Chapter I — The obligation of a vow is explained: to what virtue it belongs — religion, or another; whether a smallness of matter can exist; and whether this obligation can pass on to others

I. It is a truth of faith that a vow induces an obligation, such that the one vowing must carry out what he promised. This is clearly prescribed (Deut. 23): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin." St. Thomas confirms this (II-II, q. 88, art. 1; Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1; Quodlibet 3, art. 12): man is bound, above all, to fulfill the vows he has made to God — for this pertains to the fidelity which man owes to God. Now the breaking of a vow is a certain species of unfaithfulness. Whence Solomon gives the reason why vows must be paid: because it displeases God that a promise be unfaithfully kept. This obligation is, by its very nature, grave, and its transgression is, by its own kind, a mortal sin; for St. Thomas says (Bk. IV, loc. cit.): "One who neglects a duly made vow sins mortally, because he breaks the faith which he entered into with God." The matter will become clearer from the following little question.

II. Question I. Does the obligation of a vow pertain to the virtue of fidelity, or of religion; or also to that virtue to which the promised matter itself pertains? Response: First, it is certain that the obligation of a vow pertains to the virtue of religion, or fidelity — since a vow is that by which the worship of latria is shown to God.

III. You will object: Fidelity toward men does not oblige under mortal sin. If, then, a vow is an act of religion, pertaining to the virtue of fidelity, it will not oblige under mortal sin, but under venial. Response: It is granted that fidelity in the promises men make, and accepted by them, does not oblige under mortal sin — since this fidelity remains within the bounds of mere veracity. But the fidelity which shines forth in the obligation of vows is consecrated to God through the virtue of religion; and religion obliges under mortal sin. There is, then, a disparity of reasoning here.

IV. There is disagreement among authors as to whether this obligation of a vow pertains not only to religion, but also to that very virtue to which the matter promised by the vow itself relates. For example: you vowed to fast, and you break your fast — do you sin against religion, in breaking the obligation of the vow, and also, at the same time, against the virtue of temperance? The first, and true, opinion denies that the obligation of a vow pertains to both virtues — since one who vows a work of counsel, or supererogation, imposes upon himself no obligation other than that which arises from the promise made to God. This obligation, however, in its entirety, arises from the virtue of religion, and of fidelity. For the one vowing does not intend to add a new law of temperance for himself, beyond that which prescribes the limits of food and drink; although, out of an affection for temperance, which he reckons profitable and pleasing to God, he makes a vow of such a fast. This is sufficiently evident from the common sense of those who make vows. There is, then, no obligation in a vow pertaining to any other virtue besides the obligation of religion, and of fidelity.

V. The contrary opinion defends that the aforesaid obligation of a vow pertains both to religion, and to the virtue to which the promised matter is reduced — such that one who breaks a vow of fasting commits two sins: one against religion, another against the virtue of temperance. The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 4, §2, n. 102) cite, for this opinion, Valentia (I-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 3, q. 1, concl. 3), Sayr (Bk. VI, ch. 6, n. 8), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 11, n. 6), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 5, n. 11). But in fact Sánchez and Bonacina do not absolutely teach this opinion; rather, they contend only that, when the one vowing intended to bind himself out of a special regard for that virtue to which the matter of the vow relates, in this hypothesis the one vowing would incur two sins; but not otherwise, when he vowed absolutely, without this express intention, and without a particular affection for the aforesaid matter. And indeed, if the one vowing expressly intended to impose this twofold obligation upon himself, he would commit two sins by breaking his vow: one against the vow, the other against the virtue whose observance he undertook out of a debt he assumed by breaking the vow. Nor do I see why the theologians of Salamanca deny that the one vowing can impose upon himself, under grave fault, the obligation of an act of temperance, against that same virtue, such that, by omitting that act, he sins against both the vow and the virtue. For just as, in order to carry out some work of supererogation, a man can bind himself by a vow under grave fault to observe such a virtue, so too he can bind himself under grave fault to exercise some act of temperance. Nor is this to pervert the natures of things. The natures of things, in the moral order, are subject to human deliberation in those matters where no repugnance appears — as is entirely the case here. Is there not, indeed, a precept of fasting that obliges under mortal sin? Why can a Christian not impose such a precept of fasting upon himself, of his own accord and free will? And, on the hypothesis that someone expressly incurs such an obligation, and adds a vow to this obligation, no one would certainly deny that he would incur a twofold crime in the case of transgression, at least from an erroneous conscience.

VI. But, setting aside this verbal disagreement, the first opinion is true, and is defended by Cajetan (II-II, q. 88), Suárez (Bk. V, ch. 3, n. 3), Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 11, n. 8), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 11, n. 13). Indeed, Sánchez and Bonacina themselves uphold this same opinion, whenever the one vowing does not expressly intend to assume a twofold obligation.

