Chapter — The Casuist
Case I: Habit
Case.—Confessor A has a penitent who rather frequently has to accuse himself of certain solitary and grave sins. This penitent has tried for many years to overcome the temptation but without success. The habit in question was formed in early boyhood days and has grown upon him to such a degree that it is now, he claims, beyond his control. The temptation comes upon him with such suddenness and fury that, at least to his mind, he seems compelled to yield, and he is of the opinion that he would do so even though he knew with certainty that at the moment of gratification his soul would be lost.
Question.—Now, what is the confessor to do with such a case?
Solution.—To decide whether this penitent is guilty of grave sin each time he falls, one must consider whether his habit of sin is voluntary or involuntary.
(1). If the penitent desires to retain the evil habit it is clear that the resulting acts are of his own choice and that he sins gravely each time he yields to the temptation.
(2). If he does not positively will to continue the habit, but yet has not efficaciously rejected it, his guiltiness will depend on whether the habit was begun voluntarily or involuntarily.
(a). In the former hypothesis, the acts consequent on the habit are voluntary in their cause, since the penitent foresaw and willed them, at least in a confused way, at the time he consciously contracted the vicious habit. He cannot decline responsibility on the ground that his will-power has been weakened, any more than a person who deliberately throws himself into a deep pit can excuse himself for not continuing a journey. (b). In the latter hypothesis, the voluntariness of the acts are much diminished. The sinful habit was contracted in boyhood days before its sinfulness or gravity was understood and it grew so powerful that the will seemed utterly enslaved. One must beware, however, of taking a lax view. Only when the force of habit is so strong as to unbalance the reason and to extort consent before a clear judgment is possible, may it be said that the act is not free and not imputable. Such cases are comparatively rare. The confessor will have to judge from the circumstances the extent to which the sinful habit has weakened the free-will and diminished the guilt of the penitent. He should remember, too, that even though the habit was involuntary in its origin, it may have become voluntary subsequently, if the duty of using proper means to combat the vice was knowingly neglected.
(3). If the penitent has formally retracted the habit and has employed means to conquer it, this circumstance greatly extenuates his guilt. But here again it is only when the habit produces a gravis perturbatio mentis that it takes away grave culpability.
The confessor should be slow to conclude that such a condition of mind exists, even though the penitent should protest ever so much his powerlessness to resist. This is the very explanation that self-deceived consuetudinarii often allege in their own favor. However, the confessor should use great gentleness along with prudence and firmness. The penitent should be so directed that on the one hand he will not feel that he is free from imputability, nor on the other hand that God is a tyrant and that there is no hope for himself. He should be absolved as often as he presents himself with dispositions which the priest judges to be genuine and sufficient. Moreover he should be persistently exhorted not to become the slave of discouragement but to keep up his efforts despite his frequent relapses, and to use all means, natural and supernatural, which tend to lessen the severity of his temptations, and to strengthen the force of will-power. Especially should he be urged to commend himself to the Mercy of God.