Case XXVII: Is a Man Bound to Make Compensation for Not Having Prevented Some Injury to his Neighbor?

Florian has a deep sandpit dug on his own land. He knows that a certain Andrew often passes that way at night, but does not draw his attention to the sandpit, or warn him to be careful where he walks. The result is that when Andrew again goes in that direction one night, unaware of the danger, he falls into the pit and breaks his leg, so that he cannot work for two or three months. Ought Florian to give him any compensation or not?

Answer.—In considering the question of personal injury, compensation has to be given only when the action causing the injury (1) is unjust (contra jus strictum alterius), (2) when it is also the actual cause of the injury (causa damni efficax), and (3) when it is also blameworthy from a theological or legal point of view.

Unless all these three conditions are fulfilled, no compensation is obligatory. We may here disregard the legal offense (quam solummodo leges civiles imputant et cujus judicis sententia ret declaramur).

If a person acts consistently within his own rights, and has no intention of injuring any one, although he may foresee that the other will suffer, he is not inflicting any real wrong upon him, for the principle holds good: Qui jure suo utitur, neminem laedit. He need therefore (ex justitia) give him no compensation, any more than a man need compensate his neighbor for diverting astream of water that is injurious to his own land, though beneficial to his neighbor's. The duty of paying compensation is binding only when there has been a violation of obligations of justice and not merely violations of the law of charity, so that it is possible for a man to sin grievously without being bound to make compensation; and this distinction should always be kept in view in order to avoid rigorism.

The case would be different if there were no good reason for the action, or if a man had no strict right to perform it. For instance, a man would sin against justice if he were to divert astream that did him no harm and by altering its course harmed another person. Many circumstances have often to be taken into account when questions of this kind present themselves.

Supposing Florian had failed to warn Andrew through motives of hatred? The same answer is still applicable. He either had aright to dig the pit or he had none. In the latter case he wronged his neighbor and is bound to give him compensation, but not in the former. His bad intention does not affect this question, since it cannot make unjustifiable what was in itself justifiable. However, though Florian has not sinned against justice (and this is the point on which the question turns), because he has a right to dig a pit on his own land, he has sinned grievously against charity to his neighbor by failing to warn Andrew to take care where he walked.—Dr. Marcellin Jos. Schlager.