Case X: The Necessity of Safeguarding Life

Case.—Rufus, in love with Leonore, and finding his affection reciprocated, proposes marriage to the young lady. She freely admits that she would accept his offer were it not for one seemingly insuperable difficulty. Rufus is deformed by the presence of a tumor which she considers not only unsightly but even dangerous. The distressed lover pleads his cause and finally wins consent under condition of the removal of the deformity. Rufus then hastens to a surgeon, who assures him that the offending excrescence can be removed by the knife, but not without fear of danger to life. He consents to the operation. In preparation for the ordeal he approaches the Sacrament of Penance and there his confessor forbids the operation on the ground that it would be a violation of God’s Law prohibiting the endangering of one’s life. He persists and is sent away without absolution.

Question.—Did the confessor have the right view of the case?

Solution.—While it is never lawful to do anything that is equivalently suicide, it is lawful to do that which is indifferent in se though it involves the possibility of death, provided (a) we seek some immediate good effect, (b) our intention is not to cause death, and (c) there exists a sufficient reason to allow the evil that may possibly follow from the doing of such an action. Where no grave cause sanctions the doing of the action in question, the act is highly unlawful, it is grievously sinful. Now a legitimate cause includes an action involving the production of good not only for the community, but may even extend to the good of the individual. Where then a substantially weighty benefit accrues to the members of society from the jeopardizing of human life, the seeking of that good is entirely licit. Where, too, the aforesaid benefit comes to a single member of the community, that good may be sought even at the risk of life to the individual in question. This holds with the proviso that the risk involved be not too great, and hence that there be some reasonable proportion between the good to be accomplished and the risk to be assumed. Where on the other hand there is no adequate reason for the risk, no sufficient good to the individual or to the community, then no one would be allowed to place himself in the proximate danger of death, or in the probable danger of such an evil.

Applying the principles just stated to the proposed case, we must determine whether there exists sufficient reason for the induction of the peril that is feared on the part of the deformed Rufus. In the determination of this question we must find out how great the risk is that he is willing to run. Is it great or negligible? Is it merely a possible danger, or is it gravely probable? Rufus is not concerned about the improvement to his personal appearance except in as far as it will help him to obtain Leonore as his wife. This he considers a great good for his life and no doubt we can admit the force of his reasoning in the matter, provided the risk he runs is not out of proportion to that universally accepted good. The surgeon whom he consulted has informed him that there is some danger. However we must bear in mind that modern methods of surgery, combined with the great skill of modern surgeons, have certainly and materially reduced the danger at one time attendant upon surgical operations. So that it is safe to conclude that operations formerly full of danger are now permissible, because of the lack of that danger. The death-rate to-day following operations is hardly more than two per cent. This is so small that it can safely be neglected. This would be our view of the case before us. The danger to the patient would bear no undue proportion to the good that he hopes for from marriage with Leonore. Hence we would admit that he has sufficient reason to permit of his undergoing the operation to remove the impediment to his desired marriage. It would be a serious hardship to the community to prohibit such operations, particularly in cases where, as in the present, the good to be effected far outweighs the concomitant danger, especially in cases where the danger is more possible than probable, more imaginary than real. The confessor did not-give a proper decision in the case. He should have absolved and encouraged, not discouraged his already distressed penitent.