame is often rather about certain circumstances not necessarily to be declared than about the sins themselves. Nor has someone confessed invalidly and sacrilegiously because he was ignorant of the various species of sins. If he was ignorant of them when he was confessing, he was also ignorant of them when he was sinning. Therefore, if someone cannot bring forward another motive of a disturbed mind, let him be ordered by the confessor to acquiesce, and to trust in the divine goodness and mercy. - Elbel 223 seqq.; G. 48 seqq.; I. M. 158 seqq.

2. Caius doubts whether he touched the chalice. What is to be done?

R. Let him acquiesce. Holy Office, 25 March 1895. Every deed is presumed to have been done rightly. M. E. v. 9, p. 1, p. 91.

3. Sempronius, doubting whether he was suitable for the presbyterate, wished to remove the intention, and at the same time wished to form it. Finally he decided within himself: I intend that which I shall certainly intend in some part of the ordination. Doubtful, he received the first and the other imposition of hands; but when he was receiving the consecration of the hands, he resolved to receive the presbyterate. What concerning Sempronius?

R. Let him acquiesce. Holy Office, 26 January 1898. M. E. v. 1, p. 1, p. 243.