Case XLVIII: Can an Indefinite and General Accusation, Except in a Case of Necessity, Suffice for Confession, and Is It Permitted?

That a general accusation in case of necessity suffices for confession when it is impossible to make a specified accusation, as it not infrequently happens in the case of dying, is a universally known and certain doctrine of holy Church, and contained in the Rituale Romanum. It is another question, one upon which theologians differ, whether such accusation is satisfactory in respect to sins which one is not obliged to confess, venial sins for instance, or mortal sins already confessed and forgiven through absolution by a priest. A penitent, for instance, accuses himself of venial sins committed since the last Confession, and includes the sins of his past life with the words: “I also include all sins of my past life in this Confession,” or the penitent is not conscious of any sins committed since the last Confession, so that this general statement is his whole accusation.

In discussing this question two points must of necessity be distinguished—the validity, and the lawfulness, of such a Confession. The first question is therefore whether such a general accusation, where a materia necessaria is lacking, is valid, even if the case is not one of necessity; the second, is it permitted?

I. Is it valid? This question in my opinion should be answered affirmatively, because confirmed by the Ratio theologica, as also by the opinions of theologians.

As regards the intrinsic reason, it is essential but also sufficient in the holy Sacrament of Penance that the confessor pronounces sentence and applies his jurisdiction. The confessor is made aware from the penitent’s accusation that since his last Confession he has not been guilty of grievous sin, and that for this reason he accuses himself of sins already confessed and forgiven. With regard to these sins the confessor reasons that the penitent confesses them with sincere contrition, detailed knowledge of these sins in particular is not necessary to him, as they have been already judged by a priest and remitted; the penitent, however, deserves (de congruo) on account of his renewed accusation a renewing of the grace dispensed in the Sacrament of Penance. If a general accusation such as this did not suffice for the essence of the Sacrament of Penance, it could not suffice either in the case of a dying person, nor in any other case where, on account of circumstances, it is impossible to confess special sins. Since, however, the nature of the Sacrament is unchangeable, and in case of necessity a general accusation is valid and sufficient where it refers to the materia necessaria, then it must be valid also when it concerns a materia libera. The reason why, except in the case of necessity, a general mention of non-confessed mortal sins is insufficient for Confession is found in the Divine Commandment, which directs the sinner to confess his sins with kind and number, so that the priest may be enabled to judge of the spiritual state of the penitent, and to decide whether he is worthy or unworthy of absolution. It is clear that he who acts contrary to this commandment cannot receive valid absolution. There is no such a commandment concerning venial sins, or mortal sins already confessed and forgiven; hence it suffices to confess these in general to the confessor with true contrition and firm resolve to avoid them; the confessor judges this and gives absolution in accordance.

The intrinsic reasons for this opinion are supported by the opinion of theologians. That many great teachers do not doubt the validity of such Confession cannot be disputed. St. Alphonsus, for instance, in discussing the question whether an invalid Confession must be repeated, when the penitent renews his accusation to the confessor who has heard the invalid Confession decides (Lib. 6. n. 502) that this repetition is not required. He says: It suffices if the confessor remembers the state of the penitent, or recovers a confused knowledge of it, and the penitent accuses himself in general of everything previously confessed. The reason is that, although the first confession was not sacramental, nevertheless its ratification, when the penitent thereafter accuses himself generally of the faults confessed, joined with the knowledge previously possessed by the confessor, is rightly regarded as sufficient. Likewise, because, as Croix probably judges in the place cited, such a confession, since it was made with a view to receiving absolution, is also sufficiently called sacramental, insofar as it too pertains to the sacramental seal. If we apply this principle to our question the result is that a general accusation of the sins of the past life suffices when the sins are known to the confessor from a previous confession to such extent that he has at least a cognitio confusa of his penitent’s state of conscience. The holy teacher goes further, after supposing the case that the confessor has forgotten all and yet contents himself with the general accusation of his penitent, he expresses the opinion: He could not, indeed, lawfully impart absolution, as Lugo, number 642, Croix, number 1218, and Laymann, with the others cited above, rightly say, because then he could not impose a suitable penance. Yet if he then absolved after a confession made in general, he would absolve validly, as Laymann, chapter 9, number 6 at the end, and Croix in the place cited, with Aversa, Illsung, and Diana, teach.