VII. You will object, for the contrary opinion cited: A vow is a certain private law; and the one vowing is legislator of his own right. But a legislator, prescribing an act of some virtue — say, temperance — obliges by the precept of that virtue. The same, then, must be said of a vow. Does not one who violates a vow of fasting sin at once against fidelity and against temperance, just as a transgressor of a vow of chastity is at once unfaithful and unchaste? This is confirmed. Is not a transgressor of a vow bound in confession to disclose the matter of the vow? This is commonly taught by theologians. Now if the sin were only against religion, it would suffice to say in confession, "I sinned against my vow in a grave matter," without needing to explain the matter of the vow. Response: A vow is a private law, whereby the one vowing imposes a burden on himself. Wherefore what the one vowing regards first, and per se, is to bind himself to offering God, by means of a vow, worship, by carrying out this or that action, which he already supposes to be honorable matter for a vow. But law imposes necessity upon the matter it prescribes, or renders the matter necessary, and leaves it within its own sphere and orbit of virtue, so to speak, and, by means of such honorable matter, aims to render men subject to it virtuous. The limits of temperance are prescribed by nature itself. A law that wills men to be endowed with the virtue of temperance constitutes the necessity of temperance — and this is what the law, per se, regards. But one who dedicates a vow of fasting to God, by his own nature, and per se, does not look to, or intend, adding a necessity to the honorableness of the matter to be made subject to the vow; but, supposing the honorableness of that matter, he takes it up as an instrument by which he may show God worship — and this is what the vow, per se, regards. If it is granted that one who breaks a fast also violates temperance at the same time, it does not follow that he sins mortally against the virtue of temperance, but only venially — just as one bound by a vow not to eat would sin, if he ate. For the rest, I am not displeased by the opinion of Fr. Suárez (Bk. V, ch. 3, n. 12) and Castropalao (punct. 11, n. 9), who teach that someone can transgress a vow of fasting without overstepping the limits of temperance. As for the last point, many authors respond that one is not bound to disclose the matter subject to the vow, but it suffices to disclose the transgression of the vow in grave matter; and Sánchez gives this same law (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 25). We, however, say that confession of the circumstances that aggravate the sin is necessary, as we shall show in its proper place — at least so that the minister may form a prudent judgment of the necessity of the remedy to be applied.

VIII. Question II. Is it of greater merit to undertake some work by a vow, or without a vow? Response: The Angelic Doctor answers affirmatively (II-II, q. 88, art. 6; III Contra Gentiles, ch. 137, and elsewhere). He gives many reasons, of which I will indicate three here. First: an act of a more sublime virtue is more praiseworthy, and more excellent. A work done by virtue of a vow proceeds from the virtue of religion, which is greater than that of the one who performs the same work without a vow — for the greater the virtue, the greater the merit. Second: one who performs a work out of a vow dedicates his own freedom to God, and binds himself to God by a firmer bond. Whence, if other things are equal, one who imposes a vow on himself offers God a greater gift than one who does not impose a vow upon himself, for he who makes a vow dedicates his liberty to God for God's glory. This reasoning is rendered more sensible by this analogy: one who gives a tree, together with its fruits, gives more than one who would give only the fruits. Similarly, one who, by vow, offers his liberty to God, and at the same time consecrates the work to God, offers more to God than one who would give only the fruits — that is, the works — of the tree of liberty. Hence it is that one who performs a work out of a vow fulfills two counsels: one of the work, the other of the vow, which likewise falls under counsel. Third: a work bound by the law of a vow proceeds from a will more firmly established in the good. Therefore that work enjoys a greater goodness — for a firmer good, in celestial happiness, redounds to a greater merit than to your firmness.

IX. If, then, we consider the nature of a vow — namely, that it is exceedingly advisable to dedicate our works to God from a will established in the good — we must necessarily infer that it is very expedient for us to make vows seriously, and to offer God the more excellent gifts. The Angelic Doctor himself raises some difficulties against this.

X. You will object: it is not expedient to swear frequently, since frequent oath-taking is forbidden — for it carries with it the danger of perjury, and profanation of the divine name; but the same danger must be feared in a vow: therefore neither must we make frequent vows, etc. Response: St. Thomas himself assigns the difference (q. 89, art. 4): an oath is taken as a kind of remedy, by which aid is brought to human frailty; nor is an oath, apart from necessity, good in itself — for a mere usurpation of the divine name is lawful only through necessity. On the contrary, a vow is, by its own kind, good, and the better, the more free it is from any necessity. Wherefore we ought not to await some necessity in order to make use of it, but, absolutely, and every necessity aside, it can be offered to God. In taking an oath, we make use of God's name, or majesty and reverence. In vowing, we do not make use of God, but show God worship and reverence. And although in an oath too the worship of God shines forth, nonetheless God is honored only then, when necessity urges; his name is assumed for the confirmation of truth. Without this necessity, then, the divine majesty is not honored, but profaned.

XI. As for what is added concerning the danger of violation, the same Angelic Doctor answers (q. 88, art. 4, ad 1), in his customary divine manner: he distinguishes a twofold danger — one arising from the nature of the deed itself, the other from man's own fault. An example of the first is this: if a bridge is ruinous, its crossing is to be avoided, since danger threatens from such a bridge. An example of the second is this: if a bridge is solid and firm, and a man wishes to cross by its extreme edges — since then the danger arises not from the bridge, but from the man himself. A vow, then, is founded upon a firm resolve of the will to worship God; it also strengthens the will itself in the good. The danger of violation, however, does not arise from the vow, but proceeds from man's own fault. For our discussion here concerns a prudent vow, which a man, relying on divine aid, makes, and which he trusts he will observe, with the help of God's grace. It is not, then, any fortuitous danger that ought to hold us back from a work; otherwise we should never enter a skiff, or a ship, never mount a horse.

