Chapter — The Casuist

Case LXVIII: Reverential Fear as Impediment

¶1.

Eva, a good, pious young girl, had been brought up by her uncle, who practically forced her to marry Caesar. She was utterly averse to the marriage, and even declared in confession that she agreed to it against her will, not daring to thwart her uncle. The wedding took place, and in due time a child was born. From the wedding-day onwards Eva continued to be unhappy, and in course of time she refused her husband the debitum, because she had inwardly never consented to the marriage, and persisted in refusing her consent; moreover her confessor regarded her marriage as invalid. In order, as she thought, to make things easier for herself, she took a vow of chastity, and lived with her husband as his sister. He is, however, in danger of incontinence; and the question arises whether Eva, in spite of her strong repugnance, is bound now at any rate to consent to her marriage with Caesar, in order to avert this periculum conjugis?

¶2.

In a theological periodical of wide circulation in Italy, this question received merely " Yes " in reply. The Roman weekly, " Il Corrispondente del Clero," was not satisfied with this decision, and commented unfavorably upon it. The first point chosen for criticism was that the journal in question laid down too decidedly that "grave fear invalidates marriage by natural and ecclesiastical law." The Corrispondente declared that the theory that metus gravis could destroy a marriage also with regard to the natural law, is viewed by the best authorities merely as probabilior. Hence Mansella, in his work " de impedimentis," simply says: "an impediment of this kind indeed invalidates marriage by the positive law of the Church; but more probably it also renders it null by natural law." As a reason for the greater probability he says that fear, however grave, does not remove freedom unless it sometimes removes the exercise of reason. Gury and others make similar statements.

¶3.

The Corrispondente is still less satisfied with the following remark in the mentioned paper: "Reverential fear alone toward parents, grandparents, masters, guardians, and so forth, is not sufficient to invalidate marriage unless fear of a grave evil is added." If, says the Corrispondente, these words only mean that the timor reverentialis must be gravis, there is no objection to them; but they seem rather to mean that there must necessarily be some other metus besides, or, at least, that the timor reverentialis could not be gravis to such a degree as to invalidate the marriage; and this is not true. On the contrary, it is precisely the timor reverentialis that may easily be gravis, especially in the case of a timid girl, unaccustomed to oppose her fosterfather. The famous Schmalzgruber teaches: that a marriage is invalid when contracted by a maiden with a young man whom she detested, out of mere reverence toward her parents, joined with a probable expectation of indignation, reproaches, harsh treatment, and similar hardships. We see from this that reverentialis timor can much more readily be regarded as gravis than ordinary fear.

¶4.

After discussing these preliminary matters, the Corrispondente proceeds to answer the question. The writer believes that the other paper erred on the side of severity in the following passage: " Eva was, strictly speaking, not forced to marry, therefore she ought to be forced to consent." In stating the case, she is said to have been " practically forced," so her uncle must have brought some kind of compulsion to bear upon her, and she felt herself constrained to comply with his wishes. From her childhood she had been in the habit of obeying him, she was afraid of him, and could not make up her mind to refuse, for the first time perhaps, to do his bidding. She made no secret of her aversion to her future husband, even in the confessional, but her fear made her disregard the voice of her own conscience and yield to her uncle's pressure, so that she apparently consented to the marriage and lived tanquam uxor, though always with inward repugnance. When she grew older and found that even her love for her children did not enable her to overcome her dislike of her husband, she at last spoke frankly to him and refused, ut supra; and in order to have more strength, or a better reason for persisting in her refusal, she took a temporary vow of chastity. According to our opinion the confessor ought to point out to her the sins her weakness has led her to commit, so that she may recognize the dangerous state of her soul. He ought also to draw her attention to the unpleasant position of her husband and of her innocent children, and do his utmost to induce her to overcome her aversion; in short, he should use every means of persuasion, but we certainly cannot consider it right for him to force her, i. e. to lay upon her a solemn duty to consent to such a marriage. We are much afraid that she, having already suffered so much in consequence of her weakness, will only suffer far more in consequence of a demand on the part of her confessor that is too hard for her to comply with.

¶5.

Finally the Corrispondente del Clero considers the last reason given in the other paper, viz., Eva's vow of chastity, to be of no importance and no obstacle to her marriage, for she vowed concerning something not her own. Any reasonable person would certainly agree that her circumstances are such that a dispensation from this vow ought to be granted her, but it seems at least very doubtful whether she has made a vow de re non propria. It is admitted that the marriage is not valid; what right could such a marriage give to the reputed husband to control his wife's freedom of action?

¶6.

To sum up: Taking into account the scandal to which the dissolution of this marriage would give rise, and the position in which the husband and the children would be placed, we are of opinion that the confessor ought to use every means in his power to persuade Eva to give her consent to the marriage, but he must not compel her to do so. The Corrispondente concludes by saying that " this is only our opinion, which we desired to state in order to have it corrected, should it be erroneous."