Case LVI: Right of a Bishop to Suspend a Priest Without Trial

Titius, a priest, exercising the functions of the sacred ministry in a certain diocese, is "reported" to his bishop for indulging too freely in intoxicating drink—in fact, for being well under its influence on several occasions. Without being granted the benefit of a canonical trial, or even a thorough investigation of the charges preferred against him, the accused Titius is suspended by his bishop and ordered to repair to a monastery and remain there till he (the bishop) sees fit to recall him. Under protest Titius submits, complies with the bishop's command, and spends a considerable time in a monastery, where he is obliged to defray his own expenses.

Now it is asked:

1. Had the bishop a right to suspend Titius without a previous canonical trial or thorough investigation of the charges brought against him?

2. Had the bishop a right to order Titius to a monastery without previous trial or canonical procedure?

3. Had the bishop a right to compel Titius to defray his own expenses while in the monastery?

Solution.—1. Had the bishop a right to suspend Titius without canonical trial or other legal formality?

Prior to the Council of Trent no ecclesiastic could be punished by his bishop, v. g., suspended from the exercise of his orders, except upon a regular or formal criminal trial as prescribed by the sacred canons. This was the general law of the Catholic Church up to the time of the Council of Trent, and admitted of no exception whatever, save only in the case of murder, heresy, and in the case of regulars, who for secret crimes might be restrained by their superiors from receiving higher orders even without trial. Stremler (Eccl. Punish. p. 310) says: Before the Council of Trent, a bishop could not restrain any unworthy candidate from holy orders, nor punish a delinquent ecclesiastic, except upon a formal or an ordinary criminal trial, as established by the law of the Church and contained in the decretals. No crime could be punished, except when the delinquent had been judicially convicted, in a canonical trial conducted with the formalities established by canon law for proceedings in criminal causes."

The Council of Trent, in its 14th session, chapter I, de Reform., introduced in this respect, a complete and radical change in the existing discipline of the Church. For in its 14th session the Council enacted that in certain cases bishops could inflict punishment upon their delinquent ecclesiastics without previous trial or judicial formality of any kind whatever. By virtue of this power the bishops may in certain cases condemn an ecclesiastic, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, for reasons proved in no trial, but weighed in his (the bishop’s) conscience.... For imposing this suspension neither judicial forms nor canonical admonitions are required (Instr. Congr. de Prop. Fide, 1884). This power of the bishop to suspend his priest without canonical trial or legal procedure, but simply for reasons known to him extrajudicially, and sufficient for his own conscience, is known in Canon Law as the power to suspend a priest, or other cleric in major orders, ex informata conscientia. It was conferred on the bishops by the Council of Trent, to safeguard the dignity of the priesthood as well as the spiritual interests of the faithful, and to eradicate evils that could not be reached in any other way.

The bishop is not required to give any reasons to the priest whom he suspends, but he is required to give reasons to Rome, if appeal is taken to Rome. There lies no appeal from the suspension ex informata conscientia. That is, if the suspended priest takes an appeal to Rome, he does not thereby cause a suspension of the censure until a final decision is given by Rome. The only recourse for a priest in these circumstances is to observe the articles of his suspension, and appeal extrajudicially to the Holy See. A decreto suspensions ex informata conscientia non datur appellatio, sed semper patet recursus extrajudicialis ad S. Sedem, suspensione interim in vigore permanente (Instr. Congr. de Prop. Fide, n. v. II and 12).

There may exist among some persons a persuasion that this power of the bishops to suspend ecclesiastics without due process of law, or ex informata conscientia, was somehow abrogated for the United States by the III. PI. Council of Baltimore. Such persuasion is altogether unfounded. The power of a bishop to suspend his priest ex informata conscientia, in the United States, is reaffirmed by the Council of Baltimore and by the instruction issued by the S. C. de Prop. Fide, to the American bishops, October 20, 1884.

Thus the S. C. de Prop. Fide expressly says:

But as regards repressive remedies or penalties, let Ordinaries note that the extrajudicial remedy based on informed conscience, established by the Holy Council of Trent for hidden offenses, session 14, chapter 1, On Reform, remains in its full force.

(Appendix, III. PI. Coun. Bait.)

Titius was guilty of crimen occultum. He was well under the influence of strong drink on several occasions. He is liable to give, if he has not already given, grave scandal. He is already sacrificing the dignity of the priesthood and jeopardizing the spiritual interests of the faithful. The bishop is perfectly within his rights when he suspends Titius ex informata conscientia, without previous warning or canonical trial or other legal formality. Justam ac legitimam causam suspensioni ex informata conscientia, praebet crimen seu culpa a suspenso commissa. (Instr. Cum Magnopere, Oct. 20, 1884.)

The suspension may not be inflicted, ex informata conscientia, in perpetuum, but only for a certain period of time, or until the delinquent manifests sufficient signs of amendment.

Stremler (p. 329) says that no general rule can be laid down regarding the duration of the suspension; but he thinks that two or three months are a long time and that the suspension should rarely last longer. Only very exceptional circumstances would justify a suspension to last six months. The suspension ceases without other formality at the death of the bishop who inflicts it, but whether it also ceases in the case of the transfer or resignation or removal of the bishop imposing it, Fr. Smith says, is not so certain.