XII. Question III. Can there be a smallness of matter in a vow? Response: That the obligation of a vow is, by its own nature, grave, and obliges under mortal sin, has already been said. That its transgression can become light, either through an imperfect deliberation, or through the mind's slip, no one denies. For on this ground any law whatsoever can be lightly violated. The whole question turns on this: whether such a light transgression can occur on account of the smallness of the matter itself — just as theft, from a small taking of another's property, becomes a light offense. The smallness or gravity of matter is not always taken from the matter promised by the vow itself, but chiefly from its circumstances and its end. For matter is often light and grave by reason of its end — as will be said in the book on laws.

XIII. I preface what is common ground. If the matter of the vow is not the whole and entire matter, but only partial — say, you vowed to recite the entire Rosary, and omit one decade — then the transgression is light by reason of the smallness of the matter, which, compared to the whole, is reckoned light in common estimation. Fr. Claude La Croix, however, is not to be heeded, who, too laxly, contends (Bk. III, part 1, n. 148) that omitting the entire Rosary is a light matter — although he afterward asserts that a penitent who omits the entire Rosary imposed by a confessor as a penance would not sin mortally. He assigns a different reason for this in this manner: that the recitation of the Rosary, prescribed by a confessor, is imposed by way of a penalty; and since it is quite burdensome to recite the entire Rosary, the matter is therefore reckoned grave; but a vow, on the other hand, is offered as an act of worship to God, and it is not deemed notably burdensome in the recitation of the Rosary, and therefore it becomes light matter — but as sanctified by a vow, it becomes graver and more sublime — since it is elicited from a more noble virtue. A charming method of reasoning indeed, which occurs everywhere among certain casuists! La Croix cites in his favor Tamburini (Bk. I, on the Decalogue, ch. 1, §3, n. 21). But Tamburini expressly teaches the opposite there. Here are his own words: "You vowed a crown of the Virgin consisting of six decades; you omitted two decades. Compared to the aforesaid crown, since they are the third part, they do not seem a light matter; but, since it damages the intended end only slightly — that is, the worship of the Virgin — if the other four decades are recited, it will be venial to omit only two." La Croix, besides Tamburini, also cites Sporer, Tamburini's disciple. But Sporer, as usual, merely copies Tamburini's teaching, as can be seen (tract. 1, ch. 5, §4, n. 30). Gather from this the necessity of reading authors at their source. The difficulty, then, concerns the entire matter of a vow.

XIV. Question IV. Is it a mortal sin, when the whole of that matter, absolutely light, is omitted, to transgress a vow? Response: Cajetan teaches the affirmative opinion (II-II, q. 89, art. 5, dub. 1), Armilla (s.v. Ius, n. 11), Trovamala (s.v. Votum, q. 10), Toledo (Bk. IV, ch. 17) calls it the safer opinion; Córdoba (q. 188). The reason is that the transgression of a vow is, by its own nature, grave. Wherefore, when it is violated with deliberate mind, by omitting the entire promised matter, the transgression is complete, and consequently mortal. This reason does not press very hard: for there are many precepts of natural and divine law which, by their own nature, oblige under mortal sin; and yet a deliberate and complete transgression, in a light matter — say, the theft of a single small coin — is venial. Another reason is adduced, drawn from the parallel of a promissory oath, whose violation, even in light matter, is grave, and never light. But not even this reason is entirely convincing. First, because the nature of a vow is one thing, and that of an oath another — since an oath consists in the invocation of the divine name for the confirmation of an assertory truth. Now a grave injury is inflicted on God whenever he is invoked to confirm a falsehood. Second, because, concerning oaths, there is a certain and firm principle: that perjury is, in the opinion of all, a grave sin — the Church herself so defining, against the patrons of a milder doctrine. From this principle, validly, as it seems to me, it is argued to establish that a promissory perjury is likewise always mortal, as we shall prove below. But a similarly firm foundation we do not have in the case of a vow. Wherefore the opinion which defends that not every perjury, whether assertory... or promissory, is a mortal sin seems to me more probable, and true; but this is disputed concerning a vow.

