Chapter VI — On the insufficiency of fear-born, or servile, attrition for the valid receiving of the sacrament of Penance

We approach the discussing of a question of the highest moment; and therefore, that we may clearly, plainly, and in full light establish the truth, we shall divide this chapter into the following six sections.

I. Fear-born or servile attrition is that which is conceived from fear of hell and from the baseness of sin. Under this fear of hell there is comprehended also the loss of beatitude. Others add the necessity of a love of hope, or of concupiscence, by which God is loved as good to us, or as our beatitude. That this attrition, destitute of any love of charity even inchoate, suffices for the sacrament of Penance, very many defend; but other grave theologians deny it, and I with them. For the deciding of the controversy, first of all the prejudices of our adversaries are to be torn up.

It is evidently false that Trent defined that servile attrition suffices for the sacrament of Penance; nay, it openly repugns such an opinion.

I. In two sessions, namely the sixth and the fourteenth, discourse is had in the Council concerning the dispositions for Baptism and Penance. In the former the necessity of an inchoate love of charity is asserted, as I shall show below. In the latter it in no way favours our adversaries.

II. Cardinal Pallavicino in his History of the Council of Trent, Book 12, chapter 10, narrates that into the decree first framed the word suffice had been inserted; and that, the bishops contradicting, the word dispose was substituted. This fact is beyond controversy. Therefore Trent not only did not declare that fear-born attrition suffices, but abrogated this opinion, and substituted the contrary, which teaches that servile attrition indeed disposes, but does not suffice.

III. Innumerable are the sophisms by which the attritionists attempt to entangle and to bark at this decree. Hither almost all come back. Disposes, they say, sounds the same as suffices, because servile attrition disposes even outside the sacrament. Therefore Trent speaks of a proximate disposition, which is worth the same as it suffices.

IV. Therefore the reformation of the decree is illusory. Therefore when Trent deleted the word suffices and substituted the word disposes, it cast a mist over Catholics and deluded them, if both words signify the same. Outside the sacrament servile attrition disposes remotely; in the sacrament less remotely, or more nearly. Therefore proximately? Therefore it suffices? These are trifles.

Many falsely reckon that charity in any degree whatsoever, even remiss, justifies the wicked outside the sacrament.

I. That I may utterly overthrow this prejudice, I bring forward into the midst the doctrine common among all scholastic theologians, as the most celebrated Salmanticenses Scholastici testify, Vol. II, tract 14, disputation 7, doubt 1, § 1, no. 5. It is moreover of this kind. All acts, both natural and supernatural, attaining altogether the same formal object, or under the same formal motive — whether of faith, or of hope, or of charity, or of temperance, or of justice, or of chastity, and so forth — some are perfect, others imperfect; some produce the ultimate effect, others dispose but do not produce the ultimate effect. Therefore by the common sense of the theologians our cause is finished. Therefore imperfect charity, and in a remiss degree, does not expel the stain of sin, since this expulsion is the ultimate effect of the work of justification, consisting of several acts.

II. This doctrine the Catechism of the Council of Trent confirms, part 2, chapter 5, where at §§ 56 and 79 it examines this matter, and has not a word concerning servile attrition. But it writes these things: First therefore it is to be said that the institution of Confession is exceedingly useful to us, nay necessary. Why? Attentively weigh it. For that we may grant that sins are blotted out by contrition, who is ignorant that it must be so VEHEMENT, SHARP, AND BURNING that the bitterness of grief can be equalled and compared with the magnitude of the crimes? But since VERY FEW would arrive at this degree, it came about also that by VERY FEW indeed was pardon of sins to be hoped for in this way. Wherefore it was necessary that the most clement Lord should consult by an easier reason for the common salvation of men: which indeed he effected by an admirable counsel, when he delivered the keys of the kingdom of heaven to the Church. § 57: Confession perfects contrition. For from Catholic doctrine it is to be believed and constantly affirmed by all, that if a man be so affected in mind that he detest the sins committed, and at the same time constitute a purpose of not sinning, even though he be not affected with such a grief as could be enough for obtaining pardon, yet nevertheless, when he shall have rightly confessed his sins to a priest, all his crimes are remitted and pardoned by the power of the keys.

III. These things are so clear that they seem to me utterly to stop the mouths of the attritionists. The Catechism explains contrition, which is the principal part of the matter of the sacrament. It teaches that this contrition is an act of charity, § 27. It distinguishes the degrees of that contrition, and declares that very few arrive at this degree of fervour necessary for justification outside the sacrament. Wherefore, it subjoins, it was necessary, and so forth. What does this sacrament perform? It perfects contrition. How? Because if a sinner be not affected with such a grief as could be enough for obtaining pardon, yet nevertheless, when he shall have rightly confessed his sins to a priest, all his crimes are remitted and pardoned by the power of the keys.

