Case XXVIII: Husband’s Power over the Vows of his Wife

Case.—Ximina, when a maiden of seventeen, made a vow to the Blessed Virgin, which she faithfully fulfils, though it entails many hardships and consumes much of her free time. A year ago, at the age of twenty-three, she married Rimines and has ever since remained true to the practices demanded by the vow. Her husband has remonstrated with her many times, claiming that she is harming herself by the cultivation of the vow of piety. His reasoning having no effect, he finally placed the matter before his confessor, Father Leo, who told him that priests had not the jurisdiction to set aside vows, even of their penitents, but that he (Rimines) as a husband had such jurisdiction and could nullify the vow of Ximina. Rimines acted on the advice of his confessor, and now his wife, full of anxiety, consults her confessor as to her duty in the matter.

Question.—What must Ximina do?

Solution.—Father Leo, the husband’s confessor, spoke correctly when he affirmed that no priest, neither pastors nor confessors, had the power of annulling vows of any description. The ordinary jurisdiction for such action is vested in the Pope, in Bishops and in Prelates of religious Orders. The pastor and confessor must have delegated jurisdiction before he can validly annul vows that bind in conscience. Sometimes this delegated jurisdiction is conceded in the faculties given to every priest authorized to work in a given diocese. But generally this is not the case. Father Leo was also giving a true theological decision when he informed Rimines that, as the husband of Ximina, he had the power vested in him of setting aside any vow made by his wife. A vow may be annulled directly or indirectly. Directly, it may be set aside by one who has power over the will of the person who has bound himself by the vow. Inferiors in their relations to superiors can take upon themselves duties imposed by a vow only conditionally, that is with the consent of the superior. If this consent is refused then no vow is binding. Under this ruling, religious, children and wives are not capable of taking a vow without the consent of superiors, of parents, or of husband. So that, following the logic of this decision, Ximina could be released from any vow taken after her marriage, by virtue of the power over her will vested in her husband by divine authority, if said vow had been taken without his consent. Then the vow would have been taken in prejudice to his lawful rights.

But the vow in question was taken prior to the woman’s marriage, when Rimines had no authority over her will. This is true, but a vow may be nullified even indirectly, that is by one who has authority over the matter of the vow. Hence a husband who is by the divine plan the head of the wife, has dominion over her will in all things that pertain to the woman as wife, mother, mistress of the household, etc. This action on the part of the husband is valid when done, even without just cause. It is likewise licit when the head of the family feels that the fulfilment is irksome to him, or prejudicial to the best interests of family life. So that, in the given case, the husband Rimines may both, validly and licitly, use the jurisdiction that God has confided to his keeping, and annul

‘the vow of Ximina even though it was taken before her marriage. She voluntarily submits herself to this power when she gives herself to him in the bonds of matrimony. On her part she, too, may nullify the vows of her husband indirectly, when they cause him to neglect the duties he assumed by becoming a husband and when the vow thus interferes with the rights she assumed by becoming his wife. Ximina is bound to obey her husband, who now releases her from the binding force of her vow.