Case XLVII: Absolution of a Dying Person in the State of Unconsciousness

In the conferences held in Coetu s. Pauli ad s. Apollinarem at Rome, experienced theologians submit solutions of pastoral cases. The following is a case which P. Maurus M. Kaiser, O. Praed., presented and solved:

Father Titus was at dinner with his assistant, Father Caius, when the sexton rushed in and announced that some man had been dangerously wounded by another, who then turned the weapon against himself and attempted suicide; both were near death. The two priests hastened at once to the side of the dying, the pastor attending the aggressor, and the assistant the victim. When they returned the curate remarked: “I was just in time; the poor fellow, although quite unconscious, still lived, and thus I was enabled to give him absolution.” “That was quite useless,” answered the parish priest. “And, moreover, this murdered youth was overtaken by the judgment of God; he has lived in sin, given great scandal, and staid away from the Sacraments. As regards the murderer I did not give him absolution, although bystanders told me that before my arrival he had indicated, by winking his eyes, that he desired something. But the Sacrament of Penance can not be effective without the acts of the penitent; these are the matter of this Sacrament, just as water is the matter in Baptism. If, therefore, contrite confession is absent, then the absolutio, the forma Sacramenti, can not be applied.” Whereupon Caius doubtfully shakes his head.

Questions.—I. May a dying person, who is unconscious and gives no sign of contrition, be absolved?

II. Which of the two priests acted correctly?

III. What is to be thought of the reason with which the pastor sought to justify his action?

Resp. ad. I. We may distinguish two cases. If it is a dying person who no longer is able to give the priest a sign of contrition, but who has given such signs to those present before the priest’s arrival, then it is, as BILLUART states (De Poenit, Diss. 6 a 10, para. 7): “It is the common and certain opinion, defined in various councils and passages of law, that such a dying person is to be absolved, at least conditionally and, according to the very probable opinion of many, rather absolutely.”

In this case there is, therefore, no difficulty. But if the dying person has neither before nor after the priest’s arrival given a sign of contrition, then the case is more difficult. St. ALPHONSUS (Theol. Mor. 1, 6, 428) mentions two opinions. Some authors, he states, naming Busenbaum, Lugo, Suarez, Roncaglia, Laymann, are of opinion that absolution can not be given, and he adds: The reason is brief but very cogent, because the matter of the sacrament, which must be perceptible to the senses, is then lacking. Nevertheless he himself agrees with the sententia communior which asserts one can and should give absolution conditionate to such dying person, if this person has lived a Christian life. BILLUART likewise defends this opinion, “although several great theologians oppose it.” The reason that St. ALPHONSUS gives for this opinion is that the Sacraments were instituted on man’s account, and that, therefore, in cases of extreme necessity, one may administer them even if the matter is doubtful: “Necessity makes it lawful for a sacrament to be administered conditionally in any doubt; for by the condition injury to the sacrament is sufficiently prevented and at the same time the salvation of one’s neighbor is sufficiently provided for.

But is the reason given for the first opinion, namely: The absolution can not be given “because the matter of the sacrament, which must be perceptible to the senses, is lacking,” not a good one? The Materia Proxima of the Sacrament of Penance are the actus poenitentis—contritio et confessio—and surely if these acts are not perceivable in any way, nor may be presumed in any way at all, then absolution can not be given. This is

This is plain if, according to the opinion of St. THOMAS, we suppose the actus poenitentis as materia ex qua. But even if, with Scotus, we consider this actus only as materia circa quam, or as conditio sine qua non, the proposition is not different. For if the condition is in no wise fulfilled, nor can be presumed in any way as having been fulfilled, then absolution can not be given.

The question, therefore, is whether there is still present in such dying person, in some way or other, the materia sensibilis sacramenti, or at least may be presumed to be present. St. ALPHONSUS gives this splendid answer: “Because in that case a prudent doubt is certainly present that the dying man either knew the danger of his damnation before losing consciousness, or notices it after losing consciousness in some lucid interval, in which he is presumed to will and ask for absolution by signs truly perceptible to the senses, namely by sighs, movements of the body, or at least anxious breathing, although the confessor then does not perceive those signs (that is, as certain signs); for in so great a necessity such signs, presumed at least from a prudent doubt, suffice for giving absolution conditionally.”

This holy teacher is of the opinion, therefore, that it may be supposed that the afflicted, either before becoming unconscious, or in lucid moments that broke unconsciousness, had aroused inward contrition, and in some way or other (by sighs) desired to give exterior signs of his desire for absolution; at least the opposite is not established. This supposition, though weakly supported, suffices for granting absolution conditionatim. As BILLuart explains, this procedure is justified not merely in the case of a dying person who has led a truly Christian life, but with all who have simply, by word or deed, professed their Christian faith; indeed, as St. ALPHONSUS himself adds, even with those who have been stricken in actu peccati, i. e., duelli, adulterii. Hence to such a dying Catholic can only then not be given absolution: “When he can in no way be presumed disposed, and especially when, after a life passed without faith, before he lost his senses he contemptuously rejected the priest approaching him”; or, briefly expressed, “whose indisposition and impenitence are established.”

Resp. ad. II. The answer is obvious from the preceding argument: Caius acted correctly, but he should have granted absolution sub conditione, which does not appear from his statement of the case. It was wrong on part of Titus to refuse absolution altogether. For even if this unfortunate man came to his state in actu peccati, he could still have been absolved sub conditione, all the more so because the dying man perhaps actually through winking his eyes tried to make understood his desire for absolution.

