Chapter IV — On the obligation of vows, and various questions concerning vows

I. It is a truth of faith that a vow produces an obligation, and indeed a grave one, by which the one vowing is bound to execute what he pledges to God, as is had in Deuteronomy 23: When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it. This obligation pertains to the virtue of religion and of fidelity. An action done from a vow is of greater merit than one done without a vow, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 88, art. 6.

II. Question I. Is there parvity of matter in a vow? Answer. The obligation of a vow is by its nature grave; its violation can become light from imperfect deliberation, from an unwitting slip of mind. The difficulty is whether it can be light on the part of the matter. If the matter of the vow is divisible — as if you vowed to recite the whole Rosary and omit one decade — the omission is light from parvity of matter. If the whole matter of the vow is small — such as a vow of reciting one Our Father — then Cajetan, with others, teaches that the omission is mortal; but the opposite opinion is more probable. This little question, as regards practice, is inept. For men commonly make their vows concerning a grave matter, both on account of the end and on account of the dignity of the vow itself. The Theologians dispute whether the one vowing can bind himself gravely in a light matter, and lightly in a grave matter. To the first part of the question I say that when the matter is on every side light, one cannot bind himself gravely under mortal sin. On the contrary, when the matter is by its own nature grave, one cannot bind himself only lightly. For he who wills a vow wills, by that very fact, what necessarily follows from a vow. But a grave obligation follows from a vow in grave matter. Now it is not in the power of the one vowing to pervert the natures of things. St. Thomas is ineptly alleged for the contrary opinion. Men can freely make vows or not make them, says St. Thomas; but, this being posited, that they make vows, they must conform themselves to the nature and law of vows. Nor is the question of such moment that it needs greater discussion. Read Tome 3, book 4, dissertation 2, chapter 1, number 20.

III. Question II. Does he who violates several vows in a light matter on the same day sin gravely? Answer. The more common and more probable opinion affirms it. For although vows differ in number, they nevertheless pertain to the same virtue, and are of the same nature. When, therefore, from several light matters subject to a vow a grave matter is made, then a grave injury is inflicted upon God. Would not he who pledged to a man a grave sum of money in several promises sin deadly if he retained for himself a notable sum of the promised money? They also dispute whether one who has vowed to recite one Our Father and Hail Mary daily for several years sins mortally if he omits it for several days: and commonly they affirm it — although some distinguish concerning a vow that affects the day, and one that does not; but these disputes have been devised by the disputants themselves to exercise the keenness of their wit. Wherefore, these petty distinctions set aside, I say that the deliberate violation of a vow through an entire year is mortal.

IV. Question III. Must children fulfill the vows of their parents? Answer. Personal vows must be fulfilled by the one who made them, because they affect that very person. These vows of parents in no way bind children. For vows must be free. The vows of parents sometimes bind children, insofar as the children consent to those same vows. Hence it follows that the one vowing, who cannot fulfill the vow, is not bound to have it fulfilled through another. Real vows can be fulfilled by others, even without the knowledge, but not against the will, of the one vowing. If the one vowing has become unable to pay a real vow, he comes off free, as is plain in other debts. When a vow is mixed — namely, partly personal and partly real — if the one vowing has become unable to fulfill the personal vow, he must fulfill the real vow through another.

V. Question IV. Are heirs bound to fulfill the vows of the testator? Answer. To personal vows they are not bound. But heirs are bound to pay real vows, even if the testator expressly said that he did not wish to bind his heirs to pay such vows. For once the inheritance has been burdened with a just debt, it is no longer in the power of the testator to free it. But heirs are not bound to pay these real vows beyond the resources of the inheritance, nor before the inheritance has been entered upon, since they can repudiate it. Nor is an heir bound, to the detriment of his own Legitim, to fulfill the vows of a testator who could not burden the Legitim. Heirs can fulfill the real vows of the testator through others, just as the testator himself could have done. A Monastery too, succeeding by hereditary right to the goods of a professed Religious, is bound to fulfill the real vows which he made before his profession, because the inheritance passes to the Monastery with this burden. When the inheritance is burdened with several debts, first debts of justice must be paid, and afterwards legacies and vows. If there are several vows, those of greater moment must be paid first. If there are several heirs, each is bound to pay his own part. If, however, the thing owed to God is in the hands of one heir, the other heirs are bound to make compensation...

