Case XXXV: A Gift Unlawfully Made by a Religious

Case.—Hildegard, a professed lay-sister of an Order whose lay-sisters take simple but perpetual vows, desired to make to one of the servants a small present as a token of appreciation. Since the Mother Superior would neither give, nor allow, anything for this purpose, Sister Hildegard, without the Superior’s knowledge, asked a woman friend for five dollars, pretending that she wanted it for a pious object. The friend made her a present of this amount, for her free use, and Hildegard in turn gave it to the servant, without the knowledge, and against the will, of her Superior.

Question.—To what extent has Sister Hildegard transgressed the vow of poverty? The matter of giving scandal, of disobedience, etc., in an act of this kind, is not taken into consideration here, but merely the violation of the vow of poverty, and relatively of justice, in the case.

Solution.—1. Through the Votum simplex paupertatis, as distinct from the solemn vow of poverty, Hildegard neither lost the dominium radicale suorum bonorum, nor the ability to acquire for herself temporal goods (bona temporalia pretio aestimabilia), but she had renounced all independent use of such goods, and all free and voluntary disposition of temporal possessions as a grave obligation (sub gravi). Hence Müller (Theol. Moral., 1, II, 216) holds: “Therefore a solemn vow renders every act of ownership not only unlawful but at the same time invalid; a simple vow makes such an act only unlawful, not invalid.” The same views are expressed by Marc, and other authorities who deal with the difference between solemn and simple vows. The acceptance of the gift by Sister Hildegard, asked for and received without permission, even against the wish of the Superior, was, therefore, valid but illicit. Cardinal Gousset writes: “A Religious sins against the vow of poverty if, without permission, he receives money for his own use, or for use according to his intentions, even if employing it for pious ends” (Moral Theol., 540).

2. Sister Hildegard renounces this property by presenting the money to the servant, acting again without either the expressed or presumed permission of her Superior, another action manifestly against the vow of poverty. But is this not also stealing money from the convent? The canonical principle: Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself but for the monastery, would seem to decide that the gift acquired by Hildegard became the property of the convent, and that her unauthorized disposition thus deprived the convent. This view must be rejected, however, because in the case of Religious of simple vows the principle quoted does not cover all possible manners of acquiring property, as is the case with solemn vows, but extends merely to the special work which such Religious practice as members of the community, as is apparent from the form of the profession. In regards to purely personal gifts this principle does not therefore apply in the case of simple vows of poverty. (See Gury II, n. 162 [9], and others.) In our case the justitia commutativa was not violated; the servant, though she sinned, if acting mala fide, by cooperating in transgressing the vow, still acquired possession of the money lawfully, and for this reason is not obliged to restitution.

3. Another question is whether the amount of five dollars forms a materia gravis contra votum, and hence whether Hildegard sinned grievously?

Moralists generally agree that the same amount that constitutes a grave sin against justice is to be considered materia gravis when a Religious violates the vow of poverty. In a case of theft, five dollars would not be a sum sufficient in every case to inflict a grave injury on the loser (materia absolute gravis). In the present instance, Sister Hildegard did not take the money from the Monastery, and consequently, even though the Monastery were very poor, there cannot be question of materia relative gravis. Furthermore, since she received the money for the benefit of another, her act of proprietorship was much less than it would have been had she taken the five dollars for her own personal use. Hence we consider that her sin against holy poverty was not mortal.

4. Finally, if Hildegard had merely begged her friend to give five dollars to the said servant, and the latter had presented the money herself, then there would have been no actus proprietatis, and, therefore, no violation of the vow of poverty, though the nun’s presumption and disobedience would call for censure.