Case XCVIII: Not Radical Sanation, But Silence

Case.—Caja had in the unmarried state by sinful intimacy with Cajus, a wealthy and respected citizen, borne him a daughter, Caroline. This has been kept a profound secret, and it never became known that Cajus was the father of Caroline.

Now Caroline married, in forma ecclesiae consueta, without having the slightest suspicion, her cousin Charles, the son of a brother of Cajus. The impediment of blood relationship of the second degree was not discovered; it was known only to Caja and Cajus, and these two kept silence. Indeed, Cajus, pleased at the idea of providing at the same time for his natural daughter and his nephew, presented to the young couple a house as a wedding-gift and intended to make them the heirs to all his property. Thus Charles and Caroline live together in the best of harmony, they have several children, and naturally think a great deal of “Uncle.” Caja, however, is a victim of remorse, since through her fault her daughter is materially living in concubinage; but, she does not dare to proclaim the paternity of Cajus, lest she defame him and destroy moreover the happiness of the couple. Finally she makes the whole matter known to her confessor and asks his advice and assistance.

Question.—Quid faciendum?

Solution:

1. The confessor asks himself three questions and solves them as follows:

(a) Did Caja sin by not revealing at the right time the impediment of blood relationship?

Without doubt she sinned, saltem objective. Canonists and Moralists agree that by reason of the banns of marriage all those who know of an obstacle to the marriage are strictly obliged, out of respect for the sacrament, from the natural duty of charity, and in obedience to the positive commandment of the Church, to reveal the obstacle in the proper manner. From this duty of manifestation not even the secretum naturale and promissum excuse. Only the seal of confession, professional secrecy, and the actual secretum commissum, or the danger of grave harm to one’s self or one’s family, releases from the obligation of revealing the existing obstacle (Wernz, Jus Decretalium IV. n. 143. Bucceroni Theologia Moralis II. n. 953). Had Caja before the marriage of her daughter taken the priest into her confidence, a defamation of Cajus need not have been feared. It could have been arranged to obtain secretly and without the knowledge of the contracting parties the requisite dispensation from the Holy See. The Canonists state explicitly that the petition for dispensation may be made by a third party (the parents of the bride, or the pastor). It is necessary, of course, in this case that the young couple after the dispensation has been obtained, accept it either expressly or tacitly, as the acceptatio dispensationis by those in whose favor it is obtained is required, as a rule, for the legality of the dispensation (St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor.; de matr. n. 1145). But this acceptance by the young couple could in the present case be prudently carried out without disclosing Cajus’ paternity to the bride; moreover the Holy See may under certain circumstances so remove an impediment to marriage that it does not require the acceptatio dispensationis on the part of those affected. Therefore Caja had every reason to feel remorse.

(b) Is Caja even now obliged to take steps that her daughter’s illegal marriage be made valid?

Yes, she is under this obligation: ratione peccati materialis, for the marriage of Caroline to Charles is a continued material concubinage, through the fault of Caja, by her guilty silence, when she could and should have spoken ex justitia et caritate. Through her fault the supposed spouses are deprived of the graces and effects of the holy Sacrament; and, moreover, there is the ever-present danger that by some unforeseen accident the truth may come out, and then the happiness of this couple and of their children may be gone forever.

(c) What then is to be done to set this matter right? Caja has done well to confide the whole matter to her confessor before informing her daughter of the illegality of her marriage, or before declaring it so in foro externo. In either case scandal, danger and injury could hardly have been spared the couple. Under the circumstances the confessor can not direct Caja to take one step or the other, he may not even advise this. After the matter has gone so far there is only one remedy: the sanatio in radice to be petitioned from the Holy See. The four conditions under which sanatio in radice is granted by the Holy See (Cf. Wernz IV. n. 657- 660) are present in this case: a real consent to marriage since the beginning, continuance of the consent, a purely ecclesiastical impediment, and, weighty reasons for a dispensation. The obtaining of the sanatio through a third party without the knowledge of the husband and wife is possible and legal: there is no other way in this case. Therefore the confessor considers himself in duty bound to adopt this means. He might make the matter easy for himself by following those Moralists who assert the principle: If the impediment is occult and the spouses are in good faith, they are ordinarily to be left in it (Bucceroni l. c. n. 1034). But with Wernz his standpoint is that in view of the present practice of the Holy See regarding the sanatio in radice it would be improper simply to decide: dissimulandum, silendum. “By this means formal sins are certainly prevented, but the spouses live in material concubinage and lack the sacrament of marriage and sacramental grace. These injuries and the deprivation of such great goods are not repaired by concealment.” Thus Wernz l. c. n. 660. The confessor in this case actually proceeded then in presenting to the St. Poenitentiaria, in Caja’s name, a full statement, and request for the sanatio in radice of the marriage between Charles and Caroline.

2. After about two weeks the answer came from the S. Poenitentiaria. But it was not the disposition he had expected. Upon the reverse side of his petition he found written: “The Sacred Penitentiary answers concerning the foregoing that complete silence is to be kept and the aforesaid putative spouses are to be left in good faith.”

Therewith this case of conscience was solved in the simplest way imaginable. Caja was supremely happy and grateful to her confessor for having delivered her from her qualms of conscience. The matter was ended also as far as the confessor was concerned. But he wished to understand theoretically why Rome’s answer had thus turned out. He figured it out as follows:

Had the Holy See perhaps, with the command to keep the matter secret, implicitly validated this marriage? This was not impossible. The sanatio in radice may be granted, and is often granted, without executio and acceptatio (Wernz 1. c. n. 660, Noldin Summa Theol. Mor. III. n. 664, 5). In the present case an executio through Caja’s confessor was impossible and an acceptatio difficult to procure. But if the Holy See thus granted the sanatio, then the confessor needed no further mandatum than to keep silence, and to impose the same upon Caja. Already in the early usage of the Church a legalization of invalidly contracted marriages was known in the form of a mandatum de silentio, and there are Canonists who in this practice perceive the origin of the sanatio in radice (Wernz l. c. n. 654).

Nevertheless we do not consider that the answer of the S. P. in this case is to be understood as an implicit validation of the putative marriage. Since the confessor requested not a general validation of the putative marriage, but in terminis the sanatio in radice, it is not probable that the Holy See would have chosen an obscure and evasive form of answer. Decisive is the word “putatos’ in the Responsum of the S. P. The putatively married are to be left in good faith, therefore they have not now become actually married.

The sanatio asked for was, therefore, not granted. Why not? There are possible here only suppositions. Perhaps the Holy See considered the mere lack of validity not as a causa gravis so long as the danger of formal sins or scandals remained excluded, through the good faith of the couple. The S. P. might indeed not consider the invalidity of the marriage as certain. Who can tell whether Caroline did not after all know of her actual parentage, and had perhaps obtained a dispensation before or after the ceremony? Illegitimate children often know more of their affairs than their mothers imagine. Perhaps Cajus himself secretly had the pastor put everything in order for the young couple, when his natural daughter became engaged to his nephew. Finally, it must be considered that consanguinity, even if due to illegitimate birth, is according to its nature a public impediment to marriage. Cajus’ paternity thus far had been successfully kept a secret, but it may yet through some accident become known in foro externo. What then, if meantime the marriage between Charles and Caroline had been, secretly and without knowledge of even one of the parties, made valid? Then the now valid marriage would have to be declared in foro externo as invalid, and husband and wife, not knowing of the validation of their marriage, might optima fide separate. In place of material concubinage there would then be material adultery—and there would be no longer a possibility of sanation. Which is preferable? Be that as it may; the case was satisfactorily solved for all concerned.