Case XCIII: The Impediment of Crime

Case.—Cassandra married some ten years ago. Her husband became a confirmed drunkard and did not support her. While in his cups he was very cruel to her, so she left him, and has not seen him for the past five years. She is now keeping house for her brother. Philos boards with her brother and is very much attached to the married lady. Recently he found that his affection was reciprocated and straightway he promised to marry Cassandra, whenever her husband’s death would make her free to accept him. There has not been any question of violation of the obligations contracted by her marriage. She has just learned of the death of her husband who was accidentally drowned while bathing in the ocean.

Question.—Is Cassandra now free to marry Philos?

Solution.—The question asked is whether the impediment of crime has existence in the case quoted. Since she did not rid herself of her husband by conspiring to effect his death, which was brought about by circumstances over which she had no control, the solution of the case is greatly simplified. Again the absence of the factor of adultery removes all complication. We have to deal with a promise of marriage made during the existence of a valid marriage, which promise is conditioned by the continuance of said valid marriage. It looks as if the promise was a mere intention, externally expressed to marry when the law of God would permit both parties to contract a valid marriage. If so, no impediment of crime could possibly exist. Even if there existed more than an intention, a real, bona fide promise to marry when the existing impediment would no longer interfere with the contracting of a valid union before God, it is certain that no impediment was begotten by the promise. A promise of marriage, capable of begetting a diriment impediment of crime, must be materially and formally injurious to the welfare of the already existing union. In the absence of adultery and of all desire of conjugicide it can not be claimed that the marriage of Cassandra with her worthless spouse has suffered any material or formal injury. Hence the reasons that urged the Church to institute this impediment have no bearing on this case. The marriage with Philos would not of itself involve any scandal, and the promise by no means endangered the security and well being of the lady’s prior union. Evidently there is no reason for punishment, which punishment in the decree of the Church takes the form of an impediment dirimating the new marriage when contracted without the proper dispensation. Briefly, then, we hold that there is no reason why these parties should not be validly married. Their marriage would serve to remove any proximate danger of sin arising from their living under the same roof, and likewise do away with a possible occasion of scandal springing from the same fact. (Noldin, Vol. III, n. 611 c.).