2. We proceed now to the discussion of the second question, namely: Had the bishop a right to order Titius to a monastery to do penance without giving him the benefit of a canonical trial?

In the Instruction Cum Magnopere of the Propaganda to the bishops of the United States, October 20, 1884, concerning the manner of proceeding in criminal and disciplinary causes of ecclesiastics, we read:

I. The Ordinary is bound, by virtue of his pastoral office, diligently to look after the discipline and correction of ecclesiastics. Hence he should watch assiduously over their conduct, and make wise use of the remedies established by the canons, either for the purpose of preventing or doing away with abuses which sometimes creep in among the clergy.

II. These remedies are of two kinds: some are preventive, others repressive. The former have for their object the prevention of evils, the removing of causes of scandal, and the avoiding of voluntary proximate occasions of sin. The latter are established for the purpose of recalling the delinquent to the path of duty, etc.

III. The application of these remedies is left to the conscientious discretion of the Ordinary, provided, etc.

IV. The following are the chief preventive remedies: spiritual exercises, etc.

V. Before they are imposed upon any one, the facts calling for them must be verified in a summary manner, etc.

Now in the case of Titius, the bishop acted within the provisions of this Instruction in applying a preventive remedy, namely, in commanding Titius to make a retreat in a monastery.

"A bishop, therefore, has the right to impose a special spiritual retreat upon an ecclesiastic who is the occasion of scandal, or who remains voluntarily in the proximate occasion of sin, and who consequently, though not yet guilty of crime, follows a slippery road leading to spiritual ruin." (Smith, Eccl. Law, n. 1746.)

As space will not allow us to treat of this more fully, we refer our readers to Smith, Elements of Eccl. Law, and New Procedure, and Zitelli, Apparatus Jur. Eccl., etc.

3. Did the bishop act within his power when he obliged Titius to defray his expenses while in the monastery?

We take for granted that Titius was ordained ad titulum missionis.

Some readers may be under the impression that the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore changed the status of priests ordained ad titulum missionis, with regard to removal, etc. The council did not change the status of the ordinary missionary priest. It did create irremovable rectors and made special laws governing their removal, but it reaffirmed the laws of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, regarding all other priests ordained ad titulum missionis. In the Instruction of the Propaganda to the American bishops issued in 1884, the title of which is: "De modo servando in cognoscendis et definiendis causis criminalibus et disciplinaribus clericorum in Foederatis Statibus Americae Septentrionalis," the laws of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, concerning missionary priests, with the exception of the newly created irremovable rectors, are expressly stated to be still in force.

The decrees of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, no. 125 concerning the nature of missions and nos. 77 and 108 concerning the juridical effects of removing missionaries from office, are understood to have been in no way changed or weakened, without prejudice to what has more recently been established concerning pastors or irremovable rectors (cf. Appendix, III. PI. Con. Bait., p. 292, XLV).

If we refer now to the II. PI. Con. Bait., n. 125, we read:

By using the terms parochial right, parish, and pastor, we in no way intend to confer upon the rector of any church the right, as they say, of irremovability, or to take away or in any way diminish that power which, according to the discipline received in these provinces, a bishop has to deprive any priest of office or transfer him elsewhere.

And n. 77 of the same Council we are told that, as was decreed in the Provincial Council of St. Louis, in the year 1855, and confirmed by the Holy See: Priests to whom exercise of the priesthood has been forbidden by the Ordinary’s sentence have no right to demand support from him, since by their own fault they have rendered themselves incapable of working in the missions.

The American bishops proposed the following Dubium to the Congr. of the Propaganda:

Whether and how it is to be declared that priests ordained under the title of the mission, who have rendered themselves unworthy of exercising sacred ministry, are deprived of this title; and that the Ordinary is not bound to provide support to them.

The Sacred Congr. answered on Feb. 4, 1873:

In the case as presented, after a prior declaration of this kind is to be made to the priest by the bishop, and so long as the aforesaid priest perseveres in his depraved manner of life, displaying no sign of sincere repentance, the bishop is not bound to provide him support. (Zitelli, Apparatus Jur. Eccl. de tit. Ord., p. 352.)

Strictly speaking, therefore, the bishop had a right to require of Titius that he defray his own expenses while in the monastery, since Titius, by his own fault, forfeited his living, his missionary title ad honestam sustentationem. If, however, Titius have no means to defray his own expenses, the bishop will provide means ad NECES- SARIAM sustentationem, that is, the bishop will provide what is necessary for life, but not what would make life comfortable and pleasant.

If the bishop knows that Titius has means of his own to procure the necessaries of life, then the bishop is not obliged to defray any of Titius' expenses while Titius is accomplishing his penance. Stremler says:

"For the rest, dismissal from benefice always leaves to the ecclesiastic who is dismissed the right to the means of subsistence. The ecclesiastical judge should assign to the cleric who is deprived of his benefice, and who has no other means of subsistence, an alimentary pension, or keep him in a monastery, according to the gravity of his offense, and not allow him to tramp about, deprived of all means of living. For, say the Sacred Canons: Paupertas cogit ad turpia.