St. Alphonsus summits no reasons for his decision, but refers to Laymann, Croix, etc, so that he makes the teaching of these theologians his own. This teaching contains the answer to our question, and in proof thereof it will suffice to state the reason of their teaching, which Laymann expresses in the following words:

The reason, which I have given rather often, is that a specific and particular manifestation or knowledge of sins is not of itself and simply of the essence and necessity of the Sacrament, but only of the necessity of the divine precept, which the penitent has already satisfied. In another place (cap. 8. n. 2.) he discusses this point more extensively: But it must be carefully observed here that the specific and numerical declaration of all sins does not of itself and directly pertain to the necessity or essence of the Sacrament, as though the Sacrament of Penance could never subsist unless a complete confession of all mortal sins were made, as, among others, Paludanus noted in book 4, distinction 21, question 2, article 2, conclusion 2; Suarez, disputation 23, section 1, numbers 8 and 10; and Coninck, disputation 7, doubt 1 and doubt 10, conclusion 2. Rather, it pertains to the necessity of the divine precept; yet the voluntary transgression of that precept indirectly results in a defect of the Sacrament, namely so that it is not validly received. For at least attrition is of itself required for the substance of the Sacrament of Penance; but attrition cannot coexist with an actual sin, namely mortal sacrilege, which the person confessing commits by concealing one or more sins without a just cause, whether through malice or through gross negligence.

It follows from this that a general accusation, if not contrary to the Divine Commandment, suffices for the nature of the Sacrament of Penance. Croix likewise writes: loc. cit.: For the validity of absolution it suffices to accuse oneself of sins in general, although, speaking in itself, this is unlawful according to what was said from number 620; and in the place cited, number 623: If someone outside necessity thus accuses himself only in general of venial sins, without determining any one in its species, he is indeed validly absolved, as authors more commonly teach with Herinx, disputation 3, number 67, and Bosco, number 114. Suarez (Disp. 23. Sect. 1. n. 9.) in respect to general accusation of a dying man, who cannot specify his sins better, teaches: Finally, one who had no consciousness of mortal sin, if at that moment he said that he had sinned venially, should without doubt be absolved, since in venial matters it is not necessary for confession to explain number or species; but one who says that he has sinned says at least that he has sinned venially. Therefore this will be sufficient matter. To this the great teacher presumes an objection (n. 10) which he answers in the sense of the above-mentioned theologians. You will say: by this argument it would be proved that a confession of venial sin in general is of itself sufficient in one who has no consciousness of mortal sin, even outside a case of necessity. The answer is that, speaking only speculatively, perhaps this can be defended, both for the reason stated and also because^* one who confesses idle words is judged to present sufficient matter, and yet he declares his conscience no more than one who says that he has sinned venially, nor does he alter the confessor’s judgment more. Nevertheless, in practice this must be denied because of the uncertainty of the matter. Not without importance for our question it is to learn how Suarez refutes the reasoning of theologians, who maintain that signs of contrition without the manifestation of a particular sin are not sufficient to grant absolution to a dying man who can no longer speak. The argument of these theologians was the following: Where knowledge of some particular thing is not given, a judgment of prudence has no place; therefore neither does absolution. He answers (n. 7): It is one thing to know that another has sinned, but another to know that the other acknowledges and sorrowfully subjects his sins to the keys so that they may be forgiven; and this special knowledge is provided there. Hence, although that confession is called general with respect to its remote matter, it is particular with respect to its proximate matter. ... For no sufficient reason proves that it must be distinct on the part of the thing concerning which the accusation is made, or that this belongs entirely to the essence. And number 11 discusses this more closely. Nor does it matter that the remote matter, which is as it were the object of that confession, is universal; because absolution immediately concerns the proximate matter, which is a particular confession, and its effect also concerns this particular person, and thus this whole action concerns particulars.

^* To what extent this reasoning stands the test we will not examine here.

