Chapter IV — By the authority of the Supreme Pontiff Alexander VII it is proved that the probabilistic system wars against the evangelical Law

I. What has been said hitherto would suffice, and more than suffice, for overthrowing and exterminating Probabilism. But the more luminous the truth is, the more cavils, evasions, hiding-places, and sophistical distinctions do they need who strive to obscure and assail it. Wherefore we too are compelled to prolong the discourse, and to confirm what we have said by the authority of the Supreme Pontiffs.

II. Alexander VII, in the year 1665, on the 24th day of September, published this decree: "Our most holy Lord has heard, not without great grief of his soul, that several opinions, relaxative of Christian discipline and bringing destruction upon souls, are partly being revived after having grown obsolete, and partly newly brought forth; and that that extreme license of luxuriant wits grows greater day by day, through which, in matters pertaining to conscience, a manner of opining has crept in which is wholly alien to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers — and which, if the faithful were to follow it in practice as their right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would burst forth. Wherefore, lest at any time the way of salvation, which the supreme truth, God, whose words endure for ever, has defined to be narrow, should be widened — or rather perverted — unto the destruction of souls: the same most holy Lord, that in his pastoral solicitude he might call back the sheep entrusted to him from such a spacious and broad way, along which men go to perdition, into the right path, committed the examination of these same opinions to several ..." and so forth.

III. Let this decree be compared with the preceding demonstration, and it will forthwith appear that Probabilism wars against evangelical doctrine no less than darkness against light. Three things are to be weighed in the Alexandrine decree. First, the condemned propositions, of which there is now no dispute. Second: a manner of opining has crept in into the Theology of morals, that is, in matters pertaining to conscience. This manner was intruded by the extreme license of luxuriant wits. This manner of opining, or of probabilizing, is wholly alien to evangelical simplicity — that is, to the spirit and sincerity of the evangelical law — and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers. What follows from this? If the Faithful, if the Pastors and Directors of souls were to follow this manner, an immense corruption would burst forth upon Christian life. The third point is that this manner of opining probabilistically thrusts Christian souls into the broad and spacious way which leads to perdition. Wherefore the most holy Pontiff, that he might call them back into the path of salvation, which God has defined to be narrow, condemned several opinions. He declared the probabilistic plant poisonous — that is, alien to the evangelical law and the doctrine of the Fathers; and he reprobated many of the fruits proceeding from it.

IV. Hence it is plain, clearer than the noonday light, that in this decree the Pontiff discourses, not of particular opinions only (for these opinions he condemns one by one), but of the probabilistic system itself. A manner of opining has crept in, which, if the Faithful followed it as their rule, they would slide down into the way of perdition. Now the rule of forming conscience is Probabilism, as Terillus proves at length in his treatise on the rule of morals. The rule is, as the Probabilists themselves confess, a benign one. But the Pontiff declares that this rule wars against the Gospel and the doctrine of the Fathers. Let the Probabilists explain to us: what other manner, what other rule alien to the Gospel and to the doctrine of the Fathers, has crept into the Theology of morals, besides Probabilism? Let them point out to us another manner, another system, another rule.

V. All this is evident in the obvious sense of the decree. Add to this that, as all the Historians confess, Probabilism had been denounced to the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover Stefano Gradi, Prefect of the Vatican Library, and a near contemporary of Alexander VII, testifies — both in a votum published by order of the sacred Congregation, and in a disputation published at Rome in the year 1670 against Fr. Honoré Fabri — that the Pontiff, by those words a manner of opining, etc., branded Probabilism. For the Pontiff, having received so many letters against Probabilism from the Bishops of France and of Belgium, had conceived (says Gradi), as an excellent reporter of the things of God, an impulse toward measures altogether grave and severe in this whole matter (of Probabilism), and toward cutting off the evil, as he said, utterly at its fountain and root, by publishing an express constitution ... Nor was anything nearer than that he should do it; and he would without doubt have done it, had not Cardinal Pallavicino intervened in his counsel, to whom that matter seemed to demand a more careful deliberation than could be dispatched quickly, as it appeared it would be; and that it would be much wiser if, the fuller censure being deferred for a while, the opinions themselves should in the meantime be struck down by name, as was done ... and a preface was added, which, though under a veil of words, makes truly manifest the mind of the one decreeing, as alien from this way of philosophizing about morals — which for that reason, as you see, he called a manner of opining contrary to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers.

VI. That Alexander VII by these words (a manner of opining, etc.) branded Probabilism, is attested also by the whole Gallican Church congregated in general Assembly in the year 1700, in these words: "Now, that we may come to another head of the faith — namely, to moral Theology, corrupted in these latest times by the depraved license and subtlety of wits — we think the words of Alexander VII of happy memory should be set first ... a manner of opining has crept in, etc.; in which sentence he not only complains that errors have increased, but also — and this is the chief point — he willed it to be noted that the very method of treating the matter had been introduced, whence we might see that a corruption of morals would not only follow, but would even, as it were with a charge made, burst in upon us — one which we could scarcely restrain. Nor was it enough for the most holy Pontiff (let the Probabilists weigh these words) to have uncovered this new method of making sport of conscience and of wrapping up the truth — that is, the very fountain of the evil — but he pursued also the rivulets of the deadly doctrine," and so forth.

VII. Finally, after many things, that Assembly published this solemn edict against Probabilism, the fountain of all laxities:

"Far be it from us to approve the error of those who deny that it is lawful to follow, even among probable opinions, the most probable. But for the right use of probable opinions we recognize these rules prescribed by the Law.

"The first is that in doubts concerning the business of salvation, where equal weights of reasons offer themselves to the mind on both sides, we should follow that which is safer — or that which is in that case (mark it well) solely safe; and that we should hold this not in the place of a counsel (as the Probabilists say), but of a precept, Scripture saying: He that loveth danger shall perish in it. This is the first rule.

"The second: that concerning probable opinions about Christian doctrine we should follow what the ecumenical Council of Vienne decreed concerning the virtues infused in baptism both in infants and in adults, in these words: We have judged that this opinion, as more probable, and more consonant and concordant with the sayings of the Saints and of the modern Doctors of Theology, is to be chosen. And it is evident that this judgment of the Council pertains the more to the direction of morals, the more the sanctity and salvation of the Faithful depend upon these very things, etc.

"That therefore in practice it should be lawful for us to follow an opinion which not even they themselves would judge should be chosen as the more probable — this is new, unheard of; this was brought forth by certain known authors only in this last (mark it well) century, and set up by them as the rule of morals; it is repugnant to that saying of Vincent of Lérins, etc. This is the beginning of the evils, and the head of all the aforesaid corruptions. This was censoriously branded, in the censures of the Apology of the Casuists, by our predecessors, men strong and religious." See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, dissertation 2.