Case XXXV: Marriage by Compulsion

Illicit relations with Caius, a gentleman of high standing, have not remained without consequences for Amelia. For the sake of his own reputation Caius urges Amelia to marry Brutus, for whom she does not care; eventually, however, she does marry Brutus. Is this marriage valid? What grounds are there for and against its validity?

In this case the question arises whether the impediment of compulsion invalidates this marriage. To answer this is not an easy matter, owing to the lack of an exact account of the circumstances. First of all we must presume that Amelia gave actual consent. Should her aversion for Brutus have moved her to give only pretended consent at the marriage, no doubt could exist that the marriage is invalid. We presume then that she gave her consent; it was, however, induced by fear. Now Impedimentum Metus invalidates the marriage if the fear is great, unjust, and caused for the purpose of entering the marriage. By unjust it is understood that it must have been occasioned by another person. For the fear that arises only from one’s inner self, ab intrinseco, does not make a contract invalid, so long as there exists sufficient deliberation. Ab intrinseco is the fear that proceeds from the matter itself, and not from the person who threatens. D’Annibale, I, n. 138, well expresses it thus: “It is called intrinsic when the thing itself causes fear; extrinsic when another inflicts fear in order to extort consent.” Hence not only is the fear of an illness, the symptoms of which we observe in ourselves, ab intrinseco, but also the fear of infection, the fear of a thunderstorm, of a storm at sea, of hell-fire, etc. Fear such as this may move us to do things which we do not like to do, nevertheless it leaves our power of determination quite intact, we do something, and will to do it, although with an effort. If, however, the fear is due to the threat of another person, then a certain exterior compulsion is present, which, though it leaves us freedom of will and deliberation, induces an action which is not so much dictated by our will as by the pressure upon us. Hence Alexander II says, in De Sponsalibus: “Since consent has no place where fear or compulsion intervenes, it is necessary that, wherever someone’s consent is required, the occasion for compulsion be repelled.” When, however, there is metus ab intrinseco, then he decides for the validity of the act, for instance, De Regularibus, c. 17.

Hence it is evident that the impedimentum metus imposed by the Church applies only to the fear of a threat if it is unjust, 1. If no just claim exists for the marriage, and 2. If the evil threatened can not justly be inflicted. Therefore if a bride forces her tardy betrothed, by threats of legal action, to marry her, she is justified in so doing; also if a judge gives the seducer of a young girl the choice to marry her, or to go to prison, the resulting fear is just, and does not, therefore, render the induced consent invalid.

Let us now solve our present casus. A marriage between Amelia and Caius apparently is out of the question, either because of inequality of station or because Caius is already a married man. (there is no mention of social injury resulting for Amelia from her relations with Caius). Therefore a love for Caius is not the reason for her aversion to Brutus. Caius urges or, as is understood here, compels, Amelia to a hasty marriage with Brutus, but by what means? If he only points out to her the disgrace that will befall him and her, and if Amelia is thus induced to marriage, there would be no impedimentum metus—such fear would be ab intrinseco. Should he, however, threaten to do her harm, or to disgrace her, then there would be the impediment of fear; the fear being great, unjust, and compelling to marriage.

We may suppose the case to be practically as follows:

Caius has a large household in which Amelia is servant, and likewise Brutus. Brutus, though knowing of her condition, is willing to marry Amelia, out of regard for his master and for his own benefit, but Amelia does not want him. The master threatens dismissal and withdrawal of support. Amelia sees a hard future before her, and in order to escape this hardship, she gives her consent. Under these circumstances the impediment of fear would be present.

There is a considerable misfortune threatened unjustly, because Caius should justly provide for the expected infant, and the purpose of the threat is to induce marriage. Should the master, however, be willing to do in any case his duty in regard to Amelia, and only threaten to discontinue his special generosity, then there would be no injustice (in the particular threat) and therefore no impediment.

The confessor should, therefore, closely question Amelia without saying anything about an invalidity of the marriage. Should he find that the impedimentum is undoubtedly present, he should meanwhile not disturb the bona fides, but examine into the whole situation as to whether an agreement between Amelia and Brutus can not be induced. If Amelia can be moved to consent actually, Brutus being still agreeable, nothing further is required, because the causa metus is then certainly removed. But if Amelia of her own will insist upon a separation, the confessor must refer her to the bishop, because then the whole case belongs to the forum externum,

In this solution Brutus’ previous knowledge of Amelia’s condition is presupposed; otherwise we should have to discuss the wrong that Caius and Amelia inflicted upon him.

W. Stentrup, S.J.