Resp. ad. III, It is true that according to St. THOMAS the actus poenitentis form the materia of the Sacrament of Penance, and for this reason are as necessary for the administration of this Sacrament as water is for Baptism. But as, in extreme cases of need, one may employ a liquid for Baptism of which it may only be presumed cum tenui aliqua probabilitate that it is natural water, thus absolution may be given even if it can only be presumed cum tenui aliqua probabilitate that the dying man shows contrition. It corresponds perfectly with the benignity of our Mother, the Catholic Church, if theologians teach that one may suppose the dying person desires, through sighs, tearful eyes, etc., to express his contrition; it is possible at any rate, and the contrary is not established. Of course, the materia is valde dubia, but it is sufficient in such a case to grant absolution conditionally.

We should like to add the following remarks: For the practical procedure with dying who no longer can give intelligible signs, there exists no difficulty. The priest can safely adhere to the opinions of moralists, who, at the present time at least, unanimously maintain the principles above stated. According to this, every Catholic deprived of his senses, and near death, may be given absolution, at least sub conditione, indeed even if in actu peccati he became unconscious. The exception only is the dying person, de cuius indispositione constat; this would be particularly the case, as moralists hold, if the afflicted in question, just before he was deprived of his senses, refused to have a priest. Should, however, such a person— according to LEHMKUHL (II, n. 575)—in any way, for instance through pressure of the hand, imploring look, or some other sign, even though these be of doubtful nature, manifest a change of mind, then he may be absolved conditionally. One may indeed go even — further: Even if this unhappy person had refused to see a priest and was then deprived of his senses, it is not improbable that an inward change of disposition takes place within him and that he desires to manifest the same; the case is similar to one in which some one becomes unconscious in actu (alterius) peccati v. c. duelli; although it is always more difficult to presume a change of disposition with those who just previously have rejected grace, still it is not an impossibility. BALLERINI states (Compendium Th. M. II, n. 505a): “No one will deny that a person who can in no way be judged disposed ought not and cannot be absolved. But since a disposition can be presumed even in one who loses his senses in the very act of sinning, it scarcely appears when it will happen that a dying man can in no way be presumed contrite.” If then, for instance, a sick man to-day refuses the priest, and the following day the priest finds him unconscious, the priest should not be censured if he should give (perhaps secretly) absolution sub conditione, after reciting the respective acts, though he discovers no actual signs of a change in disposition.

While the practical procedure offers no difficulties, yet, considered theologically, the matter is not so simple. If one adheres to the view of St. THOMAS, now held as communis sententia: that the actus poenitentis are materia proxima of this Sacrament, there must, in order to warrant absolution, manifest itself, besides the interior contrition, also exterior contrition and accusation aliquo modo, so that a materia sensibilis Sacramenti be present; at the very least one must be able to presume aliqua ratione this materia sensibilis to be present. The interior dispositio, so theologians teach, may be presumed, in consideration of the mercy of God, and for the outward manifestatio according to St. ALPHONSUS the anxia respiratio, suspiria, ictus oculorum, etc., may be accepted. We may content ourselves with this, although I am under the impression many will not be convinced. For it may happen that a dying person lies there unconscious, quietly breathing; shall I refuse him absolution for lack of suspiria, etc.? Certainly not. There the opinion of St. ALPHONSUS does not entirely satisfy. I decidedly prefer to agree with other theologians who justify in another way the permission of absolution in such cases. They say a man who has lived a Christian life, or at least has remained a member of the true Church, seems thereby to have satisfactorily manifested exteriorly his intention to die as a member of this Church, intending consequently to receive the last Sacraments. This manifestatio non expresse revocata suffices to enable his receiving absolution conditionally. Even the refusal to see the priest is not always identical with a renunciation of the Church; ergo: in the case where the priest has been refused, the argument of St. ALPHONSUS is more favorable. Those who favor. the other argument must—as LEHMKUHL actually does—in order to be consistent, require such dying person to manifest exteriorly in some way his change of disposition. As, however, for this even doubtful signs suffice, i. e., pressio manuum, oculorum obtutus (LEHMKUHL), there is after all hardly a difference.

The demand that in order to warrant absolution the actus poenitentis must manifest themselves exteriorly, or that at least their manifestatio may be presumed in some way, applies at all events, if, after the sententia communis, we consider the actus poenitentis as materia Sacramenti—the materia indeed must be sensibilis. It appears to me that the matter would be different if, with the Scotists, we view the actus not as materia ex qua, but only as conditio sine qua non, or as necessaria dispositio ad sacramentum, “quae,” as BALLERINI adds (1. c., n. 506 C), “need not necessarily be perceptible to the senses” In order that the absolutio be valid the dispositio must be present, and in order that I may administer absolutio (licite) this dispositio in general must show itself outwardly. But in an extreme case the Sacrament is effective, if only the absolutio is given and the interior contrition and desire to confess are present. After the sententia communis, on the contrary, the Sacrament is not effective, when the actus poenitentis qua materia sensibilis does not show itself outwardly.

In order, therefore, to be able to give absolution to a dying person bereft of consciousness, I must, after the sententia communis, not only presume the interna dispositio, but also its externa manifestatio; after the sententia Scoti the praesumtio internae dispositionis suffices. That the latter is easier is quite evident, and for this reason I agree with BALLERINI (I. c., n. 506 C), who, to the question which opinion would better justify the granting of absolution in our case, replies: perhaps one will hardly award the palm to the first (St. Thomas’s or the common) opinion. BALLERINI refers here to the argument of those who presume the anxia respiratio, etc., as materia sensibilis.

I am aware that the otherwise ever reliable LEHMKUHL takes the other view, and even expressly states (Th. M., II, n. 512) that also according to the opinion of the Scotists, the externa manifestatio be considered pro essentiali conditione sacramenti validi.

If therefore we differ from LEHMKUHL we do not wish to consider our argument as conclusively decisive, but hope that it may perhaps induce a more thorough discussion and solution of the question.

Ignaz Rieder, D.D.