Case LVII: Envy as Mortal Sin

St. Thomas shows (2. 2. g. 36. a. 4.) not only the character of envy as capital sin, but also how the filiae invidiae: susurratio, detractio, cxultatio in adversis proximi, afflictio in prosperis proximi, odium, develop therefrom. Furthermore, he refutes the objection against classification of this sin as capital sin, as also the objection that the above-mentioned exultatio and afflictio coincide with envy; respecting the exultatio, he denies it entirely; respecting the afflictio, he admits it under one point of view, while under another he denies it. This may suffice as regards envy as capital sin.

Our task here is to ascertain whether envy is ex genere suo peccatum mortale, and if so, whether ex toto genere.

The answer to the first question is simple, if the nature of envy is precisely determined. Not infrequently penitents lack this knowledge, and they accuse themselves of envy, although they did either not sin at all, or sinned (grievously or lightly), but not through envy. There are acts which have one or two characteristics in common with envy. One characteristic, the tristitia de bono proximi has, in common with envy, the so-called aemulatio, or zelus, when someone is sad at his neighbor’s possession, because he, too, would like to possess, not in eodem individuo, but in eadem specie vel mensura. If the aemulatio has reference to natural or supernatural mental qualities, it is quite praiseworthy; if to temporal advantages, it is also of itself laudable, or at least permissible, but it becomes sinful if the desire is in any way inordinate; nevertheless, it has not even in this case the character of envy. For this there would be required the desire that the neighbor might not possess the benefit. Even this wish is not the nota specified of envy. Such desire is present also in other kinds of tristitia be bono proximi. For instance, in the tristitia, which is a result of fear, if someone, for instance, mourns over a neighbor's possession because he fears, either for himself or for others, evil consequences from it, be they deserved or undeserved. In the former case the tristitia is faulty, not so in the latter, though the fear which produces it may be inordinate, for instance, if there is no sufficient reason for suspecting that the neighbor will misuse his power in order to harm us or others. In no case has this tristitia the character of envy. Again, the desire that the neighbor might not obtain, or not possess, something of value is connected with that tristitia which someone entertains because he considers the neighbor unworthy of the benefit in question. This étristitia is called indignatio, or nemesis. In regard the bona honesta, ex quibus aliquis justus efficitur, so St. Thomas teaches (/. c. a. 2.), this tristitia can not occur at all; for the gratia justifications is not obtained except by proper preparation, if otherwise such preparation is possible (comp. Cone. Trid. sess. 6. de justif. cap. 5.). It is only possible with respect to riches and other such things, which can fall to the worthy and the unworthy (S. Thom. I. c.), and is sinful if directed against Divine Providence, which allows the unworthy to have such goods either ad eorum correctionem, in order to incite them to penance and conversion, or ad eorum damnationem, that, if they do not become converted and thus incur damnation, they will be rewarded then for the good that they have done. It is sinful also if it proceeds from a contempt of the eternal goods which God has reserved for his faithful (ps. 36. 1.). But neither in the one nor in the other case has it the character of envy.

Finally, the desire that the neighbor may not obtain, or possess, a benefit, is present in the tristitia, which is sad at the neighbor’s possession, in quantum proximo bonum est, and this tristitia is odium inimicitiae, just like the gaudium and desiderium circa malum proximi ut ipsi malum est, it results from envy (S. Thom. 1. c. 8, q: 34. a. 6.), is nearest related to it, yet not envy itself.

Although the envious does not grieve over a possession of the neighbor, because it is an advantage for the latter, still envy is directly contra caritatem (proximi), cujus est gaudere de bono proximi, because the envious only grieves over the neighbor’s possession and would like to see him deprived of it, quod sit diminutivum propriae excellentiae. The diminutio propriae excellentiae per bonum proximi is in itself never a just reason to grieve over the possession of the neighbor and to wish that he might not have the same, unless he makes use of it ad diminuendam excellentiam nostram, or if he is unworthy to possess it in common with other more worthy persons, or even in preference to them. (Compare what is said above of tristitia ex timore and the indignatio.) Then again it is quite false that the bonum proximi, except in the cases just mentioned, is a diminutio propriae excellentiae, since from your neighbor’s happiness, because of the union of charity and friendship, some excellence is rather added to you, as Laymann (l. 2. tr. 3. c. 10. n. 2) correctly remarks. For this reason we said quod sit, and not quod est, diminutivum, etc. Is envy thus directly contra caritatem proximi, it is evident that it is ex genere suo peccatum mortale (comp. S. Thom. I. c. q. 36. a. 3.).

The second question is whether it is mortale ex toto genere. St. Thomas says nothing about this, because he makes, in general, no distinction between mortale ex toto genere and non ex toto. Many other authors explicitly declare that there is not respecting this sin a parvitas materiae, but do not explain this further. Of all authors to whom we have turned for advice, we find Schwane (Special Moral Theology, I. p. 140) most explicit, in spite of his brevity: “Envy is a grievous sin if our fellow-beings are envied on account of their spiritual advantage. Envy that concerns temporal possessions of our fellow men is not always a grievous sin.”

Leaving aside this distinction between spiritual and temporal benefits, we say: Envy is always a grievous sin if the object is a possession of such nature, or such extent, that the neighbor, by its absence or deprivation, would suffer an important injury.

Dr. Anton Auer.