IV. Very many testimonies of the Fathers, especially of St. Augustine, being passed over, let one come forth into the midst — St. Thomas, who in Book 2, distinction 1, question 4, reply 1, writes these things: “It must be said that an act of charity can be called such in two ways: either that which is from charity, and this is not save in one having charity; or that which is toward charity, not as meritorious or generative, but as PREPARATIVE; and thus an act of charity can be had BEFORE THE HABIT OF CHARITY, just as to do a just act can be said to be before the habit of justice; because in the friendship of charity the soul is moved to love God by that likeness of grace; but in natural love from that good of nature which is also a likeness of the highest goodness. And therefore it is to be held that when it is said that one who has charity loves God FOR HIS OWN SAKE, the "for" denotes a relation of end and of efficient cause, because God himself superadds to nature that whence it tends into love of him. But when it is said of one LACKING CHARITY, that he loves God for his own sake, the "for" denotes a relation of end, not of efficient cause.”

V. This same doctrine he explains in the same place, distinction 28, question 1, article 4, reply 2, in these words: “It must be said that, as the acts of other virtues can be considered in two ways, either according as they are from virtue, or according as they precede virtue, so also is it of charity: for a man NOT HAVING charity can also love his neighbour and God, and even above all things, as some say. And this is to be understood of the love which falls directly under precept, AN ACT OF CHARITY, and not only according as it proceeds from (habitual) charity.”

VI. Again, 2-2, question 19, article 8, he teaches thus: “The perfect and the imperfect do not diversify the substance of a thing; but initial and filial fear differ according to the perfection and imperfection of charity, as is plain through Augustine.” Then in the body of the article he resolves these things: “Thus initial fear is not taken according as it is distinguished from servile and filial fear; but it is taken according as it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom is begun a certain fear through the inchoation of charity. Yet filial fear is not in them PERFECTLY, because they have not yet arrived at the perfection of charity. And therefore initial fear is related to filial fear in this manner, as imperfect charity to perfect. But perfect and imperfect charity do not differ according to ESSENCE, but only according to STATE.”

VII. More clearly does he confirm this doctrine, 1-2, question 113, article 10, in this fashion: “This is the common and accustomed course of justification, that, God moving the soul inwardly, a man be converted to God, first indeed by an imperfect conversion, that afterwards he may come to a perfect one; because inchoate charity merits TO BE INCREASED, that, being increased, it may merit to be perfected, as Augustine says (tract 5 on the epistle of John). Sometimes indeed God so vehemently moves the soul that it at once attains a certain perfection of justice, as was in the conversion of Paul, with miraculous things applied outwardly; and therefore the conversion of Paul is celebrated as miraculous in the Church.”

VIII. At last, 3, question 86, article 3, he declares this same doctrine, saying: “Mortal sin cannot be remitted without true penance, to which it pertains to forsake sin inasmuch as it is against God, which indeed is common to all mortal sins; but where the reason is the same, the effect is the same. Whence a man cannot be truly penitent of one sin who is not contrite of another. For if the sin displeased him because it is AGAINST GOD LOVED ABOVE ALL THINGS (which IS REQUIRED FOR THE CHARACTER OF TRUE PENANCE), it would follow that he would repent of all. Whence it follows that it is impossible for one sin to be remitted without another.” For the character of penance therefore there is necessarily required a displeasure at sin, because it is against God loved above all things. And the Angelic speaks of penance with the sacrament as necessary, as is established from the preceding article, to which he here refers himself.

IX. These things are so well known and decisive that we must confess that those Thomists who teach the opposite have not touched the fount of the Angelic doctrine, but have derived their waters from corrupted streams. What they object out of Book 4, distinction 17, or in the Supplement, question 5, article 3, where he says that however small the grief be, provided it suffice for the character of contrition, it blots out the whole fault, arises from the ignorance of the one objecting. For there the Angelic speaks, as is established from the prefatory argument, of contrition informed by sanctifying grace, which, even if remiss, blots out every fault. Vain therefore is the figment that every actual charity in a remiss degree blots out sins.

By which the attritionists brand with the note of Rigorism evangelical charity, and clothe fear-born attrition with the garb of kindliness

I. In the old Testament, say the attritionists, contrition alone blotted out sins. In the new law the sacrament of Confession was instituted. If contrition conceived from inchoate charity were necessary in this law, Christ would not have lightened but aggravated the yoke, which cannot be, since he himself testifies: My yoke is sweet.

