Case XXVI: Is It a Grievous Sin for Innkeepers to Supply Spirituous Liquors to Customers Who Are Drinking to Excess or Who Are Already Drunk?

An innkeeper is in the habit of serving every customer who asks for drink, even if he is plainly drinking too much or is already intoxicated. The man may be wasting on drink money that belongs to his wife and children, but the innkeeper pays no attention. Is not such behavior a grievous sin? And can an innkeeper receive absolution if he habitually acts thus and will not promise to alter?

A question of this kind touches one of the difficulties in Moral Theology. The point is whether and under what conditions it is permissible to connive at another's sin.

The doctrine of cooperation forms probably the most difficult part of practical moral theology. It is easy enough to say, as do the writers of most books on the subject, that formal cooperation is never permissible, but that material cooperation is allowed for comparatively important reasons. What is meant by formal and material cooperation? It is often difficult to distinguish them, and still more difficult to decide whether the existing reasons are sufficient to justify material cooperation. Lehmkuhl says (I. n. 648): "Not all difficulties in this matter can be solved. The theologian can give only principles and certain rules, the application of which in individual cases he must entrust to the practical prudence of the person acting or giving counsel"

There can be no doubt that formal cooperation occurs whenever no an innkeeper invites or urges those already half or wholly intoxicated to go on drinking. Lehmkuhl says in this connection: "To incite someone to drink more copiously is certainly intrinsically evil" (Theol. mor., I. n. 403). Berardi writes (Praxis confessariorum, pag. 169, n. 786): "Precisely to incite someone to drunkenness is intrinsically evil."

Let us imagine a case in which the innkeeper was aware that his customer intended to commit some great crime, possibly murder, and was drinking spirits in order to nerve himself for his task;—would it then not be permissible for the innkeeper to encourage him to go on drinking, until he was incapable of any action, and so was prevented from committing the intended crime? No, it would not be permissible, if such encouragement is a formal cooperation in the sin of intemperance, for formal cooperation is never allowed; it is intrinsece evil, so that we must apply to it the Apostle's words (Rom. iii, 8): " Non faciamus mala, ut veniant bona." St. Augustine lays down this principle very clearly in his work contra mendacium (c. 20, n, 40): "No one is to be led even to eternal salvation with the assistance of a lie." The end can never justify bad means, means recognized as bad.

To prove how difficult it often is to distinguish formal from material cooperation, we may refer to the debated question, whether it is right to encourage some one to commit a sin, in order to deter him from committing some more grievous offense, which he is on the point of doing. This question bears a close resemblance to the one under discussion. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor., lib. 3, tract. 3, n. 57) considers the theory that it is right " probabilior," giving as his reason that in such a case the lesser sin is no longer an evil but a good action, being less bad (the person advising does not seek evil but good, namely, the choice of the lesser evil).

Following this line of argument, some writers maintain that it is right to advise a man to drink too much in order to preserve him from immorality. Schwane, however, in his Moraltheologie (Part 1, § 47, p. 147), says: "A lesser sin may be called a lesser evil, but not a good thing, and not a moral advantage, which is the point to be proved. It is always forbidden to cooperate in any sin by counsel. Other theologians, such as Laymann, Gury, Collet, etc., state the matter more precisely, and say that it is permissible to advise a man to commit a lesser sin in order to prevent his sinning more grievously, if the lesser sin forms a part of the greater. For instance, it is permissible to say to one about to commit a murder: ' Stop, do not kill him, only wound him.' By saying this, we should not give any formal cooperation to the sin, but we should only be preventing its complete committal."

To return, therefore, to our original question: An innkeeper might set some strong wine before that particular customer, foreseeing that he would get drunk, yet not urging him to drink it. Setting wine before him is only a material cooperation in the sin of ebrietas and is permissible for relatively important reasons. The wish to prevent the intended crime is certainly a sufficient reason for allowing the sin of drunkenness. Lehmkuhl says ( Theol. mor., I. n. 744): "It will probably be lawful to induce someone to drunkenness, even one that is formal for him, for this end and this end alone: that he himself may be prevented from a greater sin upon which he is resolved—for example, homicide."

Let us now ask: May the innkeeper supply spirituous liquors to his customers at their request, when he sees that they are drinking to excess?