XV. The contrary opinion is the more common one, defended by Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1), Navarrus (Summa, ch. 12), Henríquez (Bk. V, ch. 20, n. 4), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, dub. 2), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 15, q. 4), John of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, concl. 1), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 21, n. 4), Suárez (Bk. V, ch. 4, n. 8), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 8), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 5, §4, n. 1), Palao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 11, n. 6), Sporer (tract. 3, on the Decalogue, ch. 2, sect. 2, n. 81), La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, n. 448), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 3, n. 10), Cardinal Diana (Vol. VIII, tract. 4, resol. 10), Ledesma (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 3, dub. 1), Antoine (tract. on virtues, ch. 3, q. 4), Wigandt (tract. 10, exam. 8, n. 1), where he upholds that a promissory perjury is grave, and assigns its difference from a vow; Paul of Lyon (tract. 4, diff. 2, art. 2, q. 1), Felix Potestas (Vol. I, part 2, n. 1820), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, n. 122), and many others. The reason for this opinion is obvious. A vow, as has often been said, is a private law, which, in likeness to all other laws, obliges according to the gravity of the matter; other laws, in a light matter, oblige only lightly: the same, then, must be said of a vow. This is confirmed by the parallel of partial matter, whose omission is light — since it inflicts a light irreverence toward God. Therefore, since the whole matter of the vow is light, its omission will likewise be light.

XVI. This second opinion seems to me true, if taken absolutely. I would only add this: that it scarcely has a place in practice. For men, commonly, when they make a vow, offer God something reckoned grave in common estimation, both on account of the end, and on account of the dignity of the vow itself. For who, seriously, prudently, and with deliberate mind, would make a vow to recite a single "Our Father" and "Hail Mary," or to kiss the ground twice, or something similar? Certainly men commonly pledge grave matter to God, worthy of a vow. For if it would be shameful even among men themselves, when established in some dignity, or in some case of poverty, to offer such trifling little gifts, unless necessity urged in some case — how much more should men be ashamed to dedicate to God vows whose matter is so small that its omission, or violation of the vow, could be reckoned light? This can be further confirmed from the common principle of law, which, by its own nature, obliges gravely. For just as no legislator establishes any law entirely in light matter, so too no one vowing, speaking prudently and commonly, makes a vow whose matter is light. Wherefore in practice a case will scarcely occur in which someone omits the observance of some vow without grave fault. For although the matter of a vow may appear light, it will nonetheless, by reason of the end intended by the one vowing, always be grave. For example: you vowed to recite one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" daily, to soothe some most grave temptation, since you have found this recitation an efficacious means, so that you may not succumb to temptation. I would not then dare to exempt you from grave fault, even for a single day's omission — since such matter, by this circumstance of end, becomes grave. Something similar holds in nearly all vows whose matter, considered absolutely, appears light. For everyone who prudently makes a vow does so moved by some grave consideration; and consequently the thing promised, considered in itself, will at least be grave in its end. Granting, however, the hypothesis that the matter of a vow were light in every respect, then I would grant that the transgression of the vow would likewise be light. But I maintain that this scarcely ever occurs in practice — a point I repeat so that the minister of penance may be cautious, provident, and carefully weigh not only the lightness of the matter, but chiefly the gravity of the end.

XVII. Question V. Can the one vowing bind himself gravely in light matter, or lightly in grave matter? Response: As to the first part, when the matter is light on every side, the common, and most common, opinion asserts that the one vowing cannot do this, even if he wished — since a vower cannot bind his subjects... [Concina now considers the two sub-questions]. Regarding the first part, this opinion is quite common: Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1), Pedro Ledesma (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 3, dub. 1), Sánchez (Bk. I, on Marriage, disp. 9, n. 6), Diana (Vol. VIII, resol. 11), Vázquez (Vol. II, disp. 163, ch. 4, n. 34), Raphael de la Torre (q. 88, art. 4, disp. 6, n. 8), Prado (ch. 31, q. 4, §3, n. 36), John of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, disp. 29, art. 8), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 3, n. 12), Leander (tract. 2, disp. 3, q. 9), and others commonly.

XVIII. As to the second part of the question, authors are sharply divided, and go to two extreme opinions. The first teaches that, in matter grave by its own nature, the one vowing cannot bind himself lightly. For, although anyone can vow, or not vow, once he wills to make a vow, the limitation of the obligation no longer remains in his power. Obligation follows the nature of a vow as its own property. One who wills a vow, then, must will that obligation which is proper to a vow. But the obligation proper to a vow in grave matter is grave. One who wills a vow in grave matter, then, must bind himself gravely. This is confirmed. One who wills a vow wills, by that same will, the obligation which follows the vow. Therefore one who wills a vow in grave matter wills a grave obligation. It is proved, further, by the parallel of an oath. It is indeed within a man's power to swear, or not to swear. But, given that he wills to swear, it is not in the swearer's power to bind himself to confirming the truth by means of an oath only under venial fault; rather, he is bound to adapt his intention and will to the nature of an oath. The same, then, must be said of a vow. Finally, if it were in the mind of the one vowing to limit the obligation of a vow, one professing religious life could bind himself under venial only, one being ordained to holy orders could bind himself under light fault only, one contracting marriage could impose upon himself a light obligation of rendering the debt — all of which are false. This opinion is taught by Sotus (On Justice, Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, at the end of the body of the article), Corduba (q. 188, punct. 1), Raphael de la Torre (on II-II, q. 88, art. 5, disp. 6, n. 4), Montesinos (on I-II, on laws, disp. 23, q. 9, n. 159), Pontius (Bk. XII, on betrothal, ch. 11, n. 12), Martínez de Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 4, §2, n. 8), Vázquez (I-II, disp. 158), Wigandt (tract. 10, exam. 3, n. 32, resol. 4).

