Chapter I — On Conscience, and its division

I. Question I. What is conscience? Answer. It is the dictate of our reason, concluding from the general principles of synderesis what, here and now, all circumstances considered, is to be embraced as good, and to be shunned as evil. It is called a dictate, or judgment, of the practical intellect, not of the speculative: because it does not halt in contemplation, but directs to the execution of the work. It differs from synderesis in this, that synderesis consists in those first dictates implanted, as it were, by nature, by which we judge: good is to be done, evil to be shunned; what thou wouldst not have done to thyself, do not to another; and other like principles of this kind. Wherefore conscience is not a habit, nor a power, but an act — not of the will, as Durandus contends, but of the practical intellect, as has been said.

II. Question II. Of how many kinds is conscience? Answer. One is antecedent, which directs the operation; the other consequent, which rejoices over a good work, and is distressed over an evil one. Again, one commands, another counsels: the former prescribes the operation by way of precept, the latter by way of counsel. Furthermore, on the part of the object it is divided into true — that is, right and good — and into false — that is, evil and not right. On the part of the assent it is distributed into certain, probable, doubting, scrupulous, and erroneous.

III. Question III. Does he sin who does not follow a right conscience? Answer. Conscience is called right by relation to a right rule. The rule of operation is twofold: one remote, which is the eternal law; the other proximate, which is the reason of the practical intellect. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 5 — to whom the theologians commonly subscribe — teaches that he sins who resists a conscience proposing something as commanded under precept. This is perspicuously established from holy Scripture: All that is not of faith (that is, of conscience) is sin: Romans 14. If conscience proposes anything as prohibited under mortal sin, he sins mortally who resists it; the sin will be venial, if what conscience proposes as venial is venial. It is disputed whether he sins mortally who resists a conscience proposing something as sin without determining the gravity of the sin. Dismissing petty distinctions, I say that he sins gravely who acts against such a conscience. The reason is evident. He who with deliberate mind exposes himself to a manifest danger of sinning mortally, sins mortally, as Scripture itself testifies: He that loveth danger shall perish in it. To this danger he exposes himself who acts against the aforesaid conscience; since in that malice proposed absolutely there is contained equally a grave malice and a light one. Therefore, unless the gravity or lightness of the malice be first ascertained with due diligence, there is a grave danger of offending mortally.

IV. Question IV. Is a man bound to follow his own conscience, whether right or erring? Answer. All affirm it. For the same reason which proves the duty of following a right conscience proves also that no one can act against an erring conscience. For an erring conscience, just as much as a right conscience, proposes what is to be done as commanded by the divine Law. Both prescribe that the divine Law must be obeyed. On this matter read St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 5, ad 2. In an erroneous conscience a twofold judgment must be distinguished: one by which it is judged that something is prohibited by God which is not prohibited; the other by which it is judged that the divine Law must be obeyed. The first is false; the second is true.

V. Question V. Does he sin who does not act according to a vincibly erroneous conscience? Answer. Conscience can be erroneous in two ways. 1. Invincibly, when the error, all diligence having been applied, cannot be overcome; and in this case the conscience is without fault. 2. Vincibly, when the error, diligence being applied, can be overcome. Both these consciences oblige, with this difference: that the vincible conscience can and ought to be laid aside, whereas the invincible cannot be laid aside. Now these two things — namely, the duty of laying aside a vincibly erroneous conscience, and the obligation of following it — are by no means repugnant to one another, because they flow from diverse principles. The first arises from the principle of applying the diligence necessary for finding the truth and expelling the error; the second — namely, the duty of following the erroneous conscience — arises from the dictate of that very conscience, whereby the obligation of obeying the divine Law is proposed. Read St. Thomas, question 17 On Truth, article 4.

VI. Question VI. How should he conduct himself who, from an erroneous conscience, judges both extremes of a contradiction to be sin? Answer. If the erroneous conscience be vincible, it must be laid aside. Unless you lay it aside, you sin, whether you follow it or contradict it, as St. Thomas teaches, question 17 On Truth, article 4, ad 8: Just as in syllogistic matters, one absurdity being granted, others necessarily follow; so in moral matters, one absurdity being posited, others follow of necessity. Thus, supposing that a man seeks vainglory, whether for the sake of vainglory he does what he is bound to do, or omits it, he will always sin; and yet he is not perplexed, because he can dismiss his evil intention. And similarly, supposing an error of reason or of conscience which proceeds from an ignorance that does not excuse, it is necessary that evil in the will should follow; and yet the man is not perplexed, because he can withdraw from the error, since the ignorance is vincible and voluntary.

