Chapter — The Casuist

Case XXV: A Buyer Concealing from the Seller the Real Value of Property

¶1.

Case.—A wealthy man saw a good chance to make a profitable deal. A coal mine, worked in his vicinity at great profit, acquires from the neighboring farms additional land, and gets it at a low price because the country people are ignorant of its real value. Our wealthy man figured: “I will buy the farm lands, offering for them somewhat more than the mine does, and then sell the same to the mine owners at a big profit: for when they see that they are dealing with a man who knows, they will surely pay more than they do now.”

¶2.

Question.—Can this be done with a good conscience?

¶3.

Solution.—No, by this action the man sins against charity. It would be a duty of charity to explain to the owners the value of their land and the error they are making, instead of turning their ignorance to one’s own advantage. That the man pays them more for their acres than the mine does, renders the unfairness somewhat less, but does not remove it. The appearance of a generous action is merely a pretense, and cannot deceive one as to the selfish motive of the whole proceeding. Here as always the words of Christ apply: “Omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et facite illis’ (Matth. 7, 12). A man of genuine charity, a true friend of the people, would employ his better knowledge to the benefit of his neighbors and would either divide the profit with them, or, since they are more in need than he, give them the whole profit and thus protect the poor from great disadvantage.

¶4.

It may be asked whether these transactions, dictated by egoism, are unjust and unlawful, whether therefore the wealthy man in question is under the obligation of making restitution? To this is to be answered: No; for here it is not question of an error as to the substance of the object purchased, but as to its accidental qualities, which happen to render it more valuable to the mining company and to this wealthy man, than to other purchasers. The country people’s error is, therefore, not an essential but an accidental one, and this renders the purchase of itself not invalid. But the chief point is this: the error was not brought about through cheating or deceit: the wealthy man did nothing to give to the owners an erroneous view as to the value of their fields; he therefore is not the effectual cause of their error and of the detriment suffered by them through him. Of course, the wealthy man let it take place, and did not prevent the harm which was caused the farm owners. But a non obstans is obliged to restitution only when it was his duty ex officio, contractu vel quasi contractu, to prevent the injury, and in such relation the wealthy man does not stand to the farmers, as he is not appointed their protector, nor master or superior, nor even adviser. He is obliged to avert harm to them only as a matter of charity towards his fellowman; but a violation of charity that is not accompanied by a violation of justice does not impose the obligation of restitution. Therefore the action in question was not unjust, but unfair and uncharitable.