II. This paradox of our adversaries fights point-blank with the Gospel. Paul cries out, Romans 8: For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in FEAR; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba, Father. St. Augustine cries out, tract 17 on John: It is true which he himself says: My yoke is sweet. For whatever is hard in the precepts, charity makes light. And again on the epistle to the Romans the same Augustine teaches: Most evidently are the times of the two Testaments distinguished: for the former pertains to fear, and the new to charity. St. Thomas on Matthew 4 says: The old law was a law of fear, but the new of love. This is the doctrine of all the Fathers. The yoke of Confession is hard, but sweet if it be done in all things through charity. Our adversaries take away charity from this yoke. Therefore the yoke remains hard and most hard. They reckon that the yoke is made sweet if the wing of charity, as Augustine says, be cut off from it. But they are deceived in a marvellous manner, as all the Fathers teach. They contend that the yoke is made sweet if it be accommodated to flesh and blood, and if the precepts be diminished; but in this they gravely err: and they err more gravely while they burn our opinion with the note of Rigorism, of Jansenism, and of Baianism. The Jansenists defend the first precept of charity, the necessity of contrition, the necessity of inchoate charity for the sacrament. The Jansenists defend the mysteries of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the Eucharist, and so forth. Are all these therefore to be denied? The errors of the Jansenists and of the Protestants are strenuously to be refuted. But that victory may be obtained, evangelical Morals must be purged of the figments of lax opinions, whence the heretics receive scandal. Otherwise all outcry against the Jansenists and Baianists will be empty.

I. Fear is threefold. First, natural, by which a man, nature leading, dreads temporal evils. Second, worldly, by which a man abstains from evil only out of respect of men. Third, divine, which looks to God. This divine fear is twofold: one servile, by which a man abstains from evil not out of love of justice but out of fear of hell; the other chaste, by which a man reverences God as supreme Lord, and restrains himself from sin lest he displease him. This last is twofold: initial, which is fear of fault conjoined with dread of punishment; and filial, by which a man is converted to God, not from dread of punishment, but from love of justice and of charity, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 19, art. 2.

II. Natural fear receives malice or goodness from the good or depraved affection of the will. Worldly fear is by its own nature evil.

III. In servile fear two things are to be distinguished: the fear itself, and its servility. The fear of punishment is good. The servility is evil, since it is an affection of sin lying hidden in the soul, by which, unless punishment threatened, sin would be chosen. Hence a twofold servile fear is wont to be distinguished by theologians: one which is called absolutely servile; the other which is named servilely servile. The former is good, the latter evil.

IV. It is of faith that attrition conceived from fear of hell and of punishments is good and useful for justification, as Trent defined, session 6, canon 8. At last, attrition conceived from fear of hell, faith going before, is supernatural, since it disposes to justification.

I. Fear sufficient for the sacrament of Penance ought utterly to exclude every will of sinning, as all confess: servile fear does not utterly exclude this will: therefore it is insufficient. The second proposition is demonstrated. The will of sinning, or sin, cannot be excluded save through its opposite. Between fear of punishments and sin absolutely regarded, as it is an offence of God, there is no direct opposition. For fear directly regards the punishments to be inflicted by a judge. Fear restrains the contumacy of the soul spurning torments, and to this contumacy it is directly opposed. Therefore it cannot exclude sin absolutely and of itself, as it is an offence of God, since under this consideration it does not regard sin. Nor is this a vice of fear, because this does not pertain to the office of fear.

II. That you may perceive these things more clearly, you must know that of every virtue and gift the force and sphere is limited. Faith excludes infidelity, hope despair. But neither does faith overthrow intemperance, nor hope injustice or incontinence. Do therefore faith, or hope, or the other virtues on that account contain any vice? God forbid. Since every virtue is limited, and expels only its own opposite vice. Similarly fear is good and useful, because it dreads the punishments appointed by a judge, and restrains the contumacy of the wicked man, to which it is opposed; and by restraining the contumacy of the wicked man it also in some manner excludes sin, inasmuch as it prepares punishments for the wicked. This is the whole and full office of fear. But to exclude every will of sinning exceeds the sphere of fear, because fear does not regard sin, as I have said, absolutely, as it is an offence of God.

