Chapter III — By an evident and ineluctable argument it is proved that the doctrine of the licit use of the less probable opinion in view of the more probable is false and antievangelical

I. It is an article of faith that the Gospel of Christ contains the sole and pure truth, with the exclusion of any falsity whatsoever; and that this Gospel is the certain and safe rule which God has assigned to us for the directing of our conscience.

This first proposition is an article of faith, and is placed beyond the hazard of any disputation or cavil whatsoever.

II. The Probabilists teach the licit use of both of two contradictory propositions, of which, if one is true, the other must of necessity be false. For both cannot be true, as all confess.

This second proposition is the very state of the question. It is a most luminous truth of fact, which can be called into controversy by no one, unless the state of the question be destroyed.

III. Therefore the doctrine of Probabilism is antievangelical, since it teaches the licit use of the falsity which is contained in one or the other of the opinions, and which wars as an enemy against the Gospel. This consequence is legitimate, and flows necessarily from the two first propositions.

IV. Assuredly the evangelical law is the extrinsic and remote rule of moral operations; and the intimate and proximate rule is the reason of the mind, by which the evangelical law itself is proposed. But since that law is a law of truth, as is of faith, those who lay down that the rule of conscience is a falsity, and a falsity known as such, teach an antievangelical error. Who will deny this? This the Probabilists teach by the force of their system; which I prove by explaining the second proposition.

V. I confess that it is not certainly established for us which of the two opinions is true. For it can happen, though very rarely, that the opinion which seems to us more probable is false, and the less probable true. What follows from this? This surely: that if, after mature diligence, the Antiprobabilist errs in choosing falsity in the place of truth, the error is worthy of excuse. For the Antiprobabilist venerates and champions truth as the certain and evangelical rule — that truth alone is the norm of our conscience. And he does not contradict this principle if, through his own weakness, he is deceived in selecting the opinion which he certainly judges nearer to the truth.

VI. The Probabilist, on the contrary, knowingly and willingly lays down, in the place of a system and principle, that the use of contradictory opinions is licit — of which, if one is true, the other must be false. The Probabilist knows certainly and evidently, as all know, that one or the other of the contradictories is false. Therefore, when the Probabilist lays down as a principle the licit use of contradictory opinions, he errs dogmatically; because he establishes as the rule of conscience a known falsity — one, that is, which he certainly knows to be contained in one or the other of the contradictory opinions. For although he does not know which of the two is true, he nevertheless evidently knows that in one or the other falsity is contained. Therefore, in the place of a system, by establishing the licit use of both contradictory opinions, he systematically teaches the licit use of falsity, even of known falsity. But nothing wars more hostilely against evangelical truth than falsity. The Probabilist therefore errs in two ways. First, dogmatically, as has been shown, because he lays down as his system the licit use of a known falsity contained in one or the other of contradictory propositions; secondly, morally, against prudence and against the duty of finding the truth, when he selects the less probable opinion — that is, the one less near to truth and more neighboring to falsity — in view of the more verisimilar, as the rule of his conscience. But of this second point below. For now the discourse is of the error alone, which can be called dogmatic.

VII. The Probabilists can twist their wits and stuff in patchworks of distinctions; but they will never give a simple and perspicuous answer to the aforesaid demonstration. The first proposition is an article of faith, repeated a thousand times in the Scriptures. Thy law is truth. The law of truth was in his mouth. Psalm 118: All thy commandments are truth. Thou hast commanded justice thy testimonies, and thy truth exceedingly. Zacharias adds, chapter 8: Love ye only truth and peace. God delivered the truth to his people to be guarded. A just nation, keeping the truth, says Isaias, chapter 26. The people of God manifests this truth; Isaias repeats it in chapter 38: He shall make thy truth known. And along this path of truth the sons of God walk. 3 Kings 3: Walking in truth. This David chose, Psalm 118: I have chosen the way of truth — by no means the way of probability. By this truth we become holy: Sanctified in truth. These men are prepared to champion the truth, says Paul, 2 Corinthians 13: For we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth. This is the rule of sanctity: In the sanctity of truth, adds the same Paul to the Ephesians, chapter 4. Christ came into the world that he might teach us this truth, Paul continues, 1 Timothy 2: Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. His elect he calls sons of truth, James chapter 1: He hath begotten us by the word of truth. For God is truth. It is truth which frees us from sin, as is added in John chapter 8: You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.

VIII. The privation of truth is the mark of the reprobate, as is found in the first book of Machabees: There is no truth in them. These are they, says Paul, 1 Timothy 6, who are destitute of the truth; and he adds, 2 Thessalonians chapter 2: They believed not the truth; nay, they will turn away their hearing from the truth: 2 Timothy 4, turning themselves away from the truth; Titus 1; they resist the truth: 2 Timothy 2. They are destitute of the love of this truth: They received not the love of the truth: 2 Thessalonians 2. They do not acquiesce in the truth: Romans chapter 2. They speak not the truth: Jeremias chapter 9. Who detain the truth in injustice [Romans 1]; and by the depravity of their opinions they transform it into a lie: They changed the truth of God into a lie: Romans chapter 1. Forgetfulness of the truth has filled the earth, says Isaias: Truth hath been made into forgetfulness. So it is, cries Osee, chapter 4: There is no truth upon the earth. This truth men attempt to obscure and to whittle down: Truths are decayed from among the children of men: Psalm 11.