XIX. The second opinion maintains that the one vowing can, at his own choice, bind himself under light fault in grave matter. They prove it, first, by the authority of St. Thomas, who says (II-II, q. 88, art. 10): He who vows establishes a law for himself. But a law, however much it commands something in grave matter, can by the intention of the legislator oblige only lightly. The same, therefore, must be said of a vow also. This is further confirmed from the same St. Thomas. For in the place cited (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, ad 3) he says: The obligation of a vow is caused by one's own will and intention. Whence it is said, Deuteronomy 23, etc. . . . And therefore, if it is in the intention and will of the one vowing to bind himself to pay at once, he is bound to pay at once. Therefore the gravity of the obligation must be measured from the intention of the one vowing. Lastly, they argue thus. Either it is possible to vow in such matter binding oneself only under venial fault, or it is not. If the first: then, when the one vowing expressly wills to bind himself under venial fault, the obligation will in fact be under venial fault. If the second: it will not be a true vow, and so the one vowing will remain in no way bound. This opinion is defended by Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 4, n. 5), Molina (On Justice, disp. 262, nn. 8 and 12), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 11, n. 4), Filliucci (tract. 26, ch. 3, n. 80), Diana (Part III, tract. 6, resol. 91), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 5, §2, n. 7), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 12), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 1, nn. 27 and 30), Bassaeus (s.v. Votum, 3, n. 4), Leander (tract. 2, disp. 3, q. 8), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 1, punct. 4), and not a few others.

XX. The first opinion is more probable; for its arguments are valid; the reasonings of the second opinion, however, are weak, and suffer from sophistry. They are reduced, indeed, to two heads, or rather to one — namely, to human will, which can vow, or not vow. A distinction must be drawn here, as the authors of the first opinion draw it. Man can vow, and man can not vow. But, once the position is granted that he really does vow, it is by no means in his power to diminish the quantity of the obligation, and to restrict it at will. Man can approach fire, or not approach it. But, given the approach, warming necessarily follows. Nor is it valid to object that fire, by its nature, heats even against one's will, whereas a vow does not oblige except from the consent of the will; for all theologians grant that the whole obligation of a vow depends on the freedom of the one vowing. St. Thomas says that it depends solely on the will, and on the intention of the one vowing, who can either not vow, or vow for a future time, and not the present. But, given that he has bound himself for the present time, the Angelic Doctor says this, and no more: that the one vowing can defer its fulfillment to a future time. This, and nothing else, does the Angelic Doctor state. By no means, however, does he say that it is possible to pervert the nature of the obligation. For this reason, authors of the first opinion commonly deny that a legislator can, in grave matter, lightly impose or not impose a law — although some, such as Wigandt, Gonet, and others, grant this concerning a legislator, they deny it concerning one vowing, and assign the difference: for a vow directly concerns God, as a superior, who acquires a new right over the one vowing according to the nature of the promise. Wherefore, without God's will, the obligation cannot be relaxed; but law regards the subject, whom the legislator can bind more strictly, or more mildly, at will. Moreover, the obligation of a vow is immediately of divine right; the obligation of human law, however, pertains to divine right only remotely.

XXI. So that every fallacy may be removed, it must be observed that theologians, when they assert that a vow is a private law, do not assert this in the sense that a man, privately, institutes the law of a vow; but because man, vowing, freely undertakes such a law. The law of a vow is instituted in Scripture itself. But God only counsels this law to the faithful; he does not oblige them to it. If, however, a man once wishes to embrace this counsel of vowing, he cannot, in any way, pervert the nature of that divine law by vowing. For the nature of the obligation, in grave matter, is instituted in such a way that, just as all other divine laws are necessarily to be observed, as man is subject to them, so too, once this law of a vow is freely assumed, its nature cannot be altered. It is one thing to establish a new law; it is another to freely impose upon oneself the observance of a law already made. Even granting that a legislator establishing a new law could, at will, moderate the gravity of the obligation, it does not follow from this that the same can be accomplished even by one who merely imposes upon himself the observance of a law already made. In a vow, then, distinguish a twofold obligation: one of the human deed, the other of divine right. The first depends on the will of a man; not so the other. The obligation of the human deed presupposes the will to freely embrace a vow. But, this position granted, the obligation of divine right, which necessarily follows the nature of a vow, in no way depends on the human will — which, though it can refuse the vow, cannot diminish the necessary property of the vow, and adapt it at its own discretion — which could be confirmed by very many examples.

XXII. This is confirmed. The one vowing cannot bind himself gravely in light matter, as all authors of the second opinion admit. Why? Because, they say, the one vowing cannot alter the natures of things — since the promise of the one vowing must be rational: for God rejects, and abhors, a foolish promise. But it would be irrational, and unjust, if, in matter which is by its own nature light, one imposed a grave obligation. The increase of the obligation, then, does not depend on the will of the one vowing: will its diminution depend on it? Why can he not increase the obligation in light matter, but can diminish it in grave matter? What discernible reason, I ask, is there for this? Words can be given in reply, but no solution. For, they say, the one vowing is bound to conform himself to the natures of things, and to adapt his will to them — by the very same reasoning, and with even greater right, he will be bound to do this in grave matter as well.

