Case IV: Plenary Indulgence

Titius goes to Confession and confesses all his mortal sins and as many of his venial sins as he can remember. Thereupon he elicits contrition for all his sins, both mortal and venial, and resolves to avoid all mortal sins in the future, and as many of the venial sins as the grace of God shall enable him to avoid. Then he receives absolution. Are not all his sins, both mortal and venial, remitted quoad culpam? If now, before committing any new sins, he complies with all the requirements for gaining a plenary indulgence, does he not gain the indulgence? Why then do the theologians say that it is very rare that any one gains a plenary indulgence? For instance, Father Noldin says: “Although every plenary indulgence, so far as depends upon the one granting it, can remove the whole temporal punishment, nevertheless not everyone gains it fully, but very many gain it only in part: for in those who have no fault, not even venial (is not this the case of Titius?), all punishments are removed; but in those who still have some venial sin, the punishments due for faults already removed are indeed remitted, but not those which are due for the fault still remaining.”—p. 355.

Answer.—There are two questions involved in the above case. The first question is: Are not all sins forgiven quoad culpam if they are confessed as fully as possible, and repented of? The second question is: Why should it be so difficult to gain a plenary indulgence, in such a case, since a plenary indulgence is gained by those who are free from all culpa of sin, and comply with the conditions of the indulgence?

Ad. I. When a penitent confesses all his mortal sins and as many of his venial sins as he can remember, and is then sorry for all his sins both mortal and venial, ex motivo universali, or if he be sorry for his mortal sins ex motivo particulari and for his venial sins ex motivo universali, v. g., because they are a refusal of obedience to God, or because they keep the penitent from being united more closely to God, and if then the penitent resolve to avoid not only all mortal sin in the future, but all venial sin, in as far as the grace of God will enable him, and then receives absolution, all his sins, both mortal and venial are remitted quoad culpam, and all his mortal sins, quoad poenam aeternam, but not quoad poenam temporalem.

Ad. II. If now he comply with all the conditions for gaining a plenary indulgence, and does not in the mean time commit the slightest fault, then he gains the plenary indulgence. But as it is almost impossible for a person not to commit some very slight sin, v. g., of impatience, or lack of perfect charity toward one’s neighbor, etc., apart from a very special grace of God, which is not ordinarily given, then the penitent does not gain a plenary indulgence, i. e., there is a temporal punishment and a culpa remaining on account of the sin of impatience or lack of charity, which prevents the gaining of a perfect plenary indulgence. Ballerini says: The faithful rarely cast off every affection, even the slightest, toward any venial sin, and conceive sufficient sorrow for all venial sins so as to obtain complete remission.

Theoretically, a penitent confessing all the venial sins that he can remember, and eliciting sorrow for all venial sins, confessed and not confessed, ex motivo universali, i. e., a motive equally applicable to all venial sin, and who then resolves to avoid all venial sin in the future, as far as he can with the grace of God assisting, such a penitent is absolved from all “culpa peccati,” both mortal and venial, and if he does not commit any new venial sin before complying with all the conditions of a plenary indulgence, then certainly he gains the plenary indulgence plenarie.

Practically, this happens so rarely, that theologians say that it is very rare that a person gains a plenary indulgence plenarie.

But although the indulgence granted “ut plenaria” is not gained plenarie, or plenissime, it is certainly gained partialiter, and the opinion which says that an indulgence, granted ut plenaria, must be gained either plenarie or nullo modo, so that it must have either the whole effect or none, is not a probable opinion.