Case XLVII: Administering the Last Sacraments to the Feeble-Minded

In the parish of N. one Remigius, an aged man, lies at the point of death. He has been a hopeless imbecile since his twentieth year, in consequence of a fall from a tree. One of the two priests stationed in this parish remarks: “To such persons in their last moments Extreme Unction is given, but nothing more.” But the other does not share this view, and administers to this sick man conditional absolution, also Viaticum and Extreme Unction.

Question: Which of these two priests is right?

If we examine the view of the latter, we shall at the same time arrive at a correct opinion of the other priest’s reasoning. We ask: I. Can and may this Remigius be absolved?

We preface our answer by stating a general rule, according to Lehmkuhl: For when it is certain that something essential is lacking, it is not lawful to give absolution, since it would be given wholly in vain and therefore sacrilegiously; but when it is in some way, even slightly, probable^* that all the essentials are present, absolution not only may but must be given. Yet understand this in such a way that cases can exist in which absolution may be given, but need not be given under pain of sin, namely when most theologians deny that absolution may lawfully be given and only some teach that it may be given. P. II. n. 510. From this general rule there follows for our case:

^* Marc. Inst. Mor. n. 1855 (3) remarks, supported by the teaching of St. Alphonsus: “In a case of extreme necessity, in the administration of the Sacraments it is lawful to use a probability that is slight and weakly founded.”

1. Has Remigius been a total imbecile since infancy, not having had a single lucid moment, then under no circumstances could he nor might he be absolved, propter defectum materiae Sacramenti, tum remotae (i. e. peccatorum), tum proximae (actuum poenitentis). 2. If, on the contrary, Remigius is only partly imbecile, if there be even only slight reason to suppose that he at the present time has lucid moments and, even though unnoticed, manifests the desire to confess, then, after proper effort to dispose him if necessary, at least conditional absolution must be given him in danger of death. 3. If it is morally certain that the sick man, a total imbecile for years, has no lucid moments even now, no more than ever before during his affliction, absolution cannot be given him even in danger of death, not even conditionally, because in the case of a person who for so many years has been incapable of any intelligent act, it is impossible to presume the actus poenitentis (contrition, confession and satisfaction) or in case of necessity, at least perceptible expression of the inward disposition, which, according to the doctrine of the Council of Trent (sess. 14. cap. 3), and according to the Rituale Rom., constitutes the proximate matter (materia proxima) of the Sacrament of Penance, and as such belongs to the essence of the Sacrament, also because such a person can have no actual or virtual intention of receiving the Sacrament, such as is necessary, according to the universal teaching of theologians, for the validity of the Sacrament of Penance. (St. Alph. Theolog. mor. I, VI. n. 82.) 4. As opposed to these reasons, the following rule of theologians seems to supply that probability which is necessary in order to make possible the absolution of Remigius, conditionally, upon his deathbed, in the state just described of many years of total loss of reason. This rule states: All dying persons deprived of their senses who, before losing their senses, expressly manifested a desire for confession—for example, by ordering a priest to be summoned—should be absolved. The reason is that the confession becomes sufficiently perceptible to the confessor in this case through the testimony of another and is, as it were, a confession through an interpreter. This is established from the Roman Ritual, On the Sacrament of Penance. Compare Father Marc, Moral Institutions, number 1855.

If we consider this rule in the light of the various explanations by authorities, we see that they in principle permit even the absolute granting of absolution (sine conditione: si capax es), even though some, for greater security, advise conditional absolution. (S. Alph. Theol. Moral. 1. VI. n. 481: Utrum vero, etc.), and that they allow unconditional absolution even if the patient not merely has exteriorly lost use of his senses, but also the interior use of reason. Lehmkuhl states: Hence it is clear that if a dying person has shown through witnesses a desire to confess and meanwhile has lost speech and the use of reason, there must be no doubt about giving absolution; indeed, no issue should be made of adding the condition, ‘if you are capable.’ P. II. n. 510 (2).

Furthermore, the authorities make no mention here of a requirement that between such personal expression of contrition of the penitent, and the absolution of the priest, at most only a period of an hour may elapse between Confession and Absolution, as under other circumstances (comp. S. Alph. Theol. Mor. 1. VI.n.9). The completion of the act of confession therefore must here be furnished in the deposition by witnesses, made in the presence of the priest, hence a longer or lesser interval of time between the penitent’s manifestation of contrition and the absolution of the priest does not come into consideration at all. It follows: The proximate matter (materia proxima) of the Sacrament is, in a confession through witnesses, found in former acts of the penitent, noticed by witnesses, which are now from their disposition accepted by the priest judicialiter et sacramentaliter, and which by means of this testimony and the sacramental verdict of the priest still continue to exist as materia, and which with the now supplied form of absolution join in constituting the Sacrament. In regard to the intention Lehmkuhl writes: P. II. n. 49: Pro poenitentia requiritur virtualis intentio, si actus poenitentis respicis; habitualis suffictt, si respicis solam absolutionem accipiendam.

In such confession through witnesses the proceedings are similar to those in a confession through an interpreter (Confessio per interpretem).

5. As regards the testimony and witnesses in favor of Remigius, we can at least say for him that which Pope Benedict XIV. in such a case values so highly, namely: If it is now received and settled that one who exhibits no sign of repentance before the priest is granted absolution whenever bystanders testify to the priest that he asked for confession, then with all the more reason can, or rather ought, one be absolved for whom, although no person bears testimony, there are nevertheless as many witnesses to his purpose of receiving the Sacraments in the final danger of life as there are acts of Christian virtues, sacramental confessions and Communions, and finally works of religion and piety by which throughout the whole course of his life he gave manifest proof of uprightness (De Syn. dioec. 1. VII. cap. XV. n. X).

