Case XLV: Marks of Friendship Toward an Enemy

John Smith, a wealthy and prominent Catholic, accuses himself in Confession of being on very bad terms with one of his children. It appears that one of Mr. Smith's sons, a young man of rather unsteady habits, married, over a year ago, a vaudeville actress, anon-Catholic, and from all accounts a young woman of Bohemian antecedents and proclivities. As Mr. Smith and his whole family were very much opposed to this marriage, and did all in their power to stop it, but to no purpose, they feel very much grieved by it, and refuse to have anything to do with the young man or his wife. Mr. Smith has cut the young man off in his will, has forbidden him his house, recently refused to allow him to be present at the parents' golden wedding, although all the other relatives were present; refuses to recognize the young man either in public or in private, to return his salutations or to permit any advances to be made toward a reconciliation, either by the young man himself, or by his friends.

Quaeritur: Is Mr. Smith's conduct justifiable before God, or is it sinful?

Principles: This case comes under the heading "de amore inimicorum." The law of charity imposes a twofold obligation on us in regard to our enemy. First, we must not wish him evil; second, we must wish him well.

First: We must not wish our enemy evil; that is, we must not repay evil with evil, nor cherish a spirit of revenge toward him. We must pardon the personal offense when requested, not always immediately. Sometimes there may be just cause for deferring pardon in order to manifest the pain we suffer by reason of the offense. Sometimes, even, we may be obliged to make the first advance toward a reconciliation, to prevent scandal or to save our enemy from sin, when we can do so without much trouble to ourselves.

Second: We must wish our enemy well; that is, we must include him in our prayers. We must succor him in his needs, as we would any one else. And if we exercise charity indiscriminately toward a large number, we must not exclude our enemy, for this would be a mark of revenge; and if special ties of blood, etc., unite us, we are bound to give such evidence of good will toward our enemy as we give to others who are bound to us by the same ties. But special marks of friendship that we owe to no one in particular, either by reason of their personal condition or the customs of the country, we are not obliged to show to our enemy.

Here we must remark that it is one thing to harbor a spirit of revenge, and quite another thing to desire the reparation of outraged rights. It is perfectly legitimate to desire the restoration of our good name, or the restitution of our stolen property, and to take action at law to obtain them; yes, even to take criminal proceedings against the offender to have him punished. If this is done out of love for justice, it is quite in keeping with the law of charity. If it is done from a spirit of revenge, it is, of course, sinful. Once satisfaction has been made, we must forgive the personal offense. Until satisfaction has been made, this is not required of us.

Regarding the question of saluting those who have grievously offended us, the doctrine of St. Ligouri, Tamburini, Mazotta, and others may be summed up as follows: We are not obliged to salute those who have wrongly offended us, unless they make the first advances, unless it be question of a superior, or unless to refrain from saluting our enemy for a long time could be interpreted as a mark of hatred. But if our enemy greets us first, we are bound to greet him in return, except once or again we might be justified in refusing to recognize a greeting in order to show our feelings have been hurt. In a word, the omission of the ordinary greetings and marks of good will that pass among men must be taken, sometimes on account of circumstances, not as a sign of hatred or revenge, but as a "manifestatio justi moeroris tantum." If, therefore, on account of the circumstances, the denial for a time of the ordinary salutations and greetings must be interpreted as a manifestation of wounded feelings, and if in fact the denial proceeds from no spirit of hatred or ill will, such denial is not sinful. If, however, under the circumstances, the denial of the ordinary marks of good will must be interpreted as a sign of hatred or revenge, "pro manifestatione vindictae et inimicitiae," then such denial is sinful, even though it do not arise from feelings of hatred or revenge.

Application of principles: Mr. Smith's son had become his enemy. He had given his father just cause for feeling hurt and outraged. He had done his father and his family a grievous wrong. Although an enemy, we must not forget the special ties of blood that unite them. Was Mr. Smith's conduct toward his son justified in every instance? We must take each separate count by itself.

First, Mr. Smith cuts off his son in his will. Is this act "contra justitiam," or only "contra charitatem," or wholly blameless? Whether this cutting off of children by parents in their wills be contrary to the virtue of strict justice does not appear. Some theologians think it is; others that it is not. Fr. Genicot thinks that it is not. Fr. Lehmkuhl thinks that it is. Genicot says: “Nor would I think that a parent who without just cause favored one son over the others would sin gravely, as Lehmkuhl thinks.” (I. n. 677).

“If anyone out of hatred wished to leave his children only their lawful portion, or altogether to pass over brothers who were not in need, he would be bound under grave obligation to put aside this hatred, but only urged to leave them something more; for he is using his right” (ibid.).

Lehmkuhl thinks that where there is no "clara et justa causa," parents sin against justice in preferring some children to others (I. n. 1155).

De Lugo thinks that it is not against justice: “Therefore, a confessor ought to compel a dying person who is unwilling to leave anything to his brothers, or anything but the lawful portion to his children, to put aside hatred if perhaps he is moved by hatred or revenge, and also to urge him to provide for them; nevertheless, he ought not on that account to deny absolution to one who is unwilling, unless the need is of such a degree that he ought to assist persons so closely joined to him.”

(disp. 24. n. 175).

Mr. Smith's action, therefore, in cutting off his son, is not evidently against justice. Is it against charity? If it is prompted by hatred or revenge, it is and grievously so. If it is not prompted by hatred, but by the fear that the son may abuse his inheritance, it is not. The laws of this country leave the father free in bequeathing his goods to his children. In this case the evidence favors the father. The son's past history promises poorly for the future. The son will, in all likelihood, be the better for being disinherited. The father's act, therefore, can hardly be interpreted as evidently against charity. Still it were much wiser if the father made some provision for his son, an annual allowance that could not be abused. In regard to forbidding the young man his house, we must distinguish. If the young man has reformed or is trying to reform, Mr. Smith may forbid him his house for a time, to give expression to his outraged feelings. But a year is certainly a safe limit. The young man has a home of his own now, and no longer the same claim on his father's house. Still, to continue to refuse him admission savors of hatred and revenge, and the father must desist under pain of being denied absolution. As long as the son refuses to reform, the father is not obliged to receive him.

That Mr. Smith refused to invite the son to his golden wedding may have been simply a measure of prudence. The son's presence would very likely have caused trouble, recriminations, and perhaps a general scandal; certainly if his wife were to attend.

If, however, the young man and his wife had both turned over a new leaf, this would have been an excellent occasion for bringing about a good understanding, and unless serious difficulties were apprehended, Mr. Smith could hardly have refused them an invitation without committing sin.

The same is to be said about Mr. Smith's refusal to recognize his son in public or in private. If the son continues in an evil course, Mr. Smith may continue to give expression to his sorrow by refusing to recognize him. If the son has reformed, Mr. Smith is obliged in conscience to recognize him. He may refrain for a time, say for a few months, from recognizing the son, but to continue to do so must be interpreted in the light of hatred or revenge. And his continued refusal to return his son's greetings or to open the way for a reconciliation renders Mr. Smith unworthy of absolution. It seems evident from the case that Mr. Smith is of a stern character, and no more should be required of him than is absolutely necessary. But what is required by the law of God should be insisted on with great firmness, because a man of this character easily deceives himself by believing his conduct to be prompted by a love of righteousness and justice, whereas it is prompted by a spirit of animosity and revenge.