Case XC: Marriage Contracted Through Fear

Case.—Titus, a young man of respectable family, falls in love with Sempronia, a woman of evil life. His parents threaten ejection from the family and disinheritance unless he abandon the liaison; at the same time they promise to make him heir to the greater part of their fortune, if he will agree to marry Gertrude and lead a more settled life. Titus thereupon pays suit to Gertrude, and after six months they are married. But his love for Sempronia had not waned, and even during the marriage ceremony the thought of separation from her caused him great mental anguish. After one year of married life Titus abandons wife and child to resume his former intimacy with Sempronia. To the remonstrances of his wife and parents he answers that his consent to marry Gertrude was extorted through fear and had therefore no binding force.

Question.—Is Titus’ contention correct?

Solution.—Since marriage is a contract and depends on the consent of the contracting parties, whatever takes away the freedom of consent is an obstacle to marriage. Hence undue influence brought to bear upon the parties in order to extort their consent nullifies the marriage. This results from the natural law when the stress of fear is so strong that it dethrones the reason. In other cases, when the fear is not so extreme, the consent must be deemed absolutely voluntary, i. e., the will chooses what appears the lesser evil; yet at the same time is the consent partially involuntary, inasmuch as it is given with more or less repugnance. The positive law regards contract made under such stress of fear as voidable; but since this cannot be applied to marriage, the Church has made fear a diriment impediment, i. e., one that renders the matrimonial contract null and void. It is not every fear, however, that nullifies the marriage contract, but only such fear as is: (1) extrinsic, i. e., whose cause is found in another person; (2) inflicted unjustly and with the purpose of forcing consent to marriage; (3) grave, either absolutely or relatively.

In order that fear may be considered absolutely grave, it must be such as would influence even a man of courage; but to judge whether fear is relatively grave, that is, whether it affects seriously any particular person, account must be taken not only of the danger that threatens, but also of the character of those who cause the fear and of the susceptibility of those against whom the threats are directed. Thus the fear in which subjects hold their superior, although it is reverential, may become grave, if it is augmented by threats, quarrels, vexations, etc. When the harm that threatens is inconsiderable or not imminent, it does not render the will incapable of resistance; hence the law does not regard such trifling fear, and presumes that no one would suffer compulsion therefrom.

In order to decide, then, whether the marriage of Titus was valid, we must examine into the qualities of the fear, which he alleges forced his consent. Even though it be granted that this fear continued up to the moment of his marriage, yet it is clear that the threats of ejection and disinheritance were neither unjust nor uttered with the purpose of forcing a marriage. The parents of Titus were entirely within their rights when they commanded him to break off his unlawful relationship with Sempronia. Their own honor, as well as the temporal and spiritual welfare of their son was at stake. The punishment they annexed to his disobedience was not unjust. Authorities differ as to whether parents are obliged from natural justice to will their possessions to their children. The dispositions of the civil law on this point are also different: in some places (as in most of our States) the testator has full liberty to dispose of his property as he sees fit; in others, the law determines that a certain portion of the estate must be divided between the children. The wild and irresponsible life of Titus offered a just reason for his disinheritance; but if the law made him a necessary heir, then the threats to disinherit him were futile and could not have caused an efficacious fear. Either fear did not exist, or it was justly caused. Similar grave and sufficient reasons justified the threats of ejection.

But even though the threats were unjust, they would not suffice to render the marriage invalid, since they were not aimed, except indirectly, at extorting consent to marriage. The parents sought directly the reformation of their son, and, with this end in view, proposed to him the marriage with Gertrude. The threats were intended to draw him away from Sempronia, not to force him to marry Gertrude.

Moreover, the fear excited by these menaces was not very considerable. It appears that Titus was not a timid person and that he did not stand in excessive awe of his parents’ displeasure; rather they seem to have feared him. The prospect of being thrown on his own resources was not very formidable to him, as it did not deter him only a year later when he abandoned wife and child for the sake of Sempronia. Nor would the amount of the fortune in question suffice to make the fear of its loss a grave fear. For if the parents were able to disinherit Titus, the loss of the fortune would mean the loss, not of a right, but of a reward; that is, the inheritance whose loss he feared would be a reward offered him on condition that he would amend his life. Now Canon Law does not regard the danger of losing that to which one has no right but which one hopes to obtain, as sufficient to intimidate a steadfast man; ‘since in such a case a person would be moved not so much by fear of loss as by hope of gain: hope, however, as St. Thomas teaches, does not diminish, but increases the voluntariness of an action. The fear felt by Titus because of his parents’ threats was not serious, either relatively or absolutely.

The repugnance experienced by Titus when pronouncing his consent during the marriage ceremony is explained by his sinful attachment for Sempronia and his regret that he would now be obliged to give up the old life. His consent to the marriage with Gertrude was absolutely voluntary, though partially involuntary; just as the merchant who during a storm throws his wares into the sea in order to lighten the vessel, does this willingly, although not without regret.

Since, therefore, the fear that Titus experienced did not possess the qualities necessary to vitiate consent, it must be concluded that his marriage with Gertrude was valid.