It is plain from the quoted passages that Suarez considers a general accusation sufficient for the validity of Confession, not only in the case of necessity, but also outside of it, when it relates to sins for which there is not the obligation by virtue of a Divine commandment to confess with kind and number. This opinion is supported by Herinx, who teaches it even more distinctly in the following words: Whether one who has no necessary matter confesses sufficiently, even outside necessity, by accusing himself of all sins in general or of venial sins in common? I answer that it appears entirely so: because venial sins in their species are not necessary matter for confession; moreover, such a confession is a sorrowful accusation of sins, as is clear from what was said in the conclusion. For the reason that this is not valid outside necessity for those who have mortal sins is that they must express them according to species and number, insofar as possible. To the list of theologians there extensively quoted in support of this opinion might be added many more who teach the same, as, for instance, Alexander de Alés, Sylvester, Burghaber, Dicastillo, Diana, Coninck, Voit, Reuter.

There seems to be sufficient evidence, therefore, that the validity of a general accusation in the Sacrament of Penance is based upon good reasons and excellent authority. And now we ask:

II. Is such a general accusation permissible? If our opinion were correct beyond all possible doubt, this question might at once be answered in the affirmative, assuming that there would be no objection from any quarter. The reasons given by us do not, however, remove every doubt concerning the validity of a general accusation; even if they did, such a general accusation, except in case of necessity, would offend against a universal binding usage of the Church, and it would not correspond to the special character which our Lord wished to give to the holy Sacrament of Penance. For the theologians teach that the confession of all mortal sins committed after Baptism is a Divine commandment, because the Saviour intended to appoint the priest a judge to whose decision the sinner’s fate should be absolutely subjected, not according to human discretion but according to the laws of Divine justice and mercy. Each mortal sin incurs in Divine justice the loss of heaven, and mercy decrees to restore to the sinner that which he lost. The priest, who in the Sacrament of Penance has the task of restoring, if possible, to the sinner this lost title to heaven, must be made aware of every single mortal sin, and therefore the sinner must make known to the confessor all his mortal sins. To describe a matter exactly, it is not enough to state the genus to which it belongs: there must be added the differentia specifica. The word sin gives only the general idea of an act contrary to the Divine commandment. So does the expression Divine commandment give only the general idea of a commandment, and is specified only by the object of the commandment. The idea of sin, be it mortal or venial, finds its differentia specifica in the relation of the sinful act to a certain object aimed at by the Divine commandment. Therefore the expression, “I have sinned,” is not one which indicates the essentials of a sin. Whatever the Saviour has ordained in regard to the Sacrament of Penance must be present at every administration of the same, provided it is possible and the object of the commandment is not lacking. The object, however, namely the priest’s judicial power over the sinner, as instituted by Christ, is present in the case of all sins, confessed or not confessed. Therefore a general accusation, except in a case of necessity, is never sufficient for Confession, and there is always the obligation to make known to the confessor a specified sin.