XXIII. The dilemma which the theologians of Salamanca raise is of no weight at all. For we say it is not possible for a man to make a vow under light fault in grave matter. If this is so, they say, it will not be a true vow, and thus the one vowing will remain in no way obliged. But if this is so, the case falls already: since we ourselves say that a vow cannot be found in grave matter with a light obligation. This is precisely the state of the disputation. If, then, they themselves grant that one vowing in grave matter with the intention of binding himself only lightly does not make a true vow, this is what we ourselves say — namely, that no true vow can be found in such a case. But we say that a man who, with deliberate mind, truly intends, and really vows, elicits a most true vow — one that really produces a vow, even in light matter. For the first will is efficacious. This efficaciousness produces its effect, is manifested, and is discerned. The later will [to limit the obligation] is a mere ineffective velleity, which cannot prevent the necessary properties consequent upon a vow. For one who cannot prevent the existence of that thing which necessarily follows, cannot prevent that which follows from its nature. One who truly vows, then, elicits a most true vow, although he may have the intention of not binding himself except under venial fault.

XXIV. As for the response they give, drawn from the parallel of oaths, and of other contracts, in order to elicit this obligation with only a venial obligation, it does not seem to me sufficiently solid. They say that everyone is free to receive holy orders, or to contract marriage; but, given the will to marry a wife, or to be ordained, a man is no longer free, so as to limit the obligation at his own discretion. For, they say, for a man being ordained to holy orders, or professing religious life, ecclesiastical law is present; other contracts, such as betrothal, marriage, etc., are onerous on both sides — and, lest what is certain among all be denied, this ecclesiastical law absolutely prescribes to all being ordained the making of a vow. For, by this very fact that it prescribes a vow, the one vowing remains bound to make the vow with all its consequent conditions and properties. Likewise, by this very fact that a private individual freely undertakes, and imposes on himself, the law of the vow, he accepts the vow, along with the notions that follow from it, and cannot thereafter be free to limit it. Wrongly is it objected, to disprove the one vowing's inability to limit the obligation, that God, who obliges the one vowing, is not thereafter free to restrict his own law — for a vow is offered to him, and he cannot limit the natural obligation of the vow. What is opposed regarding the parallel of an oath is likewise of no weight. For an oath cannot limit the obligation of the vow which is dedicated to God by an oath, as we have granted, and indicated above; likewise, just as a man swearing cannot limit the obligation proper to an oath, so too, in grave matter, a man vowing cannot limit either the nature or the notions consequent on both.

XXV. Question VI. Does the transgression of a vow to avoid some venial sin oblige under mortal? Response: Although, granting the absolute position of a vow in light matter — such as, for example, reciting one "Our Father" — its transgression would be a venial sin, since prudent men make such vows; nonetheless, since it scarcely ever happens that someone would elicit such a vow, unless for some grave end, it therefore holds that, if someone made a vow to avoid some venial sin, matter altogether light — an officious or jesting lie, or something similar — he would, without doubt, elicit it for some grave end. And therefore I answer that the aforesaid vow would oblige under mortal — which the theologians of Salamanca themselves admit (loc. cit., n. 155), when the one vowing would be hindered from greater perfection by a venial sin subject to the vow — although they say, with Trullench and Sánchez, and others, that such a vow, absolutely considered, obliges under venial fault, if it concerns avoiding venial fault; but under mortal, if it concerns fleeing mortal fault — since perhaps they will say that cases are to be resolved according to the natures of things absolutely considered. We, however, assert the contrary: that cases are to be resolved practically according to circumstances, and according to what commonly occurs in practice. And because there is scarcely anyone who binds himself by a vow to avoid a venial sin, except on account of some grave circumstance — otherwise the vow would be imprudent — therefore, responding according to what commonly occurs, we say that the aforesaid vow obliges under mortal. See what has been said above, n. 12, q. 1.

XXVI. Question VII. Does one who violates several vows in light matter on the same day sin mortally? Response: From what we have already said, the affirmative answer is clear. But, disagreeing even from our own particular opinion, I say that this person sins mortally absolutely — and this is taught by Sánchez (Bk. I, Summa, ch. 14, n. 16), Diana (Vol. VI, tract. 14, resol. 22), Bonacina (disp. 3, q. 6, punct. 6, n. 6), Domenico Viva (q. 8, art. 2, n. 29), and several others. Since the obligation of vows of the same character is the same, although the vows are numerically distinct. Moreover, although each vow individually may pledge to God something light, all these vows taken together nonetheless constitute a grave matter, as we suppose. Therefore, since all these belong, as they pertain, to the same virtue of religion, they gravely violate that same virtue of religion. By this reasoning, one who pledged a grave sum of money to a man in several promises would sin mortally if he retained for himself a small quantity, or if, on several occasions, he refused to render small services — since all these promises, though numerically diverse, pertain to the same virtue of justice.