A donee is bound to fulfill real vows which affect the thing donated, if the donor has become unable, whatever several say to the contrary: because a debt always follows the thing to which it is attached. A legatee, according to all, is bound to pay the real vows of the one leaving the legacy.

VI. Question V. At what time must vows be fulfilled? Answer. When a determinate time is set for execution, then it must be fulfilled at that time. When the time is indeterminate, then the one vowing must fulfill it as soon as he conveniently can, as is said in Deuteronomy 23 — unless a reasonable cause of deferring is present, so that the vow may be better fulfilled. If you foresee that you will be impeded in the future from fulfilling a vow attached to no particular day, you are bound to anticipate the execution of the vow. A vow not fulfilled at the designated time must be fulfilled after that time has elapsed. You vowed to repay Peter a hundred, which you owe within a month; the time having elapsed, you are bound to fulfill it. If, however, you vowed to fast on the vigil of such a feast, the feast having passed, the vow is extinguished. But those who vowed to fast on each Friday of this month — it is more probable to me that, the month having elapsed, they are bound to fast on each Friday of the following month: since all the Fridays of the whole year are of the same nature. He who vowed to fast on the vigil of St. Francis is not bound to anticipate it, even if he foresees that on that day he will not be able to keep the fast: because the vow is attached to a determinate day.

VII. Question VI. What must be said of a doubtful vow? Answer. You can doubt: 1. whether you made a vow; 2. whether you fulfilled it once made; 3. concerning the quantity of the thing promised. The discourse is not of a light suspicion, or vain scruples, but of a grave doubt, arisen from probable opposing reasons, which keep the intellect in suspense. The Probabilists, relying on that principle, "The condition of the possessor is the better," absolve this one vowing, when doubtful, from the obligation of the vow. This opinion is no less false than the Probabilism on which it rests. Wherefore the Antiprobabilists defend the opposite. St. Thomas, on the fourth book, distinction 38, question 1, ad 8 [recte], has this: But if he doubts how he conducted himself in vowing, he ought to choose the safer way, lest he commit himself to danger. The same St. Antoninus and the sacred canons teach. See Tome 3 on the Decalogue, book 4, dissertation 2, chapter 4.

VIII. If you are certain of the vow, and doubt whether the execution has been fulfilled, according to all you are bound to fulfill the vow. If you doubt the quantity of the thing promised, you must choose the safer part, as the sacred canons prescribe. You doubt whether you vowed a hundred, or fifty; you are bound to pay a hundred. He who vowed to give a chalice to the Church, but doubts whether a golden or a silver one should be given, ought to offer a golden or silver one according to the custom known to him of the Church to which he promised, bronze or copper being excluded. He who vowed that he would not approach a woman, but doubts whether the approach was fornicatory or conjugal, should abstain from either approach. He who doubts whether he made the vow before the age of seven, or the use of reason, is bound to the vow, as the common opinion teaches: since it is established that a vow was made, and it is only doubted at what time it was made. Scarcely anyone vows before the use of reason: therefore it must be presumed that, the use of reason having been completed, the vow was made. One certain of having made a vow, but doubting whether he had the intent of binding himself, is bound to fulfill the vow: because, the deed being proved, all things that naturally accompany such a deed are presumed. Similarly, he who made a vow extorted by fear must be presumed, in a doubtful case, to have had the intention of binding himself: because to presume simulation in one vowing or swearing is to presume a crime; but no one is to be presumed guilty of a crime. If the one vowing doubts, in the aforesaid event, whether he used amphibology of words, or mental restriction, some say the vow does not bind; but this opinion is false for the reason given, and because in doubt the safer part must be chosen. He who, provoked by anger, makes a vow, but afterwards doubts whether he had the necessary use of reason, is bound absolutely to fulfill the vow: because anger rarely so disturbs reason as to take away the liberty sufficient for sinning, and so for vowing. Wherefore if the doubt cannot be laid to rest, the rule must be kept: In doubts the safer part is to be chosen.

