Chapter — The Casuist
Case LXXVI: Mistaken Idea of the Sin of Presumption
Penitents, especially children, are apt to say that they have sinned through presuming on God's mercy. When asked what they mean, they say: " I thought I would do something and then confess it." Are such penitents really guilty of presumption?
No! What is presumption? St. Thomas defines it, in his Summa, II. II. qu. 21, a. 1, as "an immoderation of hope by which someone tends toward some good as possible through divine power and mercy when it is not possible, as when someone hopes to obtain pardon without penance or glory without merits." Any such excessus spei is sinful, for underlying it, as the angelic doctor explains (l. c. a. 2) is an intellectus falsus, viz. a false supposition that God pardons those who continue in their sins. Excessus spei arises from this erroneous idea, as a motus quidam appetitivus; and it is sinful because every appetitive movement that conforms itself to a false judgment is in itself evil and a sin.
The explanation given by St. Thomas of the nature and sinfulness of presumption shows that this sin has not been committed in the case under discussion. He is presumptuous, one who hopes to obtain pardon without penance; for this excessus spei, being a motus appetitivus, is based upon a false assumption that God will pardon one who refuses to amend his ways. Our penitent, however, thought that he could confess his sin; consequently he did not make the mistake of supposing that God would pardon him if he persisted in sin, but he was right in believing that the Lord would have mercy upon him if he repented and confessed. Therefore the motus appetitivus is based upon this correct supposition, viz., upon the hope of pardon, and is not sinful. On the contrary, the intention to confess the sin is apparent in this thought, and is contained implicate in it, and is in itself good, so that such a penitent sins less than he would have done without thinking of his conversion; for without this thought his will would have been more inclined to sin and its malice would have been greater. "To sin in the hope of receiving pardon at some future time, with the intention of abstaining from the sin and doing penance for it, is not presumption; rather, this diminishes the sin, because through it one seems to have a will less firmly fixed upon sin" (Th., I. c. q. 21, ad 3). Hence, according to St. Albertus Magnus, Adam sinned less grievously, "Because he sinned in the hope of pardon."
It is with good reason that Lehmkuhl warns confessors (I. n. 312) to make sure that penitents who accuse themselves of presumption are really guilty of this sin. For "if anyone sins from frailty or passion while at the same time hoping that he will afterward obtain pardon, and consequently determining at least implicitly to be converted afterward and withdraw from sin, he does not commit the sin of presumption; indeed, as the writers note, the sin is rather diminished" (/. c).
If, however, the sin of presumption has been committed, how ought we to deal with it? Is it invariably a mortal sin? In its nature it is a mortal sin, but propter indeliberationem vel imperfectionem actus it may, like other sins that are in their nature grievous, become merely venial. Modern moralists, such as Gury, Lehmkuhl, and others, are of opinion that whoever commits a venial sin through presumptuous confidence in God's mercy commits also a venial sin of presumption. Elbel, on the contrary, thinks that in this case there is no real presumption, "because by this happiness is not expected to be obtained rashly or by means in no way ordained by God for this end."—Dr. Kilian.