Case LXXVI: A Traveling Salesman’s Expenses

Titus travels for a large business house. He lives very sparingly on his business trips in order not to make large expenses for his firm. This is known to his wife, who often upbraids him for it. In order to make things comfortable for her husband, at least during the days he spends with his family, she takes, every time he returns from a trip, secretly about a dollar from the money he brings back. This amount is then by Titus included in the expenses, in the belief that he has spent it on the trip. The wife has been doing this for some twenty years, and has in this manner appropriated altogether some three hundred dollars of the firm’s money. She now makes known to the confessor that she has heretofore taken this money bona fide, but that she has doubts now whether she is really allowed to do this in future, and what is to be done about the past? What decision must the confessor give?

Since the woman had always acted in the belief that it was quite proper for her to take a small sum from her husband’s pocket for the purpose indicated, she has not been guilty of sin. She showed her good faith also in submitting the matter to her confessor at once when she became possessor dubiae fidei.

In regard to an obligation of restitution we think we should discriminate. The contract that Titus made with his firm may provide that Titus can place to the firm’s account only money really expended on his trips. If this be the case Titus has claim only to his actual outlay; if he charges more, there would be a violation of justice, involving obligation of restitution. It is a matter of indifference whether Titus would have been justified in spending more for his sustenance, if, according to his agreement, he can charge only what he actually spends. If he charges more, he appropriates unrightful property. Had he expended more upon the trips the firm would have had to bear the higher expense, and Titus could have charged it to the firm with good conscience. But as he has not expended it, he is not allowed to add anything to the amount of the actual expenses and charge it to the firm. Since Titus has no right to such an added amount, his wife has neither the right to employ such money for the good of her husband. If she does it she is guilty of theft, and obliged, objectively, to restore the unjustly acquired property.

The agreement of the traveling man with the firm, however, may be so worded that Titus may charge to the firm’s account whatever he requires for his support on the trip without wanting of anything. If, in the case of such an agreement, Titus was unusually economical on his trips, if he scarcely allowed himself the most necessary, there would be no violation of justice if he saved, by an extraordinary economy to which he was not obliged, an amount to be used in his household, and charge it to the firm. He was, according to the agreement, entitled to larger expenses, and for this reason may keep for himself that which he legitimately might have spent but did not. Since in this case no wrong would be done to the firm, there would be no obligation of restitution for Titus. If the husband is, therefore, allowed to keep for himself whatever he might properly have expended and charge it to the firm, neither does the wife violate justice, if she takes part of that amount, or all of it, from her husband’s pocket and uses it for his welfare, although she becomes therewith the cause of a charge to the firm. In this case the wife would, for this reason, not be obliged to make restitution. She is to be admonished, however, to discontinue her practise, or to tell her husband about it and be guided by his instruction.

Is, however, the agreement worded as supposed in the first place, and if there is present the obligation of restitution, it must be ascertained whether the wife is not, after all, released from this obligation. Frequently it will be impossible for a wife to make restitution, especially when it is a matter, as in our case, of a not inconsiderable sum. To make the husband aware of the facts would not only be a hardship, but probably lead to strife in the family, and would probably not bring about the intended result—restitution by the husband. Apart from these difficulties, which of themselves release the wife, we think that in this case there would apply what moralists call remissio a creditore. This remissio may be explicita or praesumpta. Only the latter comes under consideration here. Of it Reuter writes: Theol. Mor. p. 3, n. 351: One who retains a thing, prudently believing that the owner is not unwilling, does not sin. ... But if it is doubted whether the owner would remit it, remission must be sought. St. Antoninus (p. 20. t. I. cap. 15) does not oblige to restitution one who believes that the owner would permit it, if there is a just [reason] for believing. This is by St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 700) regarded as: Sententia satis communis, and we may apply it to the present case. We may then conclude that if the proprietor of the business did not explicitly present to his traveling man the sum taken by the latter’s wife, still Titus, or his wife, may presume this remissio. Though, according to the wording of the agreement, the firm’s rights have been violated, and therewith the obligation of restitution established, still it cannot be supposed that the proprietor of the business would demand that his traveling man should suffer privation and scarcely allow himself the most necessary. Hence Titus may presume rationabiliter that his employer would make him a present of the money thus saved by excessive economy, if he asked for it. We may suppose such attitude in a man of business who is just to his employees. Titus’ economical ways seem to indicate that this employer is a fairminded and just man, otherwise his traveling man would not have guarded his interests by extraordinary economy. Titus did not do this because afraid to make expenses and thus incur the displeasure of his firm, this the wife expressly stated. Zeal and loyalty to his employer were the sole reasons. We may suppose, therefore, that, had Titus asked his employer for it, he would have had the payment of the three hundred dollars remitted. Titus’s wife, who has invariably employed the money for her husband’s good, may expect the same indulgence. Titus’s wife, therefore, is not obliged to make restitution, no matter how the agreement was worded, because if she really has appropriated unrightful property, she may foresee prudenter that the employer would present her with the amount in question. Dr. Ph. Huppert.