Case LXVIII: The Seal of Confession and Absolution

Case.—Francis and Anna, about to be married, made their confessions on the morning of their wedding-day. Among other things the bride accuses herself of a grievous sin contra sextum, committed the previous day with the bridegroom. Right after the bride, Francis comes to confess, but makes not the least mention of the sin committed with Anna. The confessor, therefore, asked general questions in reference to the Sixth Commandment, but failed to elicit the least acknowledgment from Francis. Since he must presume that the groom confesses sacrilegiously he does not absolve him, but with a prayer gives him the blessing which the groom supposes to be the absolution.

Question.—What is to be said of the confessor’s action?

Solution.—This is a case by no means rare in practice. Concerning its solution, however, the opinions even of the greatest moralists differ. St. Thomas (opusc. 7 al. 12. qu. 6.) propounds the general principle: “In confession, the sinner who confesses is to be believed both for himself and against himself; but against another he is in no way to be believed, otherwise an opportunity for feigned confession and fraudulent defamation would be given to many.” According to this the confessor is in general to form his judgment about the penitent according to the accusation of the penitent himself (confitenti et pro se et contra se), not according to the statement of another, who possibly with deceiving or calumnious intention (ficta confessio et fraudulenta infamatio), mentions in his accusation the sins of another. The certainty that the confessor gains from the deposition of the penitent, is as a usual thing certainly greater than that which he obtains through the confession of another, as St. Thomas expressly sets forth (4. dist. 17 Qu. 3. art. 3 q. 5. ad. 2.): “With respect to this knowledge—that is, through disclosure in confession—the priest cannot receive greater certainty than by believing his subject, because this is for the assistance of that person’s conscience; hence in the tribunal of confession a person is believed both for himself and against himself.” Suarez is of the same opinion (de poenit. d. 32. s. 3. n. 9.): “However much the confessor may know the penitent’s sin from the report of others, in this judgment he is bound to believe the penitent himself more, for the reason already given.”

Therefore, if the penitent is silent about a sin of which the confessor has learned from another, then the confessor ought to assume that the penitent either has forgotten the sin, or has already confessed it to someone else, or has a lawful reason for keeping silent, or that after all the other person had erred. The confessor may refuse credence only when he has indubitable evidence of the sin which the penitent does not reveal, when, for instance, he has seen it with his own eyes; in this case says Suarez (l. c.), “he is not bound to abide by the penitent’s statements in such a way that he cannot use his own knowledge to convict and reprove the penitent himself.”

These principles apply in the case that the confessor extra confessionem has learned of the penitent’s sin, as also in the case that he knows it ex confessione alterius, as St. Thomas plainly indicates in his first quoted sentence (opusc. 7. al. 12. qu. 6.).

But the circumstances may be, as in the present case, of such kind that the confessor knows from the confession of another the sins of a penitent with evident certainty, because it could not possibly be supposed that the first penitent would calumniate the second, nor that she erred, because she had taken part in the sin. Now the question is, can the confessor make use of this knowledge, gained from the confession of another, as the rule for his conduct towards the penitent? We do not mean a use producing an obvious violation of the seal of confession, i. e., by direct reference to the accusation of another, or through pointed questions, from which the penitent may easily become suspicious that another revealed his sin. It is to be considered, however, whether it would not be allowable in order to prevent an invalid absolution on part of the confessor, to leave the penitent in good faith about receiving absolution, and either not to absolve him at all, saying a prayer instead of the absolution, or to absolve him sub conditione. On the one hand the confessor is confronted by the duty not to violate the sigillum, and to consider the knowledge gained as not available for his procedure, on the other hand it seems that the avoidance of a cooperatio ad confessionem sacrilegam is reason sufficient sine ullo gravamine poenitentis not to grant absolution or to grant it sub conditione. This is still a mooted question. St. Alphonsus enumerates the opinions of various authors and sides with Lacroix in these words: “In my judgment Lacroix thinks better: in that case he should by no means absolve, but should merely recite some prayer in order to conceal the denial of absolution.” Amongst the modern Moralists this view is also held by E. Müller, who however counsels conditional absolution when it is not certain that the penitent’s confession is sacrilegious. Göpfert holds in principle that the penitent in this case is not to be absolved: “When the confessor knows the sin only from the confession of another, particularly of the participant in the sin, then without the other’s special permission he ought not to inquire in particular about this sin, but should put only general questions that do not endanger a revelation of the other’s confession. If it is quite evident that the penitent has sacrilegiously concealed the sin, he ought not to be absolved, but should receive the blessing, without telling him about it.” When, however, such plain evidence is not practically obtainable, as is generally the case, absolution is to be given: “And since this evidence cannot be established through the confession of another exclusively, the penitent is as a rule to be absolved, absolutely, if there is no reason to doubt his sincerity, otherwise conditionally.” Noldin (De Sacram. n. 402) leaves the question open: “But if he does not confess the matter and it is plainly established that the penitent is concealing a sin committed, it is lawful to omit absolution and to recite some prayers in order to conceal its omission; but it is also lawful to absolve the penitent either absolutely or conditionally.” Gury takes a somewhat different attitude in solving a similar case. The penitent not only might, but must—saltem probabilius—be absolved. The following reasons are presented: “1. A confessor cannot use knowledge obtained from confession to deny the sacrament to any penitent. 2. Even granting at least the probability of the other opinion, it is not lawful to use a probable opinion in a matter concerning the sacramental seal.” Gury allows only a conditional absolution, for reasons of respect for the Sacrament; and, on the other hand, on account of the seal of confession and the penitent’s possible good faith, he does not permit a denial of absolution. Bucceroni, giving as his authority St. Thomas, as above quoted, is in favor of giving absolution as a general rule.

As in this important question the authors take no very decided position, it is to be recommended to absolve the penitent sub conditione, for while, on the one hand, there is good reason to doubt his sincerity, there is, on the other hand, the general principle: credendum poenitenti pro se et contra se. There is no violation of the seal of confession, because there is no revelatio peccati and no gravamen poenitentis. There is, however, also sufficient probability in the opposing opinion that one may refuse absolution, unknown to the penitent, the penitent being dismissed with the confessor’s blessing; a mala fides would at any rate make the absolution invalid.