88. Mental Restriction, Secret

1. Magdalena, a wife, is accused by her own husband concerning adultery altogether hidden, so that he can institute divorce before a judge and enter another marriage. Hence Magdalena asks her confessor whether she is held to confess her sin in court. The confessor responds that she can deny that she committed adultery.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. “It must be said that concerning this a distinction must be made. For if the adultery is altogether hidden, she ought not to confess her sin in court, nor ought an oath concerning speaking the truth to be demanded from her, because hidden things are reserved to the divine judgment alone; according to that saying, 1 Cor. 4:5: Do not judge before the time, until the Lord comes, who will illuminate the hidden things of darkness. But when infamy proceeds from adultery, or some evident signs appear which can cause vehement suspicion, or when it has been half-proved, then an oath concerning speaking the truth ought to be demanded from her, and she herself is held to confess the truth.” S. Th. Quodl. 5. a. 16. Therefore, since in the Case there is question of adultery altogether hidden, Magdalena can, by mental restriction, deny it, saying, I did not commit adultery, and understanding, which I am held to confess in court. For the response is of itself to be understood according to the question made. But a question made by a judge concerning adultery is evidently a question concerning adultery about which he himself can ask and render sentence, and which consequently the guilty woman is held to confess in court. I. M. 1530, 1535; G. 418, 419.

2. Galenus, a most skilled physician, knew a most powerful herb for checking the flow of blood. He communicated the secret only to Laelius, his dearest friend, under the latter’s promise of keeping the same secret. Galenus having died, Laelius, who alone knows the secret, would like to manifest the secret for public utility; and he proposes the doubt to his confessor.

Q. Can Laelius, in the Case, manifest the secret?

R. It seems that Laelius can manifest the aforesaid secret. The reason is that from that manifestation no damage at all can come to Galenus, indeed good can come, namely praise and honor for him. Nor truly can damage of this sort come to any other, since Laelius alone knows the secret. Whence, communication of that secret having been made to him by Galenus, he himself is now the absolute owner of this secret. Besides, the secret is altogether useful to the common good of others. Wherefore it would rather seem to be against charity not to communicate a salutary remedy to all. This is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas. For the Angelic Doctor, Quodl. 12. a. 21, raises the question: “Whether one receiving the teaching of some experiment under an oath not to communicate it is held to observe the oath”; and he responds: “One thing must be said here simply, and another in the Case. Speaking simply, he is not held, but he acted badly by swearing. An oath loses force not only when the oath is illicit, but also when he swears to worse things; because an obligating oath ought to have judgment, justice, and truth. But even if I sometimes swear something which it is lawful for me not to do, say, not to go to church, nevertheless it is not lawful to swear (forever), because although it is lawful for me for some time to do or omit this good, which is to go to church, nevertheless it is not lawful for me to interpose an oath and to harden my soul toward not doing some good, because this is to act against the Holy Spirit. And therefore an oath against everything which is of the genus of good things is illicit and not to be observed. Nevertheless, in the Case, he is held to observe it, say if that man or another sufficient physician were present and were prepared to cure and to use that experiment for the bodily health of others.” Scavini, ed. 12, Milan 1874, l. 2. n. 229, speaking of an oath of keeping a secret concerning the art of making some medicine, of healing some infirmities, says: “Notwithstanding the oath, you are held from charity to reveal it, if otherwise someone would undergo grave danger of death, or if the art would therefore die with him, with harm to the commonwealth, and the sick cannot otherwise be healed, since an oath is not for damage.”

3. Eustachius, under the strictest promise of secrecy, manifested to Hilarius that Amalia, his daughter, was spurious. Moreover Hilarius in his own mind had proposed to marry Amalia; but, her condition having been learned, he altogether changed his mind and married another.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Hilarius used his own right, nor did he act illicitly in any way. A secret is, as it were, another’s thing, and consequently of itself it is not lawful to explore or extort it. For that would be, as it were, to snatch his own thing from the owner, although someone proposes to himself not to reveal the secret to others. But after someone has in whatever way naturally learned a secret, that knowledge has now been made his own, and he is not prohibited from using it without any unjust damage to another. Hence, if the secret is some invention of art or science, I can use it, if utility follows for me and no damage follows for another; indeed also, according to Lessius, if some damage to another follows, because that knowledge is mine. If the secret regards some fact, someone can then use it, namely by doing those things to which he already had a right before the knowledge was accepted; for after the knowledge has been accepted, he does not lose the right, as, e.g., if someone seeks a benefice or office which he has learned to be vacant, or buys a field in which he has learned that a treasure lies hidden. Less. l. 2. c. 12. n. 131.

