Case LVIII: The Vow to Enter an Order

Paul, a college-graduate, has taken a vow, from religious motives, to enter an Order. In fulfilment of his vow he entered an approved congregation, and after passing a few weeks in the novitiate he comes to the conclusion that his health will not stand the strain of the many spiritual exercises and tasks prescribed in this community, and he leaves of his own accord.

^* By J. Schwienbacher, C.SS.R.

Question: Has Paul satisfied the obligations of his vow?

A vow in general is a particular law which the votary imposes upon himself, for the glory of God, and it must for this reason be interpreted according to the spirit that prevailed in the taking of the vow. There ensues for Paul, therefore, the following rules governing the fulfilling of his vow.

1. If he has not expressly intended to enter an Order sensu stricto with solemn vows, then his vow is fulfilled by entering an approved congregation with simple vows, so the Doctors universally teach, and in that case the votum ingrediendi religionem does not belong to the vows reserved by the Pope.

2. With regard to the time the vow is to be fulfilled soon if the obligation is present and the opportunity given, and this applies especially to personal vows, among which belongs the vow of entering the religious state. Hence St. Alphonsus says (Homo Apostolicus): "If the vow is perpetual, such as entering the religious life, then the theologians teach that one sins grievously if the fulfilment is delayed more than six months without just cause," and in his Moral Theology (lib. III n. 221) he adds: Sporer also agrees if the person making the vow is over forty years old. Nevertheless, with Tamburino they judge that a young man of fifteen or sixteen years who delays for three or four years is excused from mortal sin; because, as they say, this time seems slight matter in relation to the service of a whole lifetime. But I do not wholly assent to this unless there is a just cause for the delay. Such causae justae are there given by way of example.

3. Concerning our chief question, Paul's leaving the order, the vow to enter an Order imposes the obligation, under penalty of grievous sin, of employing a moral diligence (not an extraordinary or supreme effort) to obtain admission into an Order, in which at least the essential rules are observed, to enter within due time, to persevere faithfully in the same, and when the vocation has been proved to become professed in the Order. This general rule finds in our case its practical application in the following manner:

I. Paul is not allowed to enter an Order, in which the discipline "quoad observantias principaliores" has become lax. (St. Alph: lib. IV, n. 72.)

II. According to the intention of the votary St. Alphonsus distinguishes in the vow before us three cases, to which correspond different standards of obligation. (Comp. Homo Apost. v, 34.)

In the first case the votary merely obliges himself to an earnest trial of the religious life. In this case the difficulties confronting Paul excuse his action and should they cease later on, he will not be obliged to return because he has fulfilled his vow by making an earnest trial.

Of the second case the Saint says: "If any one vows to make profession, he must set about doing so even under great difficulties unless the religious life becomes absolutely unbearable for him."

The third case, which is to be supposed in our vow unless the first or second are positively ascertained, is according to St. Alphonsus as follows: "If a vow is simply made to enter an Order, one is obliged to enter and remain therein, and it would be a grievous sin to leave again, without just cause. It would be considered a just cause for leaving, if one found a manner of living which exceeded one's strength, or if one had to suffer great and prolonged sadness." Thus the Saint.

Now this just cause for leaving is present in the difficulties which Paul discovered, provided they were really insurmountable for Paul, and for this reason he is not blameworthy, especially if, to avoid self-deception, he has sought the advice of an experienced confessor. With justice Gopfert, however, adds to this the provision: "Should the just cause cease to exist, one must return to the order," for in such case the fulfilment of the vow would no longer be morally impossible. The same authority, however, remarks that "the vow is always subject to the condition that the Superior must accept and retain the votary."

III. If Paul in his vow expressly intended a certain Order, and if the fulfilment of this vow is morally impossible in regard to this order, he is of course not obliged to enter any other Order. If, on the contrary, he did not intend any Order in specie, he is, if after prudent counsel these difficulties are not to be looked for in some other Order with discipline, obliged to seek admission there, but after three or four unsuccessful trials, he may safely remain in the world, as Marc, n. 2140 (2) in a similar case justly remarks, because in such case the fulfilment of the vow may be looked upon as impossible.

IV. In conclusion the following rule may be quoted, found especially in early authorities: "It should be observed that the one who has vowed to enter an Order and has failed to gain admission in the communities of his province, is not obliged to seek admission away from his country. If a woman she is not obliged to leave her native place if there are convents there" (Homo Apost. v. 34).

The reason adduced is that as a rule it can not be presumed that the votary intended to bind himself for such a sacrifice. Lehmkuhl comments on this in view of our modern circumstances: “But what they said in ancient times I would not admit universally under the circumstances of our own time, unless peculiar difficulties existed.” (Casus Consc. vi, n. 294.)