In this case, too, the cooperation in the sin is only material, and is therefore permissible for relatively important reasons. We ought therefore to examine the reasons, and see whether they are sufficient or not. If the innkeeper fears to refuse to serve his customers, lest they should use oaths and foul language, he may certainly choose the lesser of two evils, and tolerate their drunkenness in order to prevent blasphemy. Again, if he fears to refuse to serve them, because of great loss to himself, knowing that his profits will be greatly diminished, he is not bound to refuse to supply what is ordered. Berardi says (J. c.): a moderately grave cause suffices, such as would exist if otherwise the innkeepers were notably harmed by a reduction in customers.” St. Alphonsus writes (lib. 3, tract. 3, n. 70).: “They are sufficiently excused by fear of any grave harm whatsoever.” Lehmkuhl says (J. c. n. 673): “A moderately grave cause seems both to be required and to suffice for there to be an excuse from sin.”

The innkeeper is bound not ex justitia, but ex caritate, to prevent his customers from committing the sin of intemperance. If charity be exclusively taken into consideration, the desire to avert some serious damage is enough to justify him in cooperating in another’s sin by good or indifferent actions,—in this case by supplying the drink that is ordered. It cannot be laid down as a general rule that innkeepers ought to refuse to serve such customers, since a rule of this kind would certainly inflict great loss upon them in their business. In special cases, however, it is undoubtedly an innkeeper’s duty to refuse to supply any more drink to a man ebrietati proximus, when such a refusal would not cause him any serious loss. Berardi says (J. ¢.):“The motive of profit alone—namely, because this or that drunken person pays the price of the wine requested—does not suffice.”

The expression “belonging to their wives and children” is probably not to be taken in the literal sense that the drunkard pays his reckoning with money that is not his own. If this were the meaning, the question would require special discussion. It most likely means that he wastes on drink what should be the family income, and reduces himself and his relations to poverty and want. In this case the innkeeper is not bound by justice, but only by charity, to avert ruin and want from the family. Although he is bound only by charity, it is clear that in such a case it is his duty to put up with considerable incommodum, and that he ought to have very strong reasons to justify him in supplying such drunkards with spirituous liquors when they order them in excess.

We have, finally, to notice the case where there are other inns in the neighborhood in which the innkeepers will not hesitate to supply a customer, so that a refusal on the part of one to serve him will not keep him sober. On this subject we may quote Schwane, who says in his Speciale Moraltheologie (Part I, § 48, n. 3): " Occasionally a decisive importance is ascribed to the circumstance that the action in question is the conditio sine qua non of another's sin, in such a way that material cooperation is allowed when the sin will certainly be committed quite apart from it, but it is not allowed when the sin depends upon that action, and if there were no cooperation the sin would not be committed at all." This circumstance has certainly a bearing upon the imputation of cooperation, but not in such a degree as to render the cooperation permissible as soon as it ceases to be the conditio sine qua non. An innkeeper may foresee that a customer who is evidently drinking to excess will go elsewhere and obtain what he wants if he is not served in the house where he now is. This reason does not justify the innkeeper in cooperation, *. e., in supplying spirits in excessive quantities—all that can be said is, that in cases where very probably a refusal on his part to sell would prevent the sin of drunkenness altogether, much stronger reasons are required to justify the sale than in other cases.

Enough has been said to enable us to see how an innkeeper ought to be dealt with in the confessional with regard to this point. The first thing to ascertain is whether he is in the habit of sinning grievously. If so, he must be admonished to be truly contrite for his sins, and to resolve firmly to avoid them in future. If he cannot be brought to these dispositions, absolution must of course be refused. The confessor must, however, be certain, as the result of his examination, that the penitent's action is really sinful.

We can only repeat what was stated above in words quoted from Lehmkuhl: Only general principles can be established: their application must be left to practical common-sense. An innkeeper with a prosperous business, who is respected in the neighborhood where he lives, can keep good order in a case of this kind far more easily than a poor rival, who is dependent upon the money that he takes each day. The former can say to his customer: " You have had enough for today, friend," without being obliged to fear lest he should give offense. A great deal depends upon the circumstances in a matter of this sort.

Other equally practical questions might be asked regarding innkeepers, e. g., whether they may serve their customers with flesh meat on abstinence days, or supply certain newspapers, but we have restricted ourselves to the question that was actually asked.— Professor Josef Weiss.