XXVII. Diana (loc. cit.) considers the contrary opinion probable — since, when several vows are made, each vow constitutes a certain unit, which is not united with the other vows; nor do all agree in anything such that they could form a single whole, and consequently constitute a single fault. The vows are, then, disparate: and the defrauding of the several acts of homage which the one vowing pledges to God will likewise be disparate faults; for the worship resulting from those various promises does not accrue to a single God. It is answered that such arguments are vain, since, according to the common estimation of prudent men, it is a grave matter to defraud God, in whom all these promises converge, of the grave worship shown by fulfilling the promise. That transgression, then, of many vows, really robs God of a grave portion of worship, of the kind promised him in the vows. It will, therefore, be a grave fault.

XXVIII. Fr. La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, n. 411) and Fr. Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 3) say that our opinion is not universally true; otherwise a beneficed cleric would sin mortally who daily omitted some light matter in the Mass, some small part of the Hours, and some small part of other prayers due by obligation — all of which small omissions, they say, would constitute a single grave matter, which certainly no one would maintain. They confirm this with another absurdity: if several light matters, from the fact that they are united in the same virtue of religion, constituted a single grave matter, then, by the same reasoning, several grave matters, subject to the same virtue, would constitute only a single, graver fault; and thus a beneficed cleric omitting the Mass and the Hours would commit only a single, graver fault. La Croix adds that Oviedo does not acquiesce in this opinion. But Oviedo draws a distinction here. If the vows were made from different motives — say, one in honor of the Passion of Christ, another in honor of the Blessed Virgin, a third for the deceased — even though the matters were of the same character (say, all were prayers), he teaches that the matters are by no means united, but that only several venial sins are committed, if all these aforesaid obligations are omitted on the same day — since the distinction of the ends of the vows implies a distinction of the vows themselves. On the contrary, however, if the vows were made for the same end, even if the matters were of a different character — for example, if someone in imminent shipwreck vowed a daily recitation of the Rosary, and then also vowed to give a certain sum of alms — then, he says, these matters are united, and one omitting to fulfill all such vows sins mortally. It is otherwise, he adds, if someone, for the same day, vowed to hear Mass, to say the Rosary, to give alms — though he vowed all these out of an affection for divine worship — he does not therefore say that those matters are united, nor that a single grave matter is constituted from light parts omitted — since that general and mediate motive of religion is not apt for uniting such obligations. La Croix regards this opinion of Oviedo's as more probable. Fr. Fernando de Castropalao, according to the same La Croix's report, also judges this opinion, as described, to be true — that even if all these matters, separately light, were promised by a single act, or vow, that act would nonetheless be virtually multiple, because of the diversity of the nature of the matters. By "matters of a different character," he understands those promised by vow which, though pertaining to the same virtue of religion, are nonetheless prescribed by different laws — such as the Masses, and the canonical hours.

XXIX. The arbitrary speculations, and often useless ones, of certain recent casuists compel us to indulge overly in prolixity, lest their promises should sometimes go unrefuted by us. Let us begin from Fr. Castropalao's last opinion, which we reject as excessively lax. When someone promises several matters of a different character in one vow, will he not sin mortally, because the virtue of that vow is multiple? If this opinion held, how many vows, how many stratagems of casuists would not be evaded! You vow to give two julios to a poor person, to recite ten "Hail, Holy Queen" prayers barefoot, and with arms outstretched and knees bent before the most august Sacrament, to invoke the most holy name of Jesus several times, to keep silence for a quarter of an hour, to read a spiritual passage, to visit the sick, and to comfort them, to visit the Chapel of the Blessed Virgin, to recite "Speak, my tongue," for two hours, and to scourge your flesh through the entire "Miserere" — all these things you pledge to God by a single vow. You omit them all without committing a grave crime, because that vow is multiplied according to the multiplication of the things promised? Whoever among Christians could conceive of such a fruitful multiplication of a virtually single act? No one, certainly, except new Moralists, too much accustomed to speculations contrary to the common sense of piety. Wherefore we reject this opinion of Castropalao's as contrary to common sense. For when the one vowing pledges to God all the aforesaid matters together in a single act, he offers to the divine majesty a single gift, though distinguished by various little offerings, and formed into one. Therefore, when he transgresses such a promise, he gravely offends God — which I could confirm with many examples, were the truth not self-evident.