IX. Question VII. He who vowed to abstain from wine — is he bound to abstain from beer, and other liquors distilled from wine? Answer. He who vowed to abstain from wine to avoid drunkenness must abstain from all liquors that produce drunkenness. Wherefore Fr. La-Croix is mistaken, who, book 3, part 1, number 459, with his Gobat, teaches that the one vowing, although he intended in his vow to avoid drunkenness, can take any other drinks apt to inebriate. No less lax is the opinion of Fr. Castropalao, who, treatise 15, disputation 1, point 12, number 21, teaches that he who vowed to abstain from wine can drink only so much wine as would suffice for temperate drinkers at one meal. Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 3 on the second commandment of the Decalogue, chapter 2, section 3, § 2, number 86, page 238, delivers this judgment: "Surely Castropalao, too laxly, even by German reckoning, requires that quantity which would suffice for some man drinking temperately at one dinner." The laxity of certain Probabilists is sometimes so ample that it displeases even the Probabilists themselves.

X. He who vowed to fast, determining nothing, must keep the vow according to the rite of the Church. Wherefore Sanchez and Tamburini teach too laxly that this man need not abstain from milk-foods in the time of Lent. This opinion falls, it seems to me, into the following condemned thesis: It is not evident that the custom of not eating eggs and milk-foods in Lent obliges. He who vowed to fast, no fixed number of days being set, satisfies the vow if he fasts a single day. He who vowed several fasts does not seem to satisfy it with two fasts: because plurality is not signified by the number two, according to common signification. He who vowed to fast for a month is free from the fast on Sundays: because the fast must be interpreted according to the rite of the Church. Yet some Catholic, led by a singular devotion, all superstition being removed, could fast on Sundays too — and especially to tame the flesh and concupiscence, as so many holy men have done, keeping a continual fast.

XI. He who vowed to hear Mass daily satisfies the vow on feast days by hearing one Mass: since the reasonable intention appears to be that he wills to let no day pass without hearing Mass. A girl who vowed virginity is bound to preserve it after the first shameful act committed. It is otherwise if she had vowed expressly only to avoid the first shameful act: because the vow depends on the will of the one vowing. He who made a vow of pilgrimage satisfies it by an equestrian pilgrimage: because this is a true pilgrimage, provided he did not intend to bind himself to a journey on foot; but he would by no means satisfy it if hired for a wage, or forced by violence: because the execution of a vow is an act of virtue; yet if he consented in mind and intention, even though outwardly compelled, he would fulfill the vow.

XII. He who vowed alms, without determining its quantity, can determine it after the vow was made, just as he could have before the vow. He who vowed to give one of his animals, or of the Church's vessels, can offer whichever of the promised things he pleases: for he is not bound to give either the more precious vessel or the better animal. A moderate mean must be kept in these cases. If, of the things promised, all but one should perish, this one must be offered. If you vowed to give to one of two Churches, designating neither, you can select whichever you prefer.

XIII. Question VIII. Does an error concerning the substance of the vow render it invalid? Answer. The common opinion affirms it: because error takes away the voluntary; for nothing is willed that is not first known. But error concerning adventitious matters and the circumstances of a vow does not render the vow null. But whence is it to be gathered whether circumstances redound to the substance of the vow, or not? Those redound to the substance of the vow which regard the end of the vow; but those are occasions of vowing, which excite one to vow. You vow alms to be conferred upon an honest poor man. The relief of poverty is the end of the vow...

the vow. The honesty of the poor man is the occasion which excites and impels you to the vow. In doubt whether some circumstances have the character of the end of the vow, or of the occasion, one must examine whether, these being removed, the end of the vow would still stand: for if it stands, all the other things have merely the character of occasion. But if, on the contrary, these being absent, the end of the vow would collapse, then they would have the character of the end.

