Case LXVI: Incorrect Definition of Vow

Father Sempronius, in his religious instruction, while explaining the second commandment and speaking of the vow, finds in his handbook the definition, “A vow is a well-considered promise, made to God, to do a certain good to which one is not obliged by a commandment.” Father Sempronius considers this incorrect, he omits the words: to which one is not obliged by the commandment, and substitutes therefor, “if one does not thereby prevent something better.” Was Father Sempronius right in his view that the words: to which one is not obliged by a commandment, contain an error, and what about the provision which Father Sempronius puts in their place?

St. Thomas treats of the question in II., II. ae q. 88, Art. 2: Whether a vow must always be made concerning a better good, and in his discussion makes inquiry about what may be the actual object of a vow. Starting from the fact that the vow is a voluntary promise he holds there can never be the object of a vow that which is absolutely necessary to be or not to be. It would be foolish, for instance, to make the vow to die at the end of one’s natural life. St. Thomas then, in second place, mentions things, which, although not absolutely necessary, still are necessary in order to attain a certain end, and adds that such things insofar as they are done voluntarily may be the object of a vow. Here belong those acts ordained, or forbidden, by a divine law: because their practise, or avoidance, is not necessary of their own account, but necessary in regard to eternal salvation. Though, therefore, according to St. Thomas, these things may form the object of a valid vow, there is, according to the same theologian, in the real and strict sense only that a proper object of a vow which is not prescribed by law, but advised, as only the latter depends perfectly upon our free will. Propriissime, and in first place, the object of a vow is some advised act; in second place: something of obligation. This is in our case the doctrine of St. Thomas and it is shared by theologians almost without exception. A divergency between the teaching of St. Thomas and that of other theologians is only found therein that the angelic teacher makes distinction between the object in a narrow and wider sense of the word, whilst this distinction is explicitly made by hardly any other theologian.

Recent authorities are also of opinion that not only the advised act, but also one of obligation may be the object of a vow, as is evident from even a superficial perusal of their works. Lehmkuhl (P. I., n. 498), for instance, considers this view so self-evident that it requires no proof. For those who nevertheless would be tempted to doubt, he refers to the votum castitatis as approved by the Church, the matter of which is not only celibacy, etc., but also acts always and under all circumstances forbidden to all men.

To hold the view that whatever is of obligation cannot be the object of a vow, would be to deny that all such acts are included in the votum castitatis, and consequently their commission by a person who had made the votum castitatis would be no violation of the vow, although, of course, a sin against the Sixth Commandment. That this would contradict the general conception of the vow of chastity is obvious; it appears, indeed, improbable that those who do not share our view have considered the logical consequence of their theory. Like Lehmkuhl, so does Gury (tom. I, n. 324) answer our question, and bases his affirmative answer on the fact that it does not at all conflict if the obligation to perform, or to omit, a certain act has different sources, and he continues: then indeed a vow of this kind concerns a thing good in itself, since the precept is presupposed, and it concerns a better good, since it can confer a new bond toward greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. P. Ballerini agrees with this in his note to Gury’s remark, and he adds: Moreover, to actions performed from a vow of this kind there is added the nobility which flows from the virtue of Religion and the character of more abundant merit. Upon the same ground as Gury, Müller bases his view (I., II., § 52), and he explains that it is more meritorious to do something: by virtue of a vow than to do the same thing without a vow. For one who acts by the force of a vow acts from the motive of religion and with a firmer and more constant purpose. Schwane decides in the same sense, in his Moral Theology (I., §65), and explains that such an act of obligation receives from the vow a new specific merit, and its omission an additional specific wrong which must be confessed as a breach of the vow.

It is, furthermore, certainly the sententia communis theologorum which affirms the validity of a vow not to commit a grievous sin. All authors who defend the validity of this vow must agree with our opinion, because the avoidance of grievous sin is surely something to which we are obliged. The question to what extent such a vow in respect to venial sins has validity is here without importance, for, if the validity of such a vow is disputed, it is done for another reason.

Father Sempronius, therefore, was perfectly right when he considered it an error that only something advisable, and not something of obligation, may be the object of a vow.

The provision, which Father Sempronius substituted in place of the omitted words, is superfluous in the definition of the vow, for Father Sempronius could simply have based his definition upon that of St. Thomas: est promissio Deo facta, by which the nature of the vow, as Lehmkuhl also observes, is fully expressed. If Father Sempronius, however, wished to give expression to the idea of the bonum melius in the definition, then the words: whereby one does not prevent something better are well chosen, for the essential meaning of this provision is not that the object of the vow must be better than what is of obligation, but that it not be, as Reiffenstuel (Theol. mor. tom. I., tract. VI.) puts it, of itself an impediment to another more excellent work. J. von Grimmenstein.