II [IX]. And what greater diminution of the truth can there be, than if that be rejected which more approaches the truth, and that be chosen which stands farther from the truth — that is, which is judged less true — while God commands the contrary? Thou hast commanded thy commandments to be kept most diligently: Psalm 118. Finally God, in Ecclesiasticus 37, gives this precept: Before all thy works let the true word go before thee, and before every action a steady counsel — no less true, and no less steady.

IX. Hence, then, the argument is constructed. It is an article of faith that the evangelical law, which Christ Jesus gave us as the certain, safe, and indefectible rule of our conscience, contains pure and sole truth, and rejects and detests all falsity. This, as I have said, is a truth of faith. The Probabilists defend, and that most pugnaciously, the licit use of contradictory opinions, in one or the other of which they know certainly and evidently that an antievangelical falsity is contained. Therefore the Probabilists certainly and evidently teach that a known falsity, by the force of their system, is the rule of a right conscience. Therefore the Probabilists champion an antievangelical doctrine.

X. The second proposition is most evident, since it is the very argument subjected to the disputation. Do the Probabilists deny the licit use of the more probable opinion? Do they deny the licit use of the contrary less probable opinion, concerning the very same action, and in respect of the same person? Would that they denied it — for then they would repudiate Probabilism, and devote it to the Furies. Not only do they by no means deny it; rather they most expressly affirm it; and in the name of them all, Fr. Antonio Casnedi thus addresses Christ, in tome 2, in the very dedication of his work: Since thou art the Master of truth, thou condescendest so far to human ignorance, that in thy tribunal of truth inculpable error equals truth itself. For thou dost not accuse it, but excusest it; thou dost not punish it, but rewardest it — holding thy very law for no law, and thy no-law for law, if the law be invincibly unknown as no law, and the no-law as law.

XI. This doctrine, as we have seen above in chapter 3, all the Probabilists commonly admit and defend. Therefore the second proposition of our demonstration is most evident: namely, that the Probabilists teach that the use of falsity, clothed in the cloak of Probabilism, is licit; and that this falsity, and error itself covered with the cloud of ignorance, enters the gate of Paradise, and is crowned by the Father of truth with the eternal reward of glory. But this doctrine, to my weakness, and saving better judgment, appears evidently false, antievangelical, and full of scandal.

XII. It is my pleasure to confirm what I have said by a sensible example. There are two cups of wine, in one of which poison lies hidden; but I do not know in which one determinately it resides. If I were to hand both cups to two men to drink, I should surely be guilty of homicide: since I know for certain that in one or the other a mortal poison is contained. There are two contradictory opinions, in one of which is contained the transgression of the divine Law, and therefore the guilt of eternal damnation. You do not know, indeed, which is determinately true; but you know most certainly that in one or the other falsity is contained. You propose that both be followed — the one by Peter, the other by Paul. This proposition contains the state of the question which all the Probabilists defend. Let us hear one above all, Fr. Paul Laymann, the most moderate of all the Probabilists, who in book I, treatise I, chapter 5, writes as follows: I judge that it will be nothing alien to reason, if a Doctor who is consulted signify to the one consulting him that an opinion is defended as probable by certain learned men, and that he may accordingly follow it — although the same Doctor certainly persuades himself that such an opinion is speculatively false, so that he himself cannot follow it in practice. For since the one consulting, in a doubtful matter, has the right of conforming himself to an opinion which is defended by certain learned men, notwithstanding that some others contradict it and judge the opinion speculatively improbable, the Doctor is not forbidden to indicate this very right to the one consulting him; and hence it comes about that a learned man can give opposite counsels to diverse persons according to opposite opinions, discretion and prudence however being preserved. Here you have, in few words, the whole secret of Probabilism laid open. You judge a proposition which treats of mortal sin to be certainly false speculatively, that is, absolutely, in itself. If you certainly judge it false, you also certainly judge it to be antievangelical, and therefore proscribed by God; since all falsity is disapproved by God. It is not lawful for you to follow it, says Fr. Laymann; yet it is lawful for you to urge it upon others. What? You can urge upon others what is not lawful for you? Where then is the oracle of Christ: What thou wilt not have done to thyself, do not to another? Where is the love of the truth, which you are commanded to follow, and to teach to others?

XIII. I come now to the last proposition set forth by me. A learned man can give opposite counsels to diverse persons according to opposite opinions. The learned man evidently knows, as we have said, and absolutely recognizes, that in one or the other of the opinions the poison of falsity is contained; yet he offers and urges both, to diverse men, to be followed. Therefore, knowingly and willingly, he kills one of those consulting him with the poison of falsity. You are deceived, they say. The poison of falsity, smeared over with the varnish of Probabilism, loses its power of killing. Is it so indeed? That falsity covered by invincible ignorance becomes harmless, I myself confess. But that falsity evidently known is vicious, no one can deny. Fr. Laymann, and with him all the Probabilists to a man, teach these two paradoxes — monstrous enough, in truth. The first: that you can urge upon another an opinion which you know to be certainly false in itself. The second: that you can offer opposite counsels to diverse men according to opposite opinions, while you know most certainly that in one or the other opinion the poison of falsity lies hidden. For to one of those men you urge a doctrine antievangelical in itself — as is every false doctrine. But an antievangelical doctrine does not raise to heaven; it thrusts down to hell. Who does not most evidently gather from this, that this Probabilism reduces the Gospel of Christ to pure and unmixed Scepticism, Pyrrhonism, and Academicism?