Lehmkuhl adds to this: Nor is some manifestation of such a desire lacking in one who has lived in a scarcely Christian manner, for by the fact that he remained in the Church he shows that he hopes and desires to be reconciled with God through the Church at the final time of his life (P. II. n. 514).

Beyond all doubt the absolution in all such cases is, and remains, invalid and ineffectual if the penitent after committing his last mortal sin did not make an act of contrition (saltem atiritionis), because without this act of penitence he is incapable of justification.

With this disposition for attaining the state of grace presupposed, the reasons quoted for the presence of the necessary matter and intention in our case seem to prove the validity of the absolution at least with the requisite probabilitas in order to lawfully absolve Remigius in danger of death conditionate, and we would urge the absolution under such conditions so much more, as the dying man in this state can no longer receive any other Sacrament.

II. May in our case the Viaticum also be given to the dying man? The Rituale Rom. answers: 1. It ought not to be administered to those who, because of the weakness of age, do not yet possess knowledge and appreciation of this Sacrament. To children who have not attained the use of reason, and to those who since birth have been hopeless imbeciles, and have also at present no lucid moments, according to the present practise of the Church, the Viaticum cannot be given even in danger of death. 2. It is not lawful to give Communion to the insane or delirious; yet it will be lawful if at some time they have lucid intervals and show devotion while they remain in that state, provided no danger of indignity is present. From this it follows: (a) Except in danger of death, holy Communion cannot be administered to any one, who, when receiving it, is not conscious, or has not the use of reason. (b) To children of weak mind who are of the right age, to persons partly imbeciles, to the aged of weak mind, and persons of this kind holy Communion must be given, if they are capable to distinguish the same from ordinary food, at least at Eastertime, and in danger of death. If there is well-founded apprehension, or even danger, of desecration, the Most Blessed Sacrament must never be given, not even as Viaticum: provided no danger of indignity is present. As specially concerning our case, St. Alphonsus speaks of those insane persons ‘who did not always lack the use of reason, but now lack it’; here the teaching of St. Thomas in the place cited must be followed, where he says: ‘If previously, when they were in possession of their mind, devotion toward this Sacrament appeared in them, this Sacrament ought to be administered to them at the point of death, unless perhaps danger of vomiting or spitting it out is feared.’

St. Alphonsus states as reason that such a sick man desires the holy Viaticum interpretative, and that the reception of the same is necessary for his salvation if he fell into this state of total obscurity of mind while in a state of mortal sin, about which, however, he had yet made an act of imperfect contrition. That holy Communion in this case would effect justification the holy Teacher holds for morally certain in practise, as is evident from his solution of another question (1. VI. n. 619 in fine). Hence it is evident: The priest may and should give to Remigius the Viaticum, if this may be done without probable danger of irreverence to the sacred species, and if he cannot ascertain that the patient has lost consciousness in the state of complete impenitence. Excipiunt D.D. si certo prae-sumatur talis in amentiam incidisse penitus impoenitens (S. Alph. 1. c.). Hence Lehmkuhl states (P. II. n. 146, 6), that to those who in the commission of a mortal sin (i actu peccati) lost consciousness, the Viaticum can only be given when it is the sole means by which they can probably still be helped, or if they, by a positively probable sign, give evidence of their conversion and change of mind. When in doubt, finally, as to whether the patient in his unconscious state can take the holy Eucharist sine periculo vomitus vel exspuitionis, a trial should be made with an unconsecrated host, or with part of one.

III. Respecting Extreme Unction we remark briefly that the same is to be administered to our patient all the more than holy Viaticum, partly because in such cases, according to the teaching of theologians, it remits mortal sin per se etsi consequenter (S. Alph. 1. VI. n. 731) partly because of all the Sacraments which such a dying man may receive, Extreme Unction is the one most certain to help him, because it not merely effects justification, when the patient previously has made an act of imperfect contrition and after that has committed no mortal sin, but, according to the opinion of theologians, even then if he makes this act of contrition, if not made before, after the reception of this Sacrament, in a lucid moment. Marc (Jmst. moral. 1397) puts the question: Whether Sacraments received with an obstacle revive when it is removed? And he answers in the sense of St. Alphonsus: The Sacrament of Baptism revives when the obstacle is removed by a subsequent disposition. Thus authors commonly teach.—Many probably teach the same of Confirmation, etc., and of Extreme Unction. The reason is that Extreme Unction cannot be repeated in the same danger of death; yet it appears consonant with the divine goodness that such recipients should not remain deprived of the sacramental grace which they need.

He who administers this Sacrament should be very careful never to make the condition: Si dignus es, subintelligens: si es in statu gratiae—for by this condition he would himself prevent the effect of this Sacrament most necessary for salvation. Only in case the priest cannot learn for certain whether the patient had even in his life a sufficient use of reason, he ought to give Extreme Unction with the condition: si capax es; for he who from birth has been of insane mind is incapable of receiving this Sacrament validly.

From these remarks about administering the last Sacraments to imbeciles it is plain that the priest who gave Remigius the Sacraments under the conditions mentioned, acted correctly and dutifully, that on the contrary the principle of the other, if carried out without discrimination, is theoretically false, and in practise may do great injury to the spiritual welfare of such unfortunate people.

John Schwienbacher, C.SS.R.