4. Sempronius had written his wife as heir in usufruct, with the burden added that she furnish support to Caius and to Titia, his mother; but in ownership he had named Caius himself as heir, and if he should die without offspring, he had substituted the sons of his niece Bertha, from his sister, who, the testament excluded, by law would have succeeded to the inheritance of her maternal uncle. After the death of the testator, Bertha pressed in civil judgment for the nullity of the testament, since he had called an adulterine son to the inheritance, namely Caius himself, as she said, born from Titia at a time when marriage with his wife was standing. But truly, since the arguments deduced for proving this did not exceed the limit of mere conjecture, and Bertha had declared that in the episcopal Chancery and in the baptismal parish archive documents existed by which the true status of Caius, as she contended, would be placed in clear light, the presiding judge asked the bishop that he exhibit the mentioned documents.

Q. Could the bishop manifest and hand over the commemorated documents?

R. Negatively, as is evident from the Response of the S. C. EE. et RR. 25 Feb. 1842, Bizzarri Collectan. ed. 1855, p. 101. But the reason is that it is especially of the public good that the things which are committed to some person established in some ministry by reason of office, it be unlawful to publish and manifest; for otherwise it would be done with the faith owed to public authority, especially of the Church; for no one would any longer be found who would entrust himself to the same. And thus the Civil Laws themselves exempt Advocates, Physicians, Surgeons, and other professionals from giving testimony concerning those things which become known to them by reason of profession. Nor truly could the bishop or pastor have exhibited the aforesaid documents, entrusted to his faith, from the fact that Bertha already knew the tenor of the documents from the rumor of the crowd. For if truth is obligated to guarding a secret, it cannot confirm public report and rumor, often doubtful and uncertain, by its assent and its affirmation, and render it undoubted and certain. For then it would already be done against the law of secrecy. And although perhaps Bertha knew the matter certainly from the corrupted faith of officials, and so from a shameful and unjust fact, nevertheless to continue and confirm baseness and injustice is altogether illicit. Nor truly is he to be heard in court who alleges his own baseness. Whence Bertha could acquire no right from this to the exhibition of the aforesaid documents.

5. Lucianus, by a fortuitous event, received letters directed to Lucius. Recognizing the handwriting of Rufinus, by whom many damages had already been inflicted on him, and fearing lest those letters contain something against him, whence Lucius, his friend and a powerful man, could be turned away from his friendship, he at once opens and reads the letters, and in them he in fact finds several calumnies asserted against him. Hence, saying nothing about the letters received, by opportune means he forestalls the mind of Lucius, and easily frees himself from every evil machination of Rufinus.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Lucianus licitly read the letters in the Case. For he did this not with the intention of prejudicing the right of another, but with the intention of averting from himself an unjust burden threatening him, judging probably, indeed morally certainly, that the aforesaid letters had been written to his prejudice. But it is lawful to read another’s letters, just as it is lawful to manifest a natural secret, for forestalling unjust damage to be inflicted on oneself or on another. Elbel 616; I. M. 1545.

But what if Lucianus had deceitfully stolen the letters beforehand: could he still use them for removing from himself the grave danger of damage which he first learned from the letters themselves was threatening him, or which he otherwise knows to threaten him? Generally it is not lawful to use another’s letters deceitfully stolen, especially if damage to that other follows from it. The reason is that no one can continue in sin and in injustice. But if someone uses that knowledge, unjustly acquired, for driving away from himself grave and unjust damage, that is not illicit. It is lawful in those very circumstances in which someone licitly reveals another’s sin and reads another’s letters. For just as someone would now licitly acquire that knowledge and licitly use it, so now he can licitly use knowledge already acquired, although its acquisition was unjust in the beginning. I. M. 1494, 1495, 1545; G. 429, 430, 440-442.