This opinion is, with few exceptions, universally shared by theologians. I will quote their testimony in detail, so that the reader may better know and appreciate their teaching. In the first place, there is Suarez (Disp. 23. Sect. 1. n. 10.). He teaches, in regard to the validity of a general accusation, that it is not certain, and states immediately that, practically, it does not suffice. That confession ... is of itself sufficient ... must in practice be denied because of the uncertainty of the matter. I say, therefore, that although a person is not absolutely bound to confess the species of venial sins, nevertheless, on the supposition that he wishes to confess, he is bound to present entirely certain matter, if he can, and therefore ought at his own discretion to confess some particular venial sin. No less emphatically Laymann teaches (Lib. 5. tr. 6. cap. 6. m. 14. ef 15) that one is obliged to make specified accusation. Finally, I warn that the doctrine of Alensis, part 4, question 77, member 1, articles 1 and 2, and Sylvester, under Confession 1, question 13, is not to be admitted: namely, that one bound by a general or particular statute to confess, if he has no mortal sin, satisfies the obligation by confessing venial sins generically, that is, by saying that he is a sinner or has failed in many things, at least venially. For the common practice of good confessors opposes this doctrine: outside a case of extreme necessity they do not confer sacramental absolution upon a penitent unless he has confessed some certain sin, whether mortal or venial. For since the Sacrament of Penance is conferred by way of a judicial absolution, it appears entirely fitting, and the institution of this Sacrament demands, that certain matter be presented and subjected, so that the judgment of absolution may be rendered more determinately, especially with the practice of the Church and the sense of the faithful concurring. Therefore, although someone is bound by no law to confess venial sins, yet on the supposition that he wishes to confess and be absolved sacramentally, he must explain some sin in its species. I say some sin, whether one or several. For it is neither necessary nor usually advisable carefully to gather all venial sins according to species and number in order to make a confession; rather, this is the best counsel for those who abstain from mortal sins: that with humility they disclose those venial sins which weigh more heavily upon their souls and from which they desire to be freed, with renewed sorrow and a resolution of amendment. Elsewhere (Cap. 8. n. 7. et 8.) he puts the case that very illiterate persons confess to having sinned, but are incapable of specifying a single, even venial, sin, though the confessor examines them. Of them he says: I answer with Suarez in the place cited and Coninck, disputation 7, doubt 1, number 6, that such a person, truly attrite for sins in general but unable through ignorance and simplicity to remember or explain any one in particular, can be validly absolved even outside the point of death. I say secondly that in practice this speculation has no place. The reason is that if a penitent who remembers no mortal sin nevertheless desires to confess sacramentally, he must explain some venial sin in particular, if he can, so that the Sacrament of Penance may be administered more fittingly and certainly, as St. Thomas testifies in the place cited, question 2, article 1, reply 2. It must always be presumed that the penitent can do this, especially when examined and assisted by the confessor, since no one appears so dull that he cannot understand and remember that he was negligent in prayer or spoke an idle or harmful word, etc. Yet even if we suppose that from the circumstances the confessor judges the person so ignorant that he cannot confess anything in particular, he nevertheless ought not to absolve him outside danger of death, but should openly tell him that sacramental absolution is not being conferred and that he is left to his own conscience, since, though examined, he refuses to state the matter of the Sacrament. First, because this is the practice of good confessors. Second, because there is danger that such a person, because of his ignorance, lacks true sorrow for sins and merely says that he has sinned because he has heard that all people are sinners. Third, because, if he has supernatural sorrow, he can be justified from his hidden sins by receiving the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Fourth, because, if we once concede that absolution outside extreme necessity can be conferred upon the faithful who explain no sin in particular, priests will abuse that faculty contrary to the legitimate institution and use of sacramental confession. Such persons may also be found in gross ignorance regarding necessary articles of faith. La Croix (Lib. 6, part 2, n. 622) says upon the same point: It appears more probable that outside a case of necessity it is not lawful to accuse oneself only in general of venial sins alone, for example by saying, ‘I accuse myself of the many venial sins I have committed during my life,’ but that something must be added at least in its species; both because this is contrary to the practice of the Church and because this Sacrament was instituted by way of accusation and judgment, and these, speaking in themselves and ordinarily, must concern matter that is at least certain and determined in its species. Suar. d. 23. s. 1. n. 10. Aversa § quarto. Bosco d. 7. s. 9. a nu. 115 Con, et Bonac. apud. Diana p. 3. t. 4. R. 66. contra Dicast. n. 761. Burgh. cent. 3. casu 41 et alios. What Croix says here about venial sins, applies also to mortal sins already forgiven by Confession.

