Case XXVI: Inquiring in Confession for the Name of an Accomplice

Titia, being reprimanded by her confessor for neglecting to make her Easter duty, gave the following reasons to justify herself: She said that she was at Confession last Easter, but that the confessor refused her absolution, because she would not reveal the name of a man high in the city government, with whom she had sinned. The confessor urged that he might be able to reclaim the official, who was a Catholic, if he knew his name; at least, he might be able to prevent him from doing further evil. It is not wrong, the confessor further urged, to make known the hidden sin of another, when there is a sufficient reason for making it known. In the present instance, the good of your neighbor demands that his sin be made known, because he may be reclaimed to the grace of God, or, at least, prevented from repeating this sin. Titia, however, refused to make known the name and was dismissed, without absolution, being requested to come back in another week, which she failed to do.

Now we ask:

1. Is it always, and in all cases, forbidden for a confessor to inquire the name of an accomplice, or are there any cases when this is allowed?

2. What judgment is to be formed of the confessor in question?

3. Did the confessor incur any censure?

1. In answer to the first question, we would say that Benedict XIV issued four Apostolic Constitutions condemning the practice of inquiring in confession the name of an accomplice.

The first of these constitutions begins, "Suprema omnium," and was issued in 1745. The second begins, "Ubi primum," and was issued in 1746. These two constitutions were first issued to the bishops of Portugal and Algarve. By a third constitution, beginning "Ad eradicandum," these two constitutions were extended to the whole Church. To these the same Pontiff added a fourth, "Apostolici ministerii," prescribing the mode of procedure against delinquents. In these four constitutions, the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XIV condemns the practice of inquiring the name of an accomplice, and he punishes by excommunication, to be incurred ipso facto, and reserved to the Roman Pontiff, whosoever shall teach that the aforesaid practice is licit, or whosoever shall defend it, or shall attack the decrees issued against it, or shall twist the same into another meaning; in like manner, also, suspension is decreed, "ferendae sententiae," against those who inquire the name of an accomplice, or his or her place of residence, or shall inquire such other information in confession that may easily discover the identity of the accomplice, and who shall deny absolution to penitents refusing to give this information. And these penalties are incurred, even though the delinquent may not have committed mortal sin.

The theologians maintain, however, that these constitutions do not include each and every one inquiring the name of an accomplice. They except, therefore, from the penalties decreed in these constitutions all cases in which, according to true and sound teaching ("juxta veras et sanas doctrinas"), it is allowed and even necessary for the guidance of the penitent's conscience, to demand the name of the accomplice.

Some theologians err in determining what cases are to be exempted from the Benedictine censures.

Those err who hold that it is allowed to inquire the degree of relationship in sins of incest. Because the degree of relationship does not add a new species to the sin of incest.

Again, those theologians err who maintain that it is licit to inquire whether a maid servant lives in the same house. Because it is sufficient to inquire whether the occasion is proximate or remote. Indeed, it can not be said that there is any certain grave obligation to tell a mortal sin in Confession, if such Confession will reveal the identity of the accomplice. If, therefore, the penitent is not bound to confess such a sin, by what right may a confessor question him about it?

The case may occur where concealing the name of the accomplice may work much evil, which evil the penitent is bound to prevent, but which can not be prevented except by making known the accomplice to the confessor. In that case the confessor must oblige the penitent to make known the accomplice, and if the penitent refuse, he or she is not worthy of absolution, and the penitent is bound in conscience to make the revelation, or otherwise to be judged unworthy of absolution. But it is very desirable that the identity of the accomplice be revealed to the confessor, not in Confession, but outside of it. For if the revelation be made outside of Confession, then the case is no longer a case of the confessor inquiring the name of an accomplice, but of a penitent revealing the identity of his accomplice, because he is bound to do so by a higher law. 2. The conduct of the confessor in this case in requiring the penitent to discover the identity of the accomplice is reprehensible. It is in direct opposition to the constitutions of Benedict XIV, which expressly forbid inquiry as to the name of an accomplice, under pretext of correcting him. Nor did the good that the confessor hoped to do, after learning the name of the accomplice, justify him, because it did not fall within any of the cases which require the revelation of an accomplice.

The confessor is likewise blameworthy for sending Titia away without absolution. However, it is not evident from the case, that he denied her absolution, and told her to come back, in order to induce her to make known her accomplice.

3. The confessor incurred excommunication, reserved to the Holy See, because he taught, and defended, and recommended a practice condemned as detestable by Benedict XIV. That he did so in private, and not publicly, does not exempt him from the censure. For in the constitution of Pius IX, "Apostolicae Sedis," all those incur the excommunication who teach or defend, either publicly or in private, propositions condemned by the Holy See.

It might be urged in the confessor's defense that he did not teach that it was licit to deny absolution in this case. But such defense seems to lack any solid foundation. Some theologians, indeed, hold that no excommunication is incurred where the confessor does not teach that it is licit to deny absolution. But this can not be gathered from the Benedictine constitutions; because where they speak of the excommunication incurred, they do not make mention of "absolution"; they speak of absolution only in connection with the suspension incurred by the confessor. Wherefore the confessor is not suspended, unless he teach that the practice of inquiring the name of an accomplice is licit, and threaten the penitent with a denial of absolution, as an inducement to make the revelation. The confessor, therefore, in this case, has committed a mortal sin, has incurred excommunication reserved to the Pope, and should be punished with suspension, if he denied the penitent absolution because she would not reveal the name of her accomplice.

In conclusion it is to be noted that Benedict XIV obliges all persons who shall in any manner have knowledge of such confessors, to denounce them. The penitent alone, in his or her own cause, is excused from the obligation of denouncing, "ne seipsum prodat." The priest, therefore, who knows of such confessors, outside of Confession, is bound to denounce them. This denunciation is to be made to the Holy Office. Strictly speaking, if the offense was committed "ex prava voluntate," the confessor is to be denounced to the Holy Office. If the offense was committed "ex animi levitate," the confessor is to be denounced to the Ordinary. But the Holy Office is to judge whether the offense was committed "ex prava voluntate" or "ex animi levitate." Therefore, in either case, the denunciation is to be made to the Holy Office,