III. This doctrine all the Fathers confirm. St. Augustine, sermon 13 On the Words of the Apostle, chapter 6, has these things: He who from fear of punishment does not covet, I think, does covet. By the mighty terror of arms and of weapons, of a multitude perchance surrounding or coming against him, even a lion is called back from his prey; yet the lion came, the lion returns: he did not snatch the prey, but he did not lay aside his malice. If thou art just, it is still justice: because thou consultest thy own justice lest thou be tormented. What great thing is it to fear punishment? For who does not fear it? What thief, what wicked man, what nefarious man? But this is the difference between thy fear and the thief's fear, that the thief fears the laws of men; but thou fearest his laws, thou fearest his punishment whom thou canst not deceive. For if thou couldst deceive, what wouldst thou not have done? Therefore fear does not take away thy evil concupiscence, but fear presses it down. The wolf comes to the sheepfold; by the barking of the dogs, by the shouting of the shepherds, the wolf is turned back from the sheepfold: yet is he always a wolf! Have you heard? The lion came, the lion returns: he did not snatch the prey, but he did not lay aside his malice. He is always a wolf greedy of prey, always a thief. But like to a lion, a wolf, a thief, is the will, on Augustine's testimony, of one not sinning from dread of punishment.

IV. Like things he writes on Psalm 118, sermon 11: He who from fear of punishment, not from love of justice, does the work of the law, assuredly does it unwillingly. But what a man does unwillingly, he would rather, if it could be done, not be commanded: and by this he is not a friend of the law which he would wish not to exist, but rather an enemy; nor is he cleansed by the work, who is unclean in thought and in will.

V. St. Thomas, who is called an abridged Augustine, plainly maintains this doctrine in several places. He lays down these things, 1-2, question 6, article 6: Those things which are done from fear are mixed of the voluntary and the involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in the particular case, namely for the avoiding of the evil which is feared.

VI. Likewise in the same place, article 5, reply 1, he subjoins: It must be said that in him who does something through fear there remains a repugnance of the will to that which is done, according as it is considered in itself. And therefore that which is done through fear is in a certain manner involuntary. … The timid man acts against that which even now in itself he wills.

VII. Again in the same place, question 107, article 1, reply 2, he teaches these things: The old law is said to restrain the hand, not the soul: because he who from fear of punishment abstains from some sin, does not simply withdraw his will from sin, as does he withdraw his will who from love of justice abstains from sin; and on this account the NEW LAW, WHICH IS THE LAW OF LOVE, is said to restrain the soul.

VIII. At last, 1-2, question 19, article 9, he has these things: Servile fear is not to be numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, although it be from the Holy Ghost: because, as Augustine says in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 57, it can have annexed a will of sinning. But the gifts of the Holy Ghost cannot be with a will of sinning, because they are not without charity.

I. They object first: Trent, session 14, chapter 4, condemns those who assert that attrition is forced, not free, not voluntary. ANSWER. Trent in that place condemned Luther, because he blurted out that contrition which takes its beginning from fear of hell is vicious, and makes a man more a sinner; and it defined that fear of hell is good, honourable, a beginning of penance, and disposes to charity. Wherefore that grief is free, voluntary, honourable, supernatural, and exceedingly useful for penance.

II. They object secondly: Either attrition from fear of punishments alone is sufficient, or it is evil. For therefore it does not suffice, because it does not utterly exclude the will of sinning. But what does not exclude the will of sinning is evil. ANSWER. The antecedent is false, as also is that which is subjoined. It is one thing to lack perfection, another to be infected with vice. The first beginnings of things, both natural and supernatural, are imperfect. Are they therefore vicious? Faith does not exclude sin: is it therefore evil? Servile attrition begins to assail sin by the dread of punishment: therefore it is good, honourable, useful, because it disposes to justification. But it cannot fulfil the whole which is necessary, because that is outside its sphere, as I have said above.

III. They object thirdly: Trent, session 14, chapter 4, says: But that imperfect contrition which is called attrition … if it exclude the will of sinning with hope of pardon, it declares that it not only does not make a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but that it is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Ghost, not indeed yet indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, being helped, prepares a way for himself to justice. But if no attrition excluded the will of sinning, that conditional particle would be superfluous. ANSWER. Trent by this decree condemns the errors of the innovators, and defines against them the honesty and utility of servile attrition. Servile attrition can be evil, namely if it be conceived from a servilely servile fear. Therefore the Council added the said particle, if it exclude the will of sinning, in that manner which belongs to it, namely inasmuch as it disposes to justification, not inasmuch as it suffices, because this sufficiency is outside its sphere. If you desire more, consult Vol. IX, Book 1, dissertation 2, chapter 7, § 5.