Case VIII: Clerical Censure

Father X has been forbidden by his bishop, under pain of suspension, to be incurred ipso facto, to enter a saloon for a period of one year, for any purpose whatever, except to administer the last sacraments. This is the condition on which the faculties of the diocese have been restored to Father X. He has given the bishop grievous cause for complaint in the past, and caused considerable scandal to the faithful, and the bishop does not feel justified in restoring the faculties of the diocese to him, except on the condition stated above. Father X is careful to observe the condition, while within the limits of the diocese, but whenever he goes beyond the limits of the diocese he feels free to enter a saloon, if he chooses, and does not believe that he incurs the suspension. He argues that a bishop's authority is limited to the territory of his diocese, and never reaches beyond the diocese, because that would be an invasion of another bishop's authority, which is evidently forbidden by the canons of the Church.

He desires to know whether he has incurred the censure of suspension by entering a saloon beyond the limits of the diocese, and whether (in case he has incurred the suspension) he has become irregular by violating the censure of suspension and exercising his office of the priesthood.

Answer.—In answering this question, we desire to say a word about the reasons for which a bishop may suspend a priest. Entering a saloon is not a grievous sin. Now the law says that suspension, being a grave punishment, requires a grave sin. How then can a bishop inflict a grave punishment on a priest who is guilty only of a venial sin, or, perhaps, of no sin at all? To this I we answer: While the thing forbidden by the bishop may be of lesser consequence when viewed in itself, nevertheless, it may take on a serious aspect, when viewed in the light of circumstances which make it a source of grave scandal or personal danger or subversive of some serious object which the bishop wishes to attain. “Therefore, since the end of the precept is grave and the thing commanded is necessary for that end, the gravity is derived not from the matter but from the end.” (Schmalzgr. l. 5, tit. 39, n. 60.)

But if the thing commanded or forbidden by the bishop under pain of suspension, be in itself of small consequence, and have only a slight connection with the object proposed by the bishop, then the transgression of the bishop's precept is only a venial sin at most, both in itself, and by reason of its object, and therefore induces no suspension. In the words of Ballerini:

“Although a precept concerning a matter slight in itself does not bind under grave obligation, and therefore its transgression entails neither grave fault nor the penalty of censure, nevertheless a matter slight when considered in itself can be commanded under grave obligation and sanctioned by censure when it becomes grave by reason of scandal, danger, or the intended end, etc. Thus, for example, excommunication is imposed for striking a cleric even slightly—slightly, namely, in respect of the blow, but not slightly in respect of the dishonor—because of the grave irreverence toward the clerical state; thus it is justly commanded under censure that certain persons take part in a public procession ordered for a grave purpose; likewise against those entering even a very little way through the door of a monastery; likewise against clerics who grow their hair. It is otherwise, however (St. Alphonsus, no. 31), if the matter were both slight in itself and contributed only slightly to the intended end.” (Vol. VII, 128.)

When there exists doubt as to the gravity of the thing commanded, or forbidden, or its close connection with the end the bishop hopes to attain, we must decide in favor of the bishop and the validity of the censure— one must stand by the authority of the Prelate, which is in possession, and therefore the edict of censure must be asserted to retain its force.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that the bishop acted wholly within his rights, when he forbade Father X to enter a saloon, under pain of suspension ipso facto; because there was both scandal and grave danger connected with the saloon for Father X. And while entering a saloon may not be a grave matter in itself, still under the present circumstances it becomes a grave matter, and may justly be forbidden by the bishop under pain of suspension.

We come now to the second question, viz.: Could Father X's bishop suspend him for entering a saloon outside of the diocese? We must distinguish here between a diocesan statute and a personal command given to an individual. There is question here of a personal command. A diocesan statute is limited by the territory or boundaries of the diocese. It binds no one outside the diocese. A personal precept or command, on the contrary, follows the individual like his shadow, say the canonists, "haeret ossibus," no matter where he goes.

St. Alphonsus, treating this question (l. 7, n. 23), gives two opinions of the theologians, one that a bishop can lawfully bind by censure a subject of his diocese, outside the limits of the diocese, the other that he can not, and both of these opinions the holy Doctor calls probable, though the one that holds that a priest incurs suspension, even outside the diocese, seems to him the more probable. There are a number of theologians who hold that the power of a bishop is restricted to his diocese even in the matter of a personal command to an individual, but as Ballerini, after Laymann, points out, they rest for their argument on the chapter "Ut animarum, de constitutionibus, in 6°" of the Corpus, where there is question only of episcopal laws or diocesan statutes, and not of personal commands. And therefore their opinion has no solid probability. When a bishop forbids a priest of his diocese to do something, under pain of suspension, he pronounces judgment within his own territory. That the judgment goes into effect outside the diocese, when the crime is committed outside the diocese, does not imply that there is any invasion of another bishop's territory, because the censure is incurred ipso facto, without a trial at law or any legal proceedings “without cognizance of the cause and without judicial formality,” because, as it says in the Canons, “an excommunication and any censure imposed automatically carry with them a tacit and, as it were, imperceptible execution.” (C. Pastoralis 53, de Appell.)

The true reason why a bishop may not lawfully punish by censure in another bishop's diocese is that such a proceeding would be an invasion and a violation of another's judicial territory, which is strictly forbidden by the law. But where a bishop's sentence of censure goes into effect ipso facto, without any legal proceedings or trial in court there is no invasion or violation of another's jurisdiction.

Ballerini says that a bishop certainly has the right to suspend his priest for the transgression of his command, even though the priest transgress outside the diocese, nor can the opinion that denies this be said to have any other than a certain external probability, which suddenly vanishes, if you examine the reasons on which it rests. (cf. Ball. VII, 101.)

As regards the irregularity that Father X might have incurred, by exercising the ministry while under censure, it will suffice to say, that as such an irregularity would be "irregularitas ex delicto," which is not incurred except where there is full knowledge and consent of the irregularity, it all depends on the state of Father X's conscience, when he exercised his ministry. If he was in good faith, he is not irregular. If he acted with a doubting conscience not knowing whether he was incurring an irregularity or not, but willing to take a chance, he incurred the irregularity, because he acted "cum conscientia practice dubia" and made himself liable for the consequences.