VII. What if the erroneous conscience be invincible, and judge both parts of a contradiction to be sin? This hypothesis I count scarcely probable. But granting it, no sin is committed, because there is no sin without liberty; invincible ignorance takes away liberty; therefore, the supposition being made that the conscience is invincibly erroneous, it cannot be said that the man sins, whichever part he follows. The Adversaries object that even in this hypothesis the man is free to omit or to perform his act. He is free with physical liberty, but not with moral liberty. But for sin, since it is in the genus of morals, moral liberty is necessary — which all Catholics, against Jansenius, confess to be taken away by invincible ignorance. A pastor assisting his flock on a feast day invincibly reckons that he sins if he omits Mass, and that he likewise sins if he abandons his flock to the incursions of wolves. This man is not morally free; therefore, whichever extreme he chooses, he will not sin. Though he is physically free to choose either of these two extremes, he is nevertheless not morally free: because he is not free to avoid acting against conscience, since in each extreme he apprehends sin.

VIII. Authors are wont to dispute whether it is graver to act against a vincibly erroneous conscience, or to follow it. But no certain rule can be assigned. Sometimes it is graver to follow it; sometimes it is less grave to act against it. Absolutely speaking, however, it is graver to act against it: since he who acts against it sins knowingly; he who follows it sins from ignorance; and ignorance, even though vincible, diminishes the malice of the sin. He who, shut up in prison, has the erroneous conscience that he sins mortally unless he hear Mass, according to the common opinion does not sin, for want of liberty: since that erroneous dictate is not the cause of the omission.

IX. Question VII. How is an erroneous conscience to be laid aside, and what diligence is to be applied? Answer. If the erroneous conscience has been formed rashly and imprudently, then it can be laid aside at will; and it suffices to advert to the falsity of the erroneous judgment, and to lay it aside by forming a contrary judgment upon the honesty of the operation. If, on the contrary, the conscience has been formed from a probable reason, then a contrary and more probable reason is necessary, to conquer the prior false persuasion. Ordinary diligence — not extraordinary — is necessary for laying aside a vincibly erring conscience. The former uses the accustomed means, namely study, counsel, prayers, pious works, by which the necessary light is implored of God. The latter applies extraordinary means: for instance, after taking the counsel of the Doctors of his own city, a man proceeds to other provinces to consult more learned men. The diligence to be applied must be gathered from the magnitude and diversity of the affairs. In unusual affairs, and those of extreme and highest moment, an unusual, exact, and utmost diligence must likewise be applied; on the contrary, in ordinary affairs there suffices the ordinary diligence which prudent and diligent upright men are wont to use. The extremes to be avoided are negligence and extraordinary diligence — for this latter fills the soul with scruples, anxiety, and disturbance. The omission of that ordinary and exact diligence which upright and vigilant men are wont to apply is, in affairs of grave moment, a grave sin.

X. Question VIII. From what indications can it be gathered that an erring conscience is vincible, or invincible? Answer. You can prudently presume the ignorance to be invincible: 1. If the thing ignored be of human, or of positive, law. 2. If the matter be most difficult even among the Learned themselves. 3. If no scruple, doubt, or any confused notion whatever has preceded. 4. If the man, on perceiving that he was deceived and violated the Law from ignorance, grieves and is saddened. 5. If the man be upright, and of an entire and well-ordered conscience. 6. If he has not been prejudiced by a false system and a depraved manner of opining. From these and similar circumstances and signs the Confessor can gather that the ignorance or inadvertence was invincible. The contrary holds if the matter be of the natural law; if some doubt has preceded; if the man be accustomed to offend, and be of a conscience entangled in crimes; if he be facile in adopting opinions which favor liberty and the appetites. For the rest, this ascertainment is difficult: therefore God must be prayed to with the Prophet David: Remember not my ignorances.