XIV. Question IX. Is a vow extorted by fear valid? Answer. One fear is grave, falling upon a constant man; another is light. A grave fear can arise intrinsically, as from infirmity, a storm, or an imminent shipwreck. A vow made by force of intrinsic fear is valid both by natural law and by positive law: because then the one vowing is compelled by no one but himself. Valid, then, are vows made to avoid death, shipwreck, or another misfortune. A vow is also valid on account of fear justly inflicted from outside: because when fear is justly inflicted in order to extort a vow, the one vowing is unreasonably unwilling. Light fear does not invalidate a vow, because it lightly injures free consent.

XV. The difficulty is concerning a vow made from a grave fear unjustly inflicted from outside, in order to extort it. That this vow is valid by natural law is the common opinion of the Theologians, given that the man, though unjustly compelled, truly and sincerely wills the vow, and in very deed makes it. For fear diminishes, but does not take away, the voluntary, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 89, art. 7, ad 3. To this the Theologians commonly subscribe. As to ecclesiastical law, if the discourse be of a solemn vow made in monastic profession, all affirm that this vow is null, as all the laws declare. If the discourse be of other vows, the Theologians dispute on both sides, and all affirm that each opinion is probable. The former opinion holds that vows of this kind are valid, because the laws speak only of a solemn vow, and moreover the invalidation of a vow is odious, since it derogates from the law of nature. And this opinion seems more probable, because in very deed the adversaries have adduced no text of this kind that declares such vows null.

XVI. Question X. What must be said of a conditional vow? Answer. In any vow, even an absolute one, certain general conditions are included, such as: if I shall be able, if it please God, if the Superior decree nothing else. Particular conditions depend on and are added by the free will of the one vowing himself. The execution of a conditional vow is suspended until the condition occurs. But a condition concerning the present, or the past, or a necessary future, does not make a vow conditional; only a condition concerning a contingent future event does so. A shameful condition, against the substance of the vow, invalidates it, because an error of the substance of a contract renders the act involuntary — not so if it is against the accidents of the contract. A vow under an honorable contingent future condition does not oblige until the condition occurs. If the condition depends solely on the will of the one vowing, he can suspend it at pleasure before it occurs, and free himself from the vow; if it depends on another's will, he is bound to await its arrival — as if he had said: "I vow Religion, if my father consents; if my sister marries," etc. If by his own malice he impedes the occurrence of a condition that depends on another's will, he is bound to fulfill the vow: because he who by his own fault becomes unable to execute a vow is bound to compensate for the vow, as St. Thomas teaches on the fourth book, distinction 38, question 1, article 3.

XVII. Question XI. What is a penal conditional vow? Answer. It is that which someone makes not from an affection toward the thing which he pledges, but from a zeal of avoiding the action which he detests — as if you vow in this manner: "I promise that I will build an altar, if I gamble, if I fornicate." By this vow you intend above all to avoid the sin. He who is absolved from a vow of this kind is also absolved from the penalty. He who vowed to avoid another thing, say gaming, if he violates the vow, is not bound to undergo the penalty as many times as he gambles, but must pay the penalty only once, unless he had expressly imposed upon himself as many penalties as times he would gamble.

XVIII. Question XII. What must be said of a vow to assume the religious state? Answer. He who vowed to enter Religion must apply all care that he be received into it, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 189, art. 2 [recte 10]. If the one vowing has any impediments, he is bound to manifest them to the Prelate of the Religion. If the Religion which the one vowing designated has been relaxed in the substantials of its rule, he is not bound to enter it: because then the vow does not concern a better good, as the Theologians commonly teach. If you desire more on this matter, see Tome 3 of the Christian Theology, book 4 on the Decalogue, dissertation 2, chapter 9.