Bonacina (Disp. 5. qu. 5. sect. 2 punct. 2. § 3. diff. 2. n. 15 et 17) also requires the confession of a specified sin: Fifth, you will ask whether one who has no mortal sins but only venial ones satisfies the obligation by saying generally that he has sinned venially, without explaining the species or number of the venial sins. Some doctors answer that he does satisfy it. But with Suarez, disputation 23, section 1, number 10; Coninck, disputation 7, doubt 1, number 6; and others, I hold that in practice some sin must be explained. The reason is that, although we are not bound to confess venial sins, nevertheless, on the supposition that we wish to confess, we are bound to present entirely certain matter, as is clear from what was said above concerning the matter of the Sacraments. Consequently, we are bound to explain in particular some kind or species of venial sin whenever we can speak and express it in particular, although we are not bound to explain those sins as to number. Connick anticipates the objection: You will say: it would follow from this that we may lawfully absolve certain ignorant persons who, when they come to confession, say generally that they have sinned, are sorry for it, and ask pardon and absolution, yet however much they are examined by the confessor they cannot remember in particular even one venial sin committed by them. I answer: (1) If such persons truly understand that they have sinned and, being attrite for it, truly intend to confess, they are validly absolved. (2) Commonly, however, unless some grave necessity is present, they ought not to be absolved, because commonly they do not appear to understand what sin is or that they have truly offended God. ... Add that it is altogether fitting that, insofar as possible, this Sacrament never be conferred unless the person confessing states some sins in particular, because from that confused general confession only a certain vague knowledge of the penitent’s state is obtained. But it befits a judge to render sentence from determinate knowledge when necessity does not compel otherwise.

Catalani (Part. 3. qu. 6. cap. 7. n. 9.) teaches the same and makes use of almost the same words as Bonacina: You will ask whether one who confesses only venial sins, because he committed no mortal sins, explains himself sufficiently in sacramental confession if he says, ‘I have sinned venially,’ without explaining their number or species. I answer that although there is no obligation to confess venial sins, nevertheless, on the supposition that someone wishes to subject them to the keys, he is bound to express them, if not as to number, at least as to species, so that he presents entirely certain matter; for thus must the matter of every Sacrament be whenever it can be. Therefore, if he can express the species of the venial sins, he must do so. He quotes Suarez, Coninck and Bonacina.

Herinx (Part. 4. tr. 4. disp. 3. n. 67) inclines to the opinion that a general accusation not only suffices for the validity of the Sacrament, but that it is permissible to put into practise; however, he does not wish to press his opinion. He writes: Nevertheless this is not readily to be put into practice, both because common usage opposes it and because various authors judge it unlawful, although I see no solid foundation. Accordingly, the general clause by which penitents at the end of confession accuse themselves of all sins can serve this purpose: that if perhaps more serious sorrow does not extend to the slight and daily faults which the penitent habitually and as though from custom confesses, absolution may nevertheless be valid if there is some sorrow for sins extending at least to grave sins committed at some time, to which this clause also applies,

Herinx, by maintaining that there is no valid reason for the opinion that a general accusation be not permissible, goes too far, as is shown in what has been said above. He is correct, however, in remarking that in the accusation of small venial sins, made from habit at every Confession, a true contrition may easily be lacking. This did not escape the wisdom of St. Alphonsus; he not only draws the particular attention of the confessor to it, but he also gives the remedy for averting this evil. It will not be unprofitable to conclude this argument with the practical hints which this holy doctor has left us in this respect. We will quote them literally from his Praris Confessarit (Lib. 6. ». 449. dub. 1. n. 71.): Since it is the common opinion that it is a grave sin and sacrilege to receive absolution upon slight sins confessed without true sorrow and purpose of amendment, and that sorrow for the multitude or excessive number of such faults is not sufficient without sorrow for some one of them in particular, as we have maintained against the opinion of certain persons, it is readily to be feared that confessions of this kind are sacrilegious or at least invalid. Therefore let the confessor take care not indiscriminately to absolve penitents of this kind; for even if they are in good faith, he himself cannot be excused from sacrilege if he imparts absolution to those who cannot be judged sufficiently disposed for absolution. Accordingly, if he wishes to absolve a penitent who has no sin to confess, he should either take care to dispose him to sorrow especially for some slight fault which he abhors more, or suggest to him that he confess some grave sin of his past life against some precept (it suffices to confess this generally without number), so that he may have certain matter for absolution. And in another place he adds: How many invalid confessions—which in themselves are true sacrileges—are made through the negligence of confessors in this matter!

The reasons upon which we based the discussion of our second question justifies the conclusion that a confessor who would follow a contrary practise would act with daring, and would be guilty of grievous fault.

Joseph Aertnys, C.SS.R.