XXX. As for Oviedo's opinion, we say, first, that if someone vowed, on the same day, to hear Mass, to say the Rosary, etc. (to use La Croix's own words), he would be promising things which, taken separately, would constitute grave matter: for what matter, taken in its own abstraction, is grave with respect to a precept, is likewise grave with respect to a vow. Now hearing Mass, with respect to a precept, is a grave matter: therefore likewise with respect to a vow. Absolutely, however, we say that, although the aforesaid distinction may present a diversity of its own kind, nonetheless, in practice, according to the common sense of piety and prudence, and of sincerity, and good faith, laws must be observed such that one who promises to render several offices, due on the same day, chiefly to the same Lord, incurs a grave injury — which, though separable, nonetheless, taken together, constitute a grave matter. And indeed, if a vow, as has often been said, is to be weighed above all from the intention of the one vowing, the one vowing considers nothing less, when he makes the vow, than such subtle speculations. It should be added that, as has been said above, no one, in practice, seriously and with deliberate mind, vows anything light, except for some grave cause — which holds true, with even greater right, when someone makes several vows at once, or by one vow pledges several small gifts to God. Fr. Claude La Croix's argument, however, is altogether beside the point. For we are not now inquiring whether, if the one vowing omits a small partial matter of one entire vow, and then another small quantity of another vow, he sins mortally — since it is certain among all that such omissions are only venial sins, which, however multiplied, do not constitute a single mortal sin. But the question is whether the transgression of several vows, each of which has its own entire and whole matter light, is to be reckoned mortal for the principal transgression of each entire vow. Now the transgression of the whole of some entire vow's matter presents a different species than the observance of the vow with respect to a merely light part omitted. It would scarcely occur to anyone to ask whether such light transgressions constitute a mortal sin, when it is established that the sins are only venial. But the total transgression of several vows, by its own nature, presents something grave. And, lest we waste more time on a question of little importance, even La Croix himself grants that Oviedo's opinion is more probable — which, however, does not differ from our own, except by an arbitrary distinction which occurs to no one who actually makes vows.

XXXI. Question VIII. Does one who vowed to recite one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" daily for several years sin mortally if, over several years, he daily omits this prayer? Response: The affirmative opinion, taken absolutely, is defended by Zúñiga (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, dub. penult.), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. II, ch. ult., n. 21), Valentia (Vol. III, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 4), Malder (II-II, tract. 2, ch. 5, dub. 4, q. 1), Tannerus (in II-II, disp. 5, dub. 3, n. 2). The contrary opinion is defended by Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 3), John de la Cruz (in Directorium, part 2, prec. 2, art. 4, dub. 4, concl. 1), Villalobos (Vol. II, tract. 34, difficulty 3, n. 3). They add, however, that this opinion does not comprehend a vow to give a small alms daily: for, if you repeatedly omitted small alms, as soon as these small alms would constitute a grave matter, you would sin mortally. Many others — namely, Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 5, q. 3), Vázquez (I-II, disp. 158, ch. 5), Sánchez (Bk. I, ch. 9, n. 14) — subscribe to this. To these La Croix (n. 450), the theologians of Salamanca (n. 115), Trullench (ch. 4, n. 17), Marín (n. 116), Diana (resol. 14) draw a distinction, saying: If the vow is fixed to the day, and is elicited in honor of each particular day, then a venial sin is committed by transgressing the vow on each individual day — and these venial sins, repeated on individual days, whether over one year or several, do not constitute a single mortal sin. For the obligation passes with the day to which the vow was attached. On the contrary, if the vow is not fixed to particular days, but a time-limit is merely appended as the term of the obligation, then those light matters — namely, the recitations of prayers — are united together, and, after several transgressions, constitute a single grave matter, and a mortal fault is committed.

XXXII. The difficulty, says Diana, is in recognizing when a vow really is fixed to the day, or not. And first, from Castropalao, he answers that if some particular motive shines forth in the individual days — as in reciting the Rosary daily in honor of the Blessed Virgin's calculation [i.e., number of beads] — then the vow is fixed to the day, and the obligation is not extended to the following day, or does not pass over; and this happens almost always in personal vows, as others cited by the same Diana say, to whom La Croix, Marín, Viva, and others subscribe. On the contrary, however, if the vow is real — such as giving a small coin in alms each day — then the vow is not fixed to the day, but the obligation passes to the following day; and, after so many omissions, a mortal fault is committed. Castropalao adds, however, that even in real actions of giving alms, a vow can sometimes be fixed to the day, when some particular reason shines forth in individual days.

This distinction is absolutely true, and sometimes occurs in practice. For in the case of a Cleric bound to recite the canonical hours daily, when the day has passed, the obligation likewise passes. But that Castropalao says this of real actions of giving alms, I do not consider true. Indeed, nearly all authors, when the vow concerns something to be rendered — such as alms, or any other gift, except prayer — say that the obligation is extended into future time, and consequently that one who transgresses up to a grave matter sins mortally. For the rest, how the aforesaid distinction can be applied to a vow to recite one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" daily, I do not see. For by this very fact that you promised a daily recitation of one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" for a year, it is already clear that the vow is fixed to each individual day. That the transgression of such a vow, over an entire year, should be only venial, seems to us an opinion too lax in practice — both because it is scarcely found... that someone truly vows, seriously and with deliberate mind, without at least some grave end; and also because, although the multiplication of venial sins never reaches the point of mortal fault, nonetheless the continued and deliberate transgression of a vow, on each occasion, presents a special malice — sacrilegious, and a stubborn unfaithfulness. Wherefore this deliberate will alone, to violate a vow throughout an entire year, comprehending as it does all those prayers, is gravely criminal — just as, even by our adversaries' own reckoning, the omission over a year of a single small coin, which someone had vowed to distribute daily to the poor, would be gravely culpable. And indeed, however the matter may stand in abstract and metaphysical consideration, a case will never occur, in reality and in practice, where someone violates, with deliberate mind, a true vow seriously made, throughout an entire year, without mortal fault.