Case XXIV: Promise of Making a Donation

Case.—Longinus, a wealthy citizen of Delaware and a bachelor, gave to Helena, his sister, who was a widow, a valuable piece of property, accepting her promise to give five hundred dollars a year to St. Eusebius’ Orphan Asylum. Within a month Longinus died suddenly. The transfer was then contested by Veronica, another widowed sister, on some legal technicality, and the courts ‘decided against Helena. The property was then divided equally between Helena and Veronica. Now Helena wants to know whether she is bound to pay the five hundred dollars or not, or does she fulfil her end of the bargain by paying only one-half of that amount.

Question.—How far is she obliged in conscience?

Solution.—First of all, is she obliged to pay the five hundred dollars?

No, she is not. The agreement between herself and her brother, while presumably a valid one when made, was in point of fact an invalid one, for the courts discovered a secret defect which robbed it of its legality. It is evident, then, that Longinus did not keep his part of the contract, which called for an actual and valid conveyance of the property to his sister; and though we cannot accuse him of lack of good faith, yet his error, a costly one to Helena, since it deprived her of one-half the property, affected the substance of the contract, and thereby relieved Helena of the obligation she assumed when she consented to her brother’s proposal. As, then, she did not receive what her brother promised and intended to give her, she is not bound to carry out his wish as to the five hundred dollars.

(2) Since she received one-half of the very property in question, is she obliged to pay one-half the stipulated sum? No, she is not bound to pay even two hundred and fifty dollars. As no part of the agreement was actualized, in no way can she be compelled to pay any part of the money to the Orphan Asylum. While it is true she did come into possession of a large part of the property involved, yet she became possessed of it as an heir at law and under the terms of the general law whereby the next of kin are pro rata heirs to the estate of one who dies intestate. Not coming into possession of this special donation invalidly made by her brother, she cannot be said to be bound for one half the amount.

(3) Is Veronica held to pay the five hundred or the two hundred and fifty dollars? No, we can allege no valid reason why she is under obligation to pay a single cent of the money, for she was not the cause of the failure of the agreement between her brother and sister.

She has in this matter violated no claim of justice, hence she is not bound to make up for any loss suffered by the Orphan Asylum, by reason of the decision of the civil court. If the sisters agree to give the sum of five hundred dollars or any part of it to the Orphan Asylum, they do so from motives of charity, or out of respect for the wishes of their dead brother. Neither can this wish on the part of Longinus be held to be a pious bequest or donation. The very essence of such a donation requires that it be given directly and absolutely to pious causes or be committed to some one else, with the express mandate that it be handed over to the pious cause specified.

No such donation is expressed or implied in the given case, and though the Orphan Asylum does as a matter of fact lose the yearly gratuity, this happens through no fault of those who inherit the estate of the decedent. It must be said, therefore, that both of the sisters can act as they please in this matter with a clear conscience. They might be advised to execute the wish of their defunct relative, but this is another matter. They cannot be compelled to do so.