Case XIV: A Marriage Case Recently Decided by Rome

The following is a synopsis of a marriage case recently decided by the tribunal of the Rota:

In 1879, one Werner, a German Lutheran, contracted marriage with Eliza, a member of the same sect, before a Lutheran minister. Before the marriage Werner had heard reports reflecting on Eliza, but they did not deter him from marrying her, because, as he said to his relatives, if the reports should prove true, or if the girl proved unfaithful after marriage, he would simply get a divorce. Accordingly, the marriage took place, without the wife ever learning of the objections made against her. After the birth of several children, the relations between Werner and Eliza became so strained that the wife procured a divorce in 1884. Two years later Werner married again, but his second wife died in 1895, leaving three children by the marriage.

After the death of this second woman, Werner became acquainted with Antonia, a Catholic noblewoman, who, in her desire to convert Werner and his children to the Catholic faith, consented to marry him, and accordingly applied to her bishop for a certificate de stat libero for Werner, which would declare Werner’s marriage to Eliza invalid, and that Werner was free to marry Antonia. But the bishop refused the certificate de statu libero, on account of the impedimentum ligaminis, as Werner’s first wife Eliza was still living. To remove this obstacle, Antonia, the Catholic woman, brought a case in the bishop’s court, for the declaration of the invalidity of Werner’s first marriage, on the grounds that it had been contracted with a conditio turpis, namely, the intention, if certain things proved true, of procuring a divorce, and that this conditio turpis destroyed the substance of the marriage. The bishop decided against Antonia, who thereupon appealed the case to Rome.

The Facts of THE Case.—Upon examination, the tribunal of the Rota, at Rome, found the facts of the case to be these: Werner had the intention of marrying his first wife Eliza, according to the rites of the Lutheran Church, which permits divorce for adultery, but that this dissolubility was not put as a condition on the occasion of the marriage. When adverse criticism was made against Eliza before the marriage, Werner states that: “As no facts were given, I believed the reports to be unfounded and mere idle gossip. For the moment I did not think that it would come to this, and my usual reply was that I wanted to be let alone, that I loved the girl and that I was making a good marriage.” Some days before the marriage Werner replied to some who still endeavored to dissuade him: “It makes no difference to me, even if the stories about the girl should prove to be true, or if she should go wrong after our marriage, I would not kill myself for that; I would simply get a divorce.”

From these and similar expressions of Werner, the tribunal of Rota holds that Werner’s predominating intention was to contract a valid marriage, although he held the erroneous opinion that marriage is dissoluble for adultery. When examined by the bishop’s curia, Werner testified:

“In marrying Eliza according to the rites of the Evangelical Church, I wished to contract a Christian marriage, according to the belief of my sect, and I wished to assume the duties of a Christian marriage. I believed that Christian marriage could be dissolved for certain causes and that after its dissolution I would be free to marry again. During the marriage ceremony, when I was standing before the altar, I was decided to fulfil my duties, but I also thought that, if the stories about my wife proved to be true, I would get a divorce.”

From these facts of the case it is evident that Werner wished to contract a valid marriage, although he held the erroneous opinion that marriage was dissoluble for adultery on the wife’s part; furthermore, that this intention of his was not put as a pact or condition, because he did not think it necessary, first, because he did not believe the reports about his wife; and, secondly, because if the reports should prove to be true, he had at hand a remedy for the dissolution of the marriage, independently of any prenuptial agreement, namely, divorce, sanctioned by his sect, as well, as by the law of the country.

The Law IN THE Case.—According to Catholic theology, not any intention of dissolving a marriage is sufficient to invalidate a marriage, but only such intention as has been put forward as a pact or condition, at the celebration of the marriage. When asked as to whether a marriage is valid when contracted between a Catholic and a schismatic with the intention of dissolving the marriage, the Holy Office replied, October 20, 1680: “Those marriages are null when these things are put forward as a pact or when the marriages are contracted with this condition, otherwise the marriages are valid.” If the prime intention of the parties to the contract was to contract a dissoluble marriage, such intention would destroy the substance of the marriage, since there is no such thing possible among Christians as a dissoluble marriage, Christian marriage being essentially indissoluble. But where the prime intention is to contract a true and valid marriage, then, though the parties believe that marriage is dissoluble for certain causes, still such secondary intention or persuasion is absorbed by the prime intention of contracting a true Christian marriage and it does not destroy the substance of the contract. This doctrine is set forth by Pope Benedict XIV, synodo dioecesana, 1. 13, and is confirmed by Pius VI in a letter to the Archbishop of Prague, July 2, 1789:

“Nor is there lacking an intimate reason why the intention of contracting according to the ideas of a sect or of a law which permits the dissolution of marriage for these causes does not militate against its validity, provided this intention is not put forth as a pact; for, from the very fact that non-Catholics, through error, think that the dissolution of marriage for these causes is not repugnant to the law of Christ; hence, it comes about that in their minds, by reason of this false opinion, the intention of contracting according to such laws, or to the principles of such a sect, by no means excludes the primary intention of contracting according to the divine law confirmed by Christ. Hence, this will remain at the act of contracting, and from it flows and is determined the consent which is given to the act. And consent given according to the law of Christ is suitable and sufficient for the validity of marriage, unless there be some other canonical impediment.”

Again, the making of a pact or condition is not presumed éin foro externo, but must be proved. Benedict XIV, loc. cit., says:

“If the express condition that the marriage is to be dissolved in case of adultery has not been made, although the contracting. parties may be in error with regard to the dissolution of marriage by adultery; still the presumption remains that when they willed to contract marriage as it was instituted by Christ, they willed to contract perpetual and indissoluble marriage, even should adultery take place, for, as we have said, the general will of contracting marriage as instituted by Christ prevails, and in a manner, absorbs that private error; so that the marriage thus contracted remains firm and valid.”

But, it may be asked, what if the parties, knowing the law permitting the dissolution of marriage for adultery, have contracted marriage with this positive intention that in the case of the infidelity of one of them the marriage can be dissolved.

In such case, of course, the marriage would be null, for this positive intention would destroy the marriage on account of the defect of the matrimonial mind to its proper object, i. e., to an indissoluble marriage. But the auditors of the Rota decided that this doctrine cannot be applied to the present case, because Werner, ignoring the rumors about Eliza, and having no doubt about her future fidelity, had no reason for limiting his consent at the marriage. Neither did he manifest any such intention to the girl, either before or at the marriage, and yet the condition must be put forth as a pact with the knowledge and consent of the other party, because the contract is the resultant of the will of the two persons for the same object.

From the facts and the law the Rota concludes that the marriage of Werner to Eliza was a valid marriage, and that he is not free to marry Antonia.