Case LV: A Difficult Case Presented by the Confession of a Bride

Bertha comes to Confession in preparation for her marriage and acknowledges that she is pregnant by a third party, the intended husband knowing nothing of the fact. May she enter the married state without revealing this to the bridegroom?

In regard to marriage, distinction is made between such defects and circumstances that violate the bridegroom’s vested rights, and such that do not interfere with his actual rights, though they render the marriage less desirable. To the latter belong poverty, inferior position, lack of beauty, loss of virginity, and the like. As regards these things the bride must not positively deceive the bridegroom by lying or dissimulation, but neither is she obliged in justice to make them known, not even if expressly asked about them.

As regards the corruptio, St. Alphonsus teaches positively that if the bridegroom makes inquiries about it: she may conceal it by answering equivocally; for then she does not feign, but conceals a hidden defect. L. VII. 864. It is different with defects which detract from the bridegroom’s right, as do, for instance, infamy, sexual disease, etc. In this class of defects must be included pregnancy by a third party. Lacroix confirms this explicitly (L. VI. 183). A sin against justice is committed by those who sell corrupted merchandise as perfect, particularly if the defect is concealed. Even if the bride has the firm intention to make compensation to the bridegroom for the damage resulting by the marriage (alendi prolem alienam), it is a question whether she will be capable of doing so. The fact that a wife who gives birth to a child by adultery is not obliged to make her husband aware of the fact, has no relation with our case. There is an indissolubly contracted marriage, quoad vinculum, and most deplorable consequences would result for the whole family from such revelation, while here a bride is only preparing to contract matrimony and from the revelation she alone would be at a disadvantage, and in a collision of the law the right of the innocent prevails over that of the guilty. It follows that Bertha must make known her condition to the intended husband, as also St. Alphonsus teaches (L. VII. n. 865 excepitur 1). In case she is not aware of this obligation, the confessor must instruct her, if she herself asks for information; is she bona fide and may be expected to obey, she is to be so instructed, also if she does not ask. If, however, the confessor has good reason to suppose that his direction will be fruitless, he had better keep silent and leave her bona fide.

What is to be done if, as in our case, the woman makes her Confession directly before the marriage? And if great danger is present that through such a revelation the marriage would even at the last moment be prevented to her public disgrace? Here it is necessary to discriminate. It is possible that the bridegroom will not become aware that the child has someone else for father. If this may be presumed, the bride cannot be obliged by refusal of absolution to incur great disgrace by revealing the truth, provided she is of the firm intention to do all in her power to avoid any injury to husband and legitimate children. To such an extraordinary step, as the revealing of the true situation, which would require a truly heroic act, Bertha cannot be obliged. The loss of honor and good name predominate, because of higher degree than a possible harm to the husband’s fortune. If, however, it is probable, or even certain, that the bridegroom wil learn the true state of affairs, for instance, by the early time of the birth, then I should again advise to discriminate according to the impression which the bride’s deception is likely to make upon the man. Possibly it may be supposed in good reason that the husband will accept the inevitable and forgive. Presuming this she may even in such case keep her silence; not, however, if the deception, as really must be feared, will result in a very unhappy marriage, or if it must even be expected that the husband will have recourse to the courts and institute proceedings for separation, or even divorce, on this ground. In this case the evil consequences are of greater account than the injury to her honor, and she must withdraw even at